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CHAPTER I. ETHICS AND POLITICAL 
ECONOMY IN SIDGWICK'S TIME 
Introduction and a Personal Explanation 
The so-called "crisis in economics," a term increasingly used to 
describe the present state of economics^  arises not only from the less 
than total success of Keynesian policies in recent years and the failure 
to achieve full employment with price stability. Sir John Hicks argues 
from the point of view of a Keynesian that the experience of the fifties 
and sixties calls for a reformulation of Keynes, taking into account 
facts like the existence and availability of stocks, whether markets are 
characterized by fixed or flexible prices, liquidity preference in a con-
2 text of sustained inflation, etc. Joan Robinson, on the other hand, 
argues that economics failed to move on from the question of using 
government expenditure to maintain employment to asking what government 
expenditure is for. This failure, she suggests, is due to the lack of a 
theory of distribution and an explanation for the rate of profits in 
3 _ 
orthodox economic theory. xhere is also considerable dissatisfaction 
with the implicit value premises underlying the positivist tradition of 
neoclassical economics, the failure to bring within the purview of 
economic science issues of power, equality, distributional justice and 
the why and wherefore of our Individual and social existence in the 
industrial society. In his Presidential address to the American Economic 
Association, J. K. Gailbraith discussed the failures of neoclassical 
economics arising from its ignoring the problem of power. Once power is 
made part of the system of the economist, he argues, the reasons and 
2 
remedies for inequality of income can no longer be ignored by the 
4 
economist as theorist. 
Another symptom of the crisis in theory in economics is that 
economists as economists have had very little to say about waat promises 
to be one of the more important economic issues of our time—income dis­
tribution within nations and in the global system in a framework of jus­
tice. 
Welfare economics, in its search for a wertfrei system of evaluation, 
has become "empty," as Gunnar Myrdal put it.^  The refusal to permit 
inter-personal comparisons of utility in rigorous theory has meant in 
practice that welfare economics is useless for policy purposes. "One 
wonders even if paretian welfare economics has come up with anything as 
practically useful as the famous Figovian proposition that smoke is a 
nuisance," muses Boulding.^  The voices of dissent against such an "empty 
welfare theory" have been many, and in practice many economists have 
simply accepted the "commonsense notion," as Alice Rlvlln puts it, that 
"taking a dollar or a thousand dollars from a millionaire and giving it 
to a share cropper with three hungry children does (emphasis-Rlvlin's) 
enhance total well being"^  and worked on problems of poverty, welfare 
and equity. 
It may be aesthetically satisfying for certain types of minds to 
prove that welfare economics cannot say anything definitive about welfare. 
But this doss not obviate the need for or prevent individual and institu­
tional decisions that are taken in the name of welfare and affect how 
we live and what we are. The fact that certain policy propositions 
3 
cannot be demonstrated within what are regarded as limits set by the 
scientific method is no reason for the economist to suspend judgment 
altogether as economist on important issues on which his imperfect or 
imprecise advice might nevertheless prove useful. There is no need to 
fight shy of ethical propositions either, for we cannot in the human 
situation, both as economists and as people escape the necessity of 
choice. Even economic issues cannot altogether escape the characteris­
tic of moral choice and moral consequences. If this is true, it is 
better that we attempt to bring to the ethical aspects of economic choice 
and decision making an awareness and sensitivity to the implications of 
what we do or do not do. 
Recent years have seen the development of a formal theory of 
g 
economic policy, which, even though it does separate the role of the 
economist and policymaker, does postulate interpersonal utility compari­
sons. And in practice, the limitations of the formal theory have not 
inhibited economists from giving policy advice based essentially on 
Ideological considerations especially as they relate to problems of free 
trade versus protection, equity and efficiency in taxation; or monopoly, 
9 
competition, governmental privilege, and interference in the market. 
Admittedly, however, the concern that economics should be a political 
economics that puts policy questions within a framework of ethics and 
politics, is that of a minority who are sometimes even denied the status 
of professional economists. Economists as a rule have generally there­
fore shied away from problems of redistribution of income. Where they 
have been concerned with equity, it has been in terms of the trade off 
4 
between equality and efficiency. But when it has been a question of how 
far society should go in using public resources to compensate individuals 
for deficiencies in family environment and ocher disabilities, the 
economist is content to leave the area to the professional politician 
and the moral philosopher. 
This was not always so. Economics, in the typical dichotomy between 
production and distribution, postulated by John Stuart Mill, did not 
avoid the latter question. 
The eighteenth and nineteenth century tradition of ethics and moral 
philosophy Included what later became the social sciences. The develop­
ing social sciences remained conscious of the need to maintain the link 
between the social science and the concept of right and wrong, just and 
unjust. Even In the age of specialization, the social scientist in main­
taining the separation between what Fritz Machlup has called "value 
references" and "value judgement s must take into account explicitly 
the "value references" implicit in the tradition of a particular dis­
cipline as well as the moral implications which even so-called 'neutral' 
positive science may involve in the particular directions of its evolu­
tion. 
There is in recent years growing, though still too limited, aware­
ness on the part of the physical and social scientist of the ethical 
aspects of science. It would be useful, therefore, to go back to the 
nineteenth cefitUEy bfâdltlOn 0£ mOrâl philosophy âHu evaluate It ftOfu the 
point of view of the needs of the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
5 
One of the most Important among moral philosophers in England was 
Henry Sldgwick, who is well known to modem students of ethics. Henry 
Sidgwick was also in the tradition of Locke, Hume, Smith and Mill who 
attempted to apply their ethical perceptions—in the case of Sidgwick, 
a modified utilitarianism—to economics. Sidgwick was interested in 
particular in economic policy as it relates to the role of government in 
dealing with the distribution of national income and the problem of 
poverty. 
I propose in the following pages to examine the ideas of Henry 
Sidgwick, the questions he asked about human behavior and motivation, the 
ends of individual and social existence and the means for achieving the 
"general happiness." Similar questions are being asked today by a 
variety of scientists and philosophers and so a re-evaluation of Sidg­
wick' s attempted integration of ethics and economics may enable us to 
understand better our situation, our needs and the concerns of modern 
scholars about the relationship between economic means and social and 
moral ends. 
Brief Biographical Sketch of Henry Sidgwick 
(b. May 31, 1838 - d. Aug. 29, 1900) 
Henry Sidgwick was born at Skipton in Yorkshire, where his father, 
the Rev. William Sidgwick, was headmaster of the grammar school. He was 
the third child of the Rev. William Sidgwick and Mary Crofts. He was 
three years old when his father died. His mother was an able woman of 
strong character, intelligence and culture, and outlived her husband by 
thirty-eight years. 
6 
Henry Sldgwick was educated at Rugby Schgol and from there, at the 
unusually young age of seventeen, was sent to Trinity College, Cambridge 
in October 1855. There he studied Mathematics and the classics. He was 
a competent mathematician and became a distinguished scholar of the 
classics. Four years after he had joined Trinity College, his brilliant 
university career was crowned by the first place in the classical Tripos 
and a first class in the Mathematical Tripos. In October of 1859, he was 
elected a fellow at the same college. When just a little over twenty-
one years of age, he was appointed an assistant tutor in the classics. 
He continued to teach for the remaining forty years of his life. 
His interest in problems of theology took him soon after his 
appointment as assistant tutor of the classics to Germany where he 
studied both Hebrew and Arabic at Gottingen. He hesitated for a time 
between devoting himself to oriental studies and classical scholarship 
but settled for the latter. Over the years, his interest switched to the 
pursuit of the "moral sciences" as they were called in Cambridge--meta­
physics, ethics, and psychology. In 1867, he exchanged his lectureship 
in the classics for one in the moral sciences. As the social sciences in 
those days were regarded as a part of moral sciences, Sidgwick was 
increasingly involved in raising the status of Social Sciences at 
Cambridge and helped to pave the way for the Economics Tripos at the 
university. In some ways, he may be regarded as one of the men who 
helped the emergence of the Cambridge School of Economics. 
In 1869, he resigned his fellowship because he felt he could no 
longer honestly consider himself a bonafide member of the Church of 
7 
England, that being the condition then attached by law to the holding of 
fellowships in the College at Cambridge. His action was surprising for 
there were apparently many holders of fellowships who were in the same 
intellectual and moral situation as was Professor Sidgwick. But Sidgwick 
was a conscientious man and was so regarded by his friends, who expected 
higher standards from him than average men prescribe for their own con­
duct. (Bryce quotes Mrs. Cross (George Eliot) as saying the above.It 
is significant that Sidgwick's action was so highly regarded and respec­
ted that he not only retained his position at the university as lecturer 
but that the statutes were changed in 1871, abolishing tests for posi­
tions in universities altogether. In 1883, Sidgwick was appointed 
Professor of Moral Philosophy and in 1885, reelected Fellow of the 
College. 
In 1876, Sidgwick had married Miss Eleanor Balfour with whom (along 
with other friends) he had already been working to establish a program of 
study and residence halls for women at Cambridge. Later, the institution 
became Newnham College for Women, a pioneer Institution of higher educa­
tion for women in England. Mrs. Sidgwick became Principal of Newnham 
College in 1889 and Mr. and Mrs. Sidgwick lived at the college from then 
on. John Viscount Morley wrote that Sidgwick fought "one of the stiffest 
12 battles of the time in the movement for the better education of women 
and that it was crowned with signal success. 
Besides spending time on the cause of the education of women and 
university matters, Sidgwick devoted a great deal of time to Psychical 
Research. In 1882, he helped to found the Society for Psychical Research, 
8 
of which body he was always a leading member and twice President. It was 
characteristic of Sidgwick's commitment to seeking the truth that he 
brought to bear on the investigation of psychic phenomena a healthy 
skepticism that was never overly optimistic about the truth of alleged 
psychic facts nor unduly deterred by the discovery of the falsity or 
deception that lay behind so many of them. 
"The foundation of the Society for Psychical Research and the. keep­
ing of it in the straight and narrow path of science in face of dogmatic 
materialism and enthusiastic credulity," writes C. D. Broad, "are 
achievements on which they (Mr. and Mrs. Sidgwick) can be congratulated 
without reserve.... It would be difficult to imagine anyone better fit­
ted by the perfect balance of his mind for research in this most diffi-
13 
cult and irritating subject than Sidgwick." It should be added that 
Sidgwick's interest in Psychic Research stemmed not merely from the 
intrinsic scientific interest of the subject but also from its relevance 
to understanding the sources of human motivation and character, the 
processes of thought which determine the adoption of ethical principles, 
which was the central concern of his life and work. 
Sidgwick's main interests were in the moral and social sciences--
metaphysics, ethics, politics, and economics--and his main works are his 
Methods of Ethics. The Principles of Political Economy. The Elements of 
Politics. and Outline of Ethics. He is, according to T. W. Hutchison, 
"the last major English moral philosopher who made a noteworthy contribu­
tion to political economy, and for that reason alone his work would have 
a special interest.His greatest influence has, however, been on 
9 
ethics, his Method of Ethics being "on the whole the best treatise on 
moral theory that has ever been written" and "one of the English philo­
sophical classics. 
It is significant that contemporaries of Sidgwick who have left us 
accounts of him regarded him as a person who in his personal life and 
contacts was even more influential than his works. Alfred Marshall said 
of Sidgwick "I was fashioned by him. He was so to speak my spiritual 
father and mother.(Marshall did treat Sidgwick pretty badly in life. 
Conflict between Sidgwick and Marshall arose over Sidgwick's views as 
a member of the General Board of Studies of the University of Cambridge 
and as Chairman of the Special Board on the nature of the lectures re­
quired in economics. Marshall denounced Sidgwick as a petty tyrant and 
despite Sidgwick's explanations returned to the attack both in letters to 
Sidgwick and in his inaugural lecture of February 1885.)^  ^ John Neville 
18 
Keynes called him "the most intellectually gifted man he had ever met," 
"If any Englishmen ever belonged to the household of Socrates, Sidgwick 
19 
'J22 he" vTote Mar ley ^ Jaiass Bryce wrote? "Few men of our time have 
influenced so wide or devoted a circle of friends as did Henry 
20 Sidgwick." Bryce concludes his account of Sidgwick as follows: "When 
his friends heard of his departure there rose to mind the words in which 
the closing scene of Socrates is described by the greatest of his dis­
ciples, and we thought that among all those we had known there was none 
of whom we could more truly say that in him the spirit of philosophy had 
21 its perfect work in justice, in goodness and in wisdom." 
10 
From his writings, Sidgwick emerges as a man committed to truth 
verified by reason and experience and historical and contemporary facts. 
He brought to bear on even his study of Biblical writings the same com­
mitment to the principles of rational investigation as he did in his 
lectures on the plays of Shakespeare to the students of Newnham 
22 College. Perhaps even more impressive than his dedication to go to the 
bottom of all phenomena being investigated to the extent possible is the 
passion—what he calls "enthusiasm"—to see a better world and work 
towards it. This was the basis, paradoxical as it might seem, of his 
"religiousness" and his conviction that government can and should play a 
greater role in making possible equity and social justice. But he never 
permitted his desire for a better world to become a mere "utoplanism." 
In a critical review of Matthew Arnold's parting address at Oxford Uni­
versity he summed up what may be regarded as the essence of the social 
problem. "And if it were possible that all men under all circumstances, 
should feel what some men, in some fortunate spheres, may truly feel— 
that there is no conflict, no antagonism between the full development of 
the individual and the progress of the world—I should be loath to hint 
at any jar or discord in this harmonious movement. But this paradisaical 
state of culture is rare. We dwell in it a little space and then it 
vanishes into the ideal. Life shows us the conflict and the discord; on 
the one side are the claims of harmonious development, on the other the 
cries of struggling humanity.... This lattef ("what in the interests of 
the world is most pressingly entreated and demanded") if done at all, 
must be done as self-sacrifice, not as seIf-development. And so we are 
11 
brought face to face with the most momentous and profound problem of 
ethics. 
The unifying element of Sidgwick's intellectual effort of a 
lifetime was his attempt to reconcile the antagonism between the 
rationality of self-development and the necessity for a moderate 
amount of sacrifice for the social good. This led him to plead for 
a religion that while teaching "that unnecessary self sacrifice is 
folly and that whatever tends to make life harsh and gloomy cometh 
of evil," would at the same time stimulate the necessary amount of 
24 
self-sacrifice to better the lot of mankind. 
C. D. Broad said of Sidgwick during the celebration of the 
centennial of his birth; "More than any man whom I know Sidgwick 
did succeed in 'seeing life steadily and seeing it whole.' The 
strong desire for unity and symmetry which he shared with all 
philosophers never led him to over-simplify the facts. His high 
ethical and religious ideals never caused him to whitewash 
unregeneràte huniàuity or to view through rose colored spectacles 
the frantic struggle to feed and breed and kill and escape which 
make up the life of most men.... His whole hearted acceptance of 
the methods and achievement of natural science never hid from him, 
as ic does from so many, the standing miracle of man as thinker, 
25 
artist, organizer and moral agent." 
12 
Intellectual Influences on Henry Sidgwick 
In philosophy as well as ethics and economics, Sidgwick studied and 
worked in a rich period in human thought both on the European continent 
and in the United Kingdom. Of the period, C. D. Broad writes, "the 
period from 1855 to 1875 was one of immense activity in the realm of 
ideas and practice. The traditional view of the Jewish and Christian 
scriptures was being undermined by the writings of Strauss and Baur 
and Renan and the doctrine of evolution was being established in biology 
by experts like Darwin and Huxley, and was being exploited by enthusias­
tic amateurs like Herbert Spencer as the key which was to unlock all the 
26 problems of the universe." As an undergraduate student, he became a 
member of the philosophical discussion society that went by the name of 
"Apostles" which met at the house of John Grote, the Knlghtbridge Pro­
fessor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Cambridge» In an auto­
biographical narrative, Sidgwick described the spirit of the "apostles" 
as one of the pursuit of truth with absolute devotion "which led him to 
discover that the deepest vent of his nature was towards the life of 
27 thought—thought exercised on the central problems of human life." 
Sidgwick'8 own seriousness was such that he "sought light on these 
problems," "not casually but systematically and laboriously, from 
28 
various sources and by very diverse methods," Sidgwlck's own work 
was based on thorough study and discussion and constituted a direct 
continuation of the work of the moral philosophers of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, particularly of Joseph Butler and Immanuel Kant and 
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. 
13 
John Stuart Mill was the single greatest moral and intellectual 
influence on Sidgwick, his take-off point in ethics, politics, and 
economics. In all his works, he acknowledges reverently this intellec­
tual parentage. 
Ethical Thought in Sidgwick's Time—An 
Outline Survey of Influences 
Before we look at the formative influences on Sidgwick's ethics, it 
would be useful to define our terminology. Ethics is concerned with the 
meaning of good and bad, and right and wrong. We will use the terms 
ethics and moral philosophy synonymously to mean investigation about 
morality, moral problems and moral judgements. Moral philosophy arises, 
writes William Frankena, when "we pass beyond the stage when we are 
directed by traditional rules and even beyond the stage in which these 
rules are so Internalized that we can be said to be inner-directed, to 
the stage in which we think for ourselves in critical and general terms 
29 
...and achieve a kind of autonomy as moral agents." The problem of 
morality arises at a minimum when there are at least two people. There­
fore, though "private ethics" in terms of the bases and justification of 
private conduct is emphasized often, ethics is social in character and 
implications because even what is "moral" for personal behavior or con­
duct has to be decided in the context of group and societal relationships. 
And very few personal actions are entirely free from societal conse­
quences. 
Morality involves, to quote Frankena once again, "1) certain forms 
of judgements in which particular objects are said to have or not to have 
14 
a certain moral quality, obligation or responsibility; 2) the implication 
that it Is appropriate and possible to give reasons for these judgements; 
3) some rules, principles, ideals and virtues that can be expressed in 
more general judgements and that form the background against which 
particular judgements are made and the reasons given for them; 4) certain 
characteristic natural or acquired ways of feeling that accompany these 
judgements, rules and ideals, and help to move us to act in accordance 
with them; 5) certain sanctions or additional sources of motivations that 
are also often expressed in verbal judgements, namely, holding respon­
sible, praising and blaming; 6) a point of view that is taken in all this 
judging, reasoning and feeling, and is somehow different from those taken 
30 in prudence, art, and the like," Moral judgements may be "judgements 
of moral obligation" or "deontlc judgements" (as when we talk about 
particular actions as being right and wrong) or they may be "judgements 
of moral value" or "aretalc" judgements (as when we talk not about 
actions but about persons, motives, intentions being good or bad). What 
•w'c call "values" are therefore normative judgernent?: Both these types 
of judgements should be distinguished from judgements of nonmoral value 
as when we evaluate things such as cars, paintings, experiences, forms 
of government, etc. 
The starting point for understanding Sldgwlck's ethics, as of all 
ethics, is the ethics of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), "The mainstream of 
English ethics so far as it flows independently of revelational theology'* 
wrote Sldgwick in his Outline of Ethics "begins with Hobbes and the 
3 i 
replies that Hobbes provoked." Hobbes had an essentially materialistic 
15 
and egoistic view of human nature. He concluded from his view of 
psychology that all human impulses are seIf-regarding. Each man's 
appetites or desires are naturally directed either to the preservation 
of his life or the heightening of it which he feels as pleasure and to 
the diminution of pain. Even the most apparently unselfish emotions are 
perceived by Hobbes as various aspects of self-regard. "All society is 
either for gain or glory," he writes. Men are therefore not naturally 
sociable. It is only mutual fear that drives them into political union 
and to accept the restraints and duties involved in such union. 
Men are endowed with reason which guides them to observe the social 
rules of behavior because they are a means to their preservation or 
pleasure. Such observance of rules is conditional, according to Hobbes, 
on their general observance, which needs the intervention of government. 
Whether such a government arises by virtue of a social compact or is 
imposed on the peopl by force, the authority of the sovereign must be 
unquestioned and unlimited. The only constraint on the sovereign is the 
law of nature which enjoins on it the duty to seek the good of the 
people because it is bound up with its own good. But the sovereign is 
accountable only to God for its fulfillment of duty. Its commands are 
the basis of right and wrong for the conduct of its subjects and ought 
to be obeyed absolutely in return for the protection afforded by the 
sovereign for as long as the protection is afforded. As Sidgwick points 
out, the theoretical basis of Hobbes is the principle of Egoism--"that 
it is natural and so, reasonable for each individual to aim solely at 
his own preservation or pleasure." Moreover, good and evil are relative 
16 
In a double sense; from one point of view, they are defined as the 
objects respectively of his desire and aversion; from another, they may 
be said to be determined for him by his sovereign. 
Hobbes derives his theory of obligation from his account of the Laws 
32 
of Nature. (A law of nature is a general rule based on reason which 
forbids a man to take his life or the means of preserving it.) He has 
nineteen such laws of which the first three are the most important. The 
right of nature is that each man has the liberty to use his own power for 
self-preservation; thus, it may be said that in a state of nature every 
person has a right to everything. This leads to insecurity because the 
natural right to preserve one's life of one person leads others to kill 
him. This leads to the first law of nature "that every man ought to 
endeavor peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it." The second law 
of nature is derived from the first "that a man be willing when others 
are so too, as far forth as for peace, and defense of himself he shall 
think necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be content 
with 50 much liberty against other acn, as he would allow other inen 
against himself." A large number of men thus renounce part of the right 
each of them possessed. But this renunciation is prudential, not moral--
"the object is some good to himself." Since the basis of making such a 
covenant is the expectation that it would be kept, Hobbe's third law 
follows that "men perform their covenants made." This is the law which 
prescribes adherence to justice as a standard of conduct. Until a cove­
nant has been made, nothing can be unjust. When there is a covenant, not 
to perform one's part of it constitutes injustice, provided there exists 
17 
some power which will coerce all to keep their covenants. Hobbes con­
siders the moral virtues prescribed by the laws of nature as moral 
virtues because the practice of them conduces to peace, which all men 
acknowledge as good. 
John Locke (1632-1704) is the next figure we must consider. He 
agreed with Hobbes in interpreting "good" and "evil" as nothing but 
pleasure and pain or that which occasions or procures pleasure and pain 
but he identified the meaning of moral goodness with conformity to the 
Law of God. Ethical rules could be constructed on the basis of prin­
ciples Intuitively known but were obligatory irrespective of the nature 
of political society. Iratances of such rules he gave were such as "no 
government allows absolute liberty," "where there is no property there 
is no Injustice," etc. The aggregate of such rules he regarded as the 
Law of God. He affirms cautiously the possibility of the scientific 
ascertainment of this Law of God. He thought that morality might be a 
science "capable of demonstration" if men applied themselves with suf­
ficient zeal and disinterestedness, though he himself did not produce 
such a science. He did, in his adherence to the concept of natural law 
make important modifications such as "that all men are originally free 
and equal; that one ought not to harm another, but rather aid in preserv­
ing him, 30 far as his preservation is not thereby impeded; that compacts 
ought to be kept; that parents have a power to control and direct their 
children, but only till they come to the age of reason; that the goods 
of the earth are common to all in the first instance, but become the 
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private property of one who has 'mixed his labor with them,' if there is 
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enough and as good left in common for others...." 
The Cambridge moralists who constituted a small group of thinkers 
at Cambridge in the 17th Century sought also to reply to the legalistic 
view of morality of Hobbes. They regarded morality as an absolute 
system of knowledge of good and evil, right and wrong, that was intu­
itively certain, and independent of the arbitrary will of the Sovereign, 
human or divine. They contended that man is by nature benevolent. More­
over, they believed that men are sometimes moved to action by benevolence 
but that duty consists in being benevolent because one ought to be benevo­
lent. The distinction is thus made between "instinctive" and "rational" 
benevolence. Benevolence was regarded as natural to man not only because 
it was instinctive but also because it was rational. Men desire to be 
benevolent not only because it might sometimes give them pleasure but 
also for its own sake. Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), the most distin­
guished of the Cambridge platonists, regarded the distinctions of good 
and evil à» objectively real and cognlsablc by husan rsasorii As Sidg^ ick 
wrote, "The knowledge of them (good and evil) comes no doubt to the human 
mind from the Divine; but it is from the Divine Reason, in whose light 
man imperfectly participates, not merely from the Divine Will as such. 
Ethical, like mathematical, truth relates properly and primarily not to 
sensible particulars, but to the intelligible and universal essences of 
things, which are as immutable as the Eternal mind whose existence is 
inseparable from theirs. Ethical propositions therefore are as 
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unchangeably valid for the direction of the conduct of rational beings 
as the truths of geometry are. 
The question then arises if the cognition of what is moral will lead 
to right action. Experience shows that this is not so. While it is 
possible that Cudworth himself may have thought in terms of a love of 
moral excellence in his description of reason, the Cambridge platonists 
did not often distinguish between the perception of virtue and the desire 
to act virtuously. It was left to Joseph Butler to emphasize both. 
While the Cambridge platonists emphasized "reason" as the basis of 
understanding the Good, moral philosophers like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson 
emphasized the "moral sense" as the distinct attribute of man which 
enabled him to do so. Shaftesbury (Third Earl of Shaftesbury, 1671-
1713) distinguished between three kinds of motives in men: 1) the 
"natural" affections which are directed to the good of its kind; 2) the 
"self-affections" which are directed to the good of the self; and 3) the 
"unnatural" affections which are directed to the momentary satisfaction 
of such malevolent desires as are harsftil to society and to self; The 
unnatural affections should be excluded altogether from a well-balanced 
mind. The first kind are a source of happiness to those who do experi­
ence them. Shaftesbury regarded mental pleasures as superior to bodily 
ones. Similarly, self-affeetions if kept within limits, would also 
enhance an Individual's good. But man is a member of society and man as 
a social being may be considered "good" only when his impulses and 
affections are so graduated and balanced as to promote the good of 
society. Even benevolent social Impulses must be so balanced as to 
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allow room for all kinds of affections except the malevolent. What is 
important is a harmony of the different elements. An affection such as 
generosity, for example, should be tempered by sufficient self-affection 
in order to achieve both private happiness and public good—the tendency 
to promote the latter being taken as the criterion of balance. 
Shaftesbury's argument is that the blending of private and social 
affections which promotes public good, also conduces to the happiness of 
the individual. Fulfillment of natural affections yield great mental 
satisfactions and self affections, when limited, also directly promote 
the individual good. Shaftesbury went further in regarding not only 
fulfillment of affections as conducive of happiness, but the contempla­
tion of such actions as becoming "affections" themselves so that there 
developed in the individual "a love of good for its own sake." Thus 
Shaftesbury answered the question of the obligation to virtue in terms 
of the obligation to self-interest. 
But the optimism of Shaftesbury which conceived that the operation 
of Micrsl sense would always be in harsony with raticnal judgement as to 
the good of uhe species was powerfully challenged by Bernard De 
Mandeville (1676-1733), famous author of the "Fable of the Bees." He 
pointed out that even in his world of bees the laboring poor are driven 
to work by necessity and that even the upper and middle classes are not 
as free as appeared at first sight. Self-love must be bound by justice 
in the world of bees. However, Mandeville did not have a social philos­
ophy to cope with the problem. He was merely clever in regarding man 
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as a selfish, headstrong and cunning animal whose selfish Impulses 
clever politicians subdued by resort to flattery. 
In coming to the defense of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, (1694-
1747), Adam Smith's teacher, admitted self-preservation and self-love as 
Important motivations of men at the level of subsistence but felt that 
beyond that the moral sense would and should exercise a "regulating and 
controlling function" In establishing a hierarchy of values that placed 
love of fellowman and God above those of personal advantage. He regards 
the "calm" and the "extensive" affections as preferable to the "turbu­
lent" and "narrow." The best man Is he who has the calm, stable, univer­
sal goodwill to all by which he desires "the highest happiness of the 
greatest possible system of sensitive beings" or who has the "desire and 
love of moral excellence, which in man is Inseparable from the universal 
35 goodwill which it chiefly approves." Hutcheson did not think that 
there was a conflict between the two and treated these as coordinate. 
In analyzing private good or happiness Hutcheson went to great lengths 
to show that 3 true regard for private interest al^ jsys coincided %ith the 
moral sense and benevolence. But in thus attempting to show the harmony 
of private and public good, he is careful to show the strict disinter­
estedness of benevolence. As a matter of fact, Hutcheson in deducing 
natural laws from his theory of "moral sense" explicitly moves to the 
later utilitarian view that a so-called "material" good action is one 
which procures "the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers" and a 
formal good action is one which flows from disinterested benevolence 
towards the same end. 
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Joseph Butler (1692-1752) was an ordained minister of the Church of 
England who became Bishop of Bristol and then of Durham. He Is a unique 
figure whose "Fifteen Sermons" and "Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue" 
contained in his "Analogy of Religion" constitute, according to C. D. 
Broad one of the best introductions to ethics that exists. Butler was 
influenced by both the Cambridge platonlsts and Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson. 
Butler's concept of human nature is that of a system in which the 
different propensities and principles have a function and a proper place, 
and which work together in certain right proportions and right relation­
ships. The latter are determined by the end or use for which man exists. 
In looking at the Tightness or wrongness of our action, we have to look 
at the actual relative strength of the various propensities of human 
nature in relation to the system as a whole, and in comparison with what 
human nature ought to be like, as discovered by reflecting on the great 
variety of actual persons. 
Buclèr eoiicêivêd of human nature as consisting c f  I) s, number cf 
"particular passions or affections" such as is a direct movement towards 
an external object. They may benefit the agent or mainly benefit other 
people. 2) Two general principles of "cool self-love" and "benevolence" 
which constitute the bases of action and are at the same time regulative 
of particular Impulses. By cool self-love, Butler means "the tendency 
to seek maximum happiness for ourselves over the whole course of our 
lives. It is essentially a rational calculating principle which leads 
us to check particular impulses and to coordinate them with each other 
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as to maximize our total happiness in the long run." By benevolence is 
meant the principle of trying "to maximize the general happiness accord­
ing to a rational scheme and without regard to persons." 
Butler pointed out that particular impulses are directed at particu­
lar objects and are different from and may even conflict with self-love 
which is a general principle. Generally speaking, particular impulses 
are means to self-love but not always. As for self-love and benevolence, 
he did not think that they were contrary to each other. Overemphasis on 
the one at the expense of the other does produce contradictions between 
the two but excessive indulgence in anything of course produces unhappi-
ness. Therefore, a person has to check an excess of indulgence of the 
particular impulses. 3) Conscience, the supreme regulator, Butler 
defines as follows, "...there is a superior principle of reflection or 
conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal prin­
ciples of his heart, as well as his external actions, which passes 
judgement on himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions in 
themselves just, rigut, gooui others to be in themselves evil, wrong, 
unjust; which without being consulted, without being advised with, 
magesterlally exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of 
3 6 them accordingly...." Conscience has a cognitive and an authoritative 
aspect. As a cognitive force, conscience reflects now actions from the 
point of view of right and wrong. Butler thought that all persons are 
endowed with a moral understanding or moral sense. Moreover, the moral 
faculty judges only in reference to the ideal nature of the agent. A 
child has to be judged, for example, differently from an adult. The 
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The judgement of conscience is definitive at least in terms of moral 
rightness for not doing or doing something. However, he does not con­
vert moral dictates into self-evident intuitions or axioms. 
Butler puts conscience above benevolence and self-love which in turn 
were regarded as superior to the particular impulses. In particular 
people, of course, self-love may overpower conscience at the expense of 
prudence. Butler regarded both excesses as wrong. Conscience has the 
right to be supreme even though it may lack the "psychological power" 
to regulate. 
Butler's influence on Sidgwick was profound; David Hume's (1711-
1776) though not so obvious, was both more widespread and penetrating. 
Hume is not just a figure who influenced his contemporaries and succes­
sors to a remarkable degree. His significance as the father of one type 
of intellectual tradition--that of what Hayek has called "the Empirical 
and unsystematic" tradition—has grown in recent years. His stamp on 
contemporary thought is vital. 
David Hume described his Treatise of Human Nature as an attempt to 
introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects. He 
derives a set of general principles about human nature from observed 
facts. The ethical categories in Hume are three: firstly, intrinsic as 
opposed to instrumental good and evil; second, virtue and its opposite; 
third, the problem of what men ought to do, Hume defined good and evil 
as pleasure and pain. He was concerned with virtue, then aspects of 
character that are admirable and with right and wrong and the nature of 
justice. 
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According to Hume, men's ability to make moral judgements depends 
on their passions and sentiments, not purely on their intellectual 
faculties. Moral approbation and disapprobation are in the nature of 
sentiments, not a result of "reason." Reason discovers matters of fact 
and relations between ideas. But reason is inert and cannot by itself 
produce action, where as moral judgements do influence action. Moral 
judgements cannot, therefore, be derived from reason. 
Hume regarded the human mind as consisting of perceptions which are 
either ideas or impressions. Impressions are either original or secon­
dary. Original Impressions are sense impressions, secondary impressions 
are called passions, e.g. feelings (except bodily pleasure and pain which 
are original impressions), emotions and sentiments. With regard to the 
operations of the intellect, he develops the principle of association of 
ideas. Ideas are associated by the three principles of contiguity, 
resemblance and causation which link persons with other people or 
objects. He also postulates a principle of association of impressions. 
The two pifiiïclplêâ ûftêri wûïk together. Thê iûetuod îîuîûê employs in his 
explanations is one of empirical argument and demonstration. 
Crucial to the explanation of moral judgement is also the idea of 
"sympathy." We experience emotion by a feeling of sympathy, by seeing 
others experiencing it. We feel moral approval for a quality according 
to whether it is useful or agreeable to oneself or others. Moral 
approval or disapproval are "sentiments" which we experience when we 
contemplate the qualities in question as disinterested spectators. In 
making moral judgements, we examine the qualities and the actions as 
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they exemplify the qualities from the point of view of the motives that 
produced them. For Hume, motives are all-important in determining the 
nature of moral good. For good conduct to be good, the motive has to be 
right. The point of view is all-important. Moreover, we have to con­
sider a quality or character in general and distinguish between pleasure 
received by us as private persons and pleasure received by us as well 
wishers of others. The ethical point of view is the humanitarian. 
Rationality is essential for impartiality and sympathy is needed for 
participating in the feelings of others. 
Hume's ethical theory is based on a distinction between the many 
natura- virtues and the one artificial virtue "justice." In general 
natural rights were brought under the headings of "property and 
promises." Property is anything of which we cannot be rightly deprived 
and may be taken to include life and liberty. Hume says that in condi­
tions of natural scarcity and in view of man's natural propensity to look 
after himself and those nearest to him, it is a matter of "learning" to 
make covenant» aiiu abide by them la order to safeguard property. The 
sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature but arises 
from education and human convention. It is a result of what Hume calls 
"artifice" or "contrivance." Men are led both by training and by a 
sense of honor to abide by the conventions they set up. The first 
general convention establishes the concepts of "justice" and "injustice" 
and of property, right and obligation. "Our property is nothing but 
these goods, whose constant possession is established by the laws of 
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society, that is by the Laws of Justice," Hume's concept of justice 
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does not have any sense of fairness or equitable distribution but con­
sists rather in the maintenance of an existing distribution except in so 
far as it is modified by agreement and consent. His idea of justice 
contains no basis for criticism of the existing distribution. Justice 
is derived from the self-interest of men to maintain property. 
The question then is how moral obligation becomes attached to 
justice. The answer lies in sympathy. In Hume's own words, "The general 
rule reaches beyond those instances in which it arose; while at the same 
time we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments they enter­
tain of us. Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establish­
ment of justice; but a sympathy with public interest is the source of 
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the moral approbation which attends that virtue." Sympathy brings 
about our compliance both to the "artificial virtues" and to many of the 
"natural virtues." Our approval and disapproval therefore rest on the 
principle of the general interest, derived originally from self-interest 
and expanded by sympathy to others. Hume thus rejects by appeal to 
rêâllty LUC tOOt of mCjual SpptObStlvu IH Self = lOVS Âîîd Cîl ths SSïûS 
empirical basis attempts to establish that "reflections on public 
interest and utility" are "the sole source of the moral approbation paid 
to fidelity, justice, veracity, integrity" and other virtues as well as 
the sole basis for the duty of allegiance. But as is pointed out by 
Kemp, "Hume is not restricted to any narrowly utilitarian view of 
morality; for him utility means usefulness for any desired end or pur­
pose, not just usefulness for the purpose of producing pleasure and 
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reducing or preventing pain." 
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Adam Smith (1723-1790) takes off from Hume in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. He regarded sympathy as the ultimate element into which 
moral sentiments may be analyzed. According to Smith, men approve of 
the conduct of another person, if when they put themselves in the other's 
situation, they feel a sympathy for the motivations underlying the 
other's behavior. Our approval of virtue is convenient for the individ­
ual and society but is not based essentially on "utility." Rather it is 
based on "propriety" of action or "sentiment." Propriety is the basis 
of moral judgement and our view of propriety arises from sympathy. Men 
are thus "spectators" in their observance of the conduct of others and 
to the extent that they are not personally involved in the situation 
observed and are impartial spectators, develop moral norms for their 
society. Conscience, according to Adam Smith, originates in the indi­
vidual's attempts to observe his own behavior with the purpose of 
anticipating other people's reactions. This role of observing one's own 
behavior leads to the "ideal spectator" who is the internal monitor of 
one's actions and develops conscience as an autonomous factor in people's 
lives. Morality thus comes to be ultimately founded upon experiences of 
what in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of 
merit and propriety, approve or disapprove of 
Smith justifies conduct based on the ideal in the same manner as he 
justifies conduct based on normal attitudes—i.e. they have beneficial 
consequences for the general happiness. The ideal man makes us 
"genuinely rather than merely prudentially concerned to act in accord­
ance with the wishes of their fellows. Conscience, therefore, gives 
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men a commitment to social cooperation which would not result from 
external sanctions alone.Moral sentiments in general and conscience 
in particular have a functional utility in demonstrating that they are 
essential for social harmony and the happiness of mankind. Smith does 
not think that "considerations of utility have any significant influence 
in determining the content of any widely accepted moral principles. But 
Smith does assume that utility is the standard by which to assess the 
42 good and bad qualities of a total way of life. Smith does not, of 
course, assert that men should work for other people's happiness or 
welfare but he does think that a society should be evaluated in terms of 
the happiness of its members. For Smith, all thinking persons must 
accept benevolence or concern for human happiness as the contemplative 
moral principle (arrived at after much reflection) which in turn helps 
to assess practical moral principles. Universal benevolence constitutes 
the basis of Smith's justification of utility. 
As pointed out by Sldgwlck, the theories of Hume and Smith together 
anticipate the explanations of moral sentiments offered by the utilili-
tarians. By utilitarianism In this context we mean a general theory of 
ethics which provides a criterion for distinguishing between right and 
wrong and a basis for moral judgements of actions. Utilitarians believe 
that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the good­
ness or badness of the results of these actions. Moreover, they believe 
in the hedonist principle that the only thing good in itself is pleasure 
and the only thing bad in itself Is pain. As utilitarians have thought 
of happiness as a sum of pleasures, utilitarianism has usually been 
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represented in terms of the greatest happiness principle that the right-
ness of an action is determined by its contribution to the happiness of 
everyone affected by it. 
The above representation of utilitarianism is that of Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the two greatest influences, apart from 
Butler and Kant, on Henry Sidgwick. (Joseph Butler is important only 
from the point of view of the evolution of Henry Sidgwick's particular 
version of utilitarianism. For the theory of utilitarianism in general, 
David Hume remains the far more important figure.) 
According to Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), pleasure and pain determine 
both what we shall do and what we ought to do. The appropriate basis of 
action is the happiness of people whose interest is in question. The 
community is the sum of its members and as such the happiness of the 
community is the sum of the happiness of its members. Bentham distin­
guishes between "probity" which means "forbearing to diminish the happi­
ness of others" and "beneficence" which means "studying to increase it." 
bentham sees a rough coincidence between the sphere of probity and the 
domain where punishment under law would be appropriate. Private morality 
is the proper sphere for enhancing human happiness. As to the motives 
people have to consider the happiness of others, Bentham answers in 
terms of motives of sympathy and benevolence and semi-social motives of 
love and amity and reputation. 
It is Sidgwick's view that Bentham himself, in many of his writings, 
does not adequately reconcile the conflict between his view that men 
will first and always consult their own Interests and his assumption 
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sometimes that the Interests of men will conflict with that of their 
fellows. However, in the posthumously published Deontology (edited from 
the manuscript by Bowrlng) the assumption is that the conduct which pro­
motes general happiness always promotes that of the agent. But in the 
actual conditions of society, according to Sidgwick, this is not true. 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) modified the emphasis on pleasure in 
Bentham by distinguishing between inferior physical or bodily pleasures 
and superior mental and intellectual pleasures, in the process almost 
abandoning the hedonistic calculus of Bentham. Bentham based his so-
called "hedonistic calculus" on a sevenfold distinction of the properties 
of pleasure—its intensity, its duration, its certainty of actually tak­
ing place and its propinquity, its distance in time from the calculation. 
Moreover, there are two causal relationships in which pleasures and 
pains stand to other pleasures and pains—fecundity, the chance a 
pleasure has of being followed by sensations of the same kind, and 
purity, the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the same 
kind. Finally, in all cases where the interests of a number of people 
are in question, the extent. or number of people affected, needs to be 
43 taken into consideration. 
These seven properties are called the dimensions of pleasure and 
pain and constitute the base of calculating the balance of the sum of 
pleasures and pains. John Stuart Mill argues that while it is possible 
to establish the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures in this 
fashion, it would be better to recognize the fact that some kinds of 
pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others in their 
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intrinsic nature. "It would be absurd," he wrote, "that while in 
estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, 
the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity 
alone.It is, of course, possible to restore the identification of 
value with the quantity of pleasure that Mill ostensibly rejects, by his 
(Mill's) own argument that superiority of mental pleasures can be estab­
lished by the decided preference "people have for them." For surely, 
the greater preference can be taken as indicative of a stronger desire 
for the particular kind of pleasure referred to. 
Mill's solution of the conflict referred to above between the ego­
istic theory of motivation (all action is ultimately for the sake of the 
agent's own pleasure) and the utilitarian ethic of general happiness is 
Hobbeslan, that self-sacrifice is a means to individual happiness. More­
over, men have a natural feeling of sympathy for their fellows. Living 
in society also conduces to a greater concern for the general happiness. 
Mill also suggests that what begins as a means to an end, becomes desir­
able in itself. 
Mill has a famous and controversial "equivalent to proof" of utility 
that goes as follows: The first step is an affirmation of the principle 
of psychological hedonism: Pleasure, or happiness is the only thing men 
desire for its own sake. The second principle has been called that of 
subjective ethical hedonism. Each man's pleasure is a good to him. 
The final step is the derivation of objective ethical hedonism. The 
general happiness is good for all. But the proof is "hardly adapted to 
convince an individual that he ought to take the greatest amount of his 
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own happiness as the standard and supreme directive of his conduct. 
Actually when he considered the matter of the source of obligation of 
utilitarian morality, Mill goes to the explanation of "feeling of unity 
with his fellow creatures." But as suggested by Sldgwick, even with the 
modifications introduced into the concept, "it cannot be said that Mill's 
utilitarianism includes an adequate proof that persons of all natures and 
temperaments will obtain even the best chance of private happiness in 
this life by determining always to aim at general happiness. 
Mill also concerns himself with the problem that utility does not 
include actions which we commonly regard as just. For example, it is 
only the aggregate amount of pleasure and pain with which the principle 
of utility is concerned. This aggregate may be compatible with many dif­
ferent distributions of pleasure--more and less inequalities in society. 
Mill contends that the greatest happiness principle of Bentham secures 
equality of treatment. But this is unconvincing. Equality of treatment 
enjoined by the principle of justice is a difficult and complex question 
and is so recognized by Mill. He cites income distribution, taxation 
and punishment as problems that are extremely difficult to resolve 
justly. Justice, as a matter of fact, is less easily accounted for by 
utility than Mill supposed. 
It remains to examine briefly the influence of Inmnuel Kant (1724-
1304) on contemporary ethics in Sidgwick's time. Kant treats the notions 
of duty or obligation and right and wrong as fundamental. He states that 
"nothing in the world can possibly be conceived which can be called good 
without qualification except a good will." A good will is one which 
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wills rightly. No action is good unless done from a good motive. This 
motive must be different from natural inclination of any kind. The 
rightness or wrongness of action does not depend upon actual consequences 
or intended consequences. Right action is done from a sense of duty. 
Moreover, the fundamental laws of morality must be the same for all. 
In examining the criterion of rightness of motive, Kant distin­
guishes between "actions on impulse" and "actions on principle," the 
latter being actions taken according to some rule or principle. He holds 
that for an action to be right, it must be done on a general principle 
accepted by the agent. 
Kant, moreover, distinguishes between "hypothetical" and "categori­
cal imperatives." A principle of conduct which is accepted, not on its 
own merits, but as a rule for gaining some desired end is called the 
hypothetical imperative. Such a rule, as is pointed out by C. D. Broad 
is both contingent and derivative. "A categorical imperative," on the 
other hand, "would be one that is accepted on its own merits, and not as 
a rule for gaining scms desired snd."^  ^ Kant regards as right action 
only action done on a principle which is a categorical imperative. For 
a principle to be general, Kant has the criterion "Act on a maxim which 
thou canst will to be law universal" and this is both a necessary and 
sufficient condition for any principle to be a categorical imperative. 
Kant thus provides a test for rules of action, a test moreover which 
recognizes action on the basis of principles. Kant however does not 
allow for actions to be right under certain circumstances for certain 
people and not right for others in the same situation. 
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Kant gives two other forms of the law of morality. "Act so as to 
treat humanity in thyself or any other as an end always, and never as a 
means only." The third form is "A principle of conduct is morally bind­
ing on a person if and only if he can regard it as a law which he can 
impose on himself." Both these forms contain important truths, though 
it is not quite so clear that they are equivalent to the first, the 
"universal law." Even though there is no necessary connection between 
Virtue and Happiness, Kant did believe that virtue deserved a certain 
amount of happiness. 
Evolution of Sidgwick's Ethical Theory 
The preface to the sixth edition of Sidgwick's "Methods of Ethics" 
contains an account from the pen of Henry Sidgwick that describes the 
intellectual evolution of his ethical thought. It would be useful to 
summarize this account. Sidgwick's first adhesion to an ethical system 
was to the utilitarianism of Mill, to which he (Sidgwick) turned in some 
relief from the pressure of what he calls "arbitrary and unreasoned moral 
rules" which everyone in society was required to obey. He was attracted 
both by psychological hedonism and the ethical hedonism in its universal-
istic form without perceiving the conflict between the two. The rela­
tion between "interest" and "duty" which had been inadequately dealt with 
theoretically by J. S. Mill continued to trouble Sidgwick until further 
study and reflection led him to perceive the irreconcilability on 
rational grounds of "my happiness" (egoistic ethical hedonism, as he 
calls it) and the "general happiness" (universalistic ethical hedonism), 
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either of which by themselves are rational. Moral choice then becomes 
necessary as between "general happiness" and "self-interest." At this 
point, Sldgwlck was led to modify Mill's utilitarianism so that its 
basis would be the need of a fundamental ethical "intuition" which he 
postulated as the Kantian moral law "Act from a principle or maxim that 
you can will to be a universal law." But this did not still settle 
finally the question of subordination of self-interest to duty. There 
is, according to Sldgwlck, nothing in the Kantian imperative which could 
prevent the Hobbeslan "self-preservationist" from choosing as perfectly 
reasonable for all men, his own happiness, in preference to the general 
happiness. "The rationality of self-regard seemed to me as undeniable 
as the rationality of self sacrifice," he writes. 
He saw, however, on a re-reading of Joseph Butler that he had in 
his earlier readings not understood or misunderstood him and that Butler 
indeed admitted that "Interest, my own happiness, is a manifest obliga­
tion" and that this "duality of the governing faculty" or what Sldgwlck 
calls "the dualism of the practical reason" was seen clearly by Butler. 
At this point, Sldgwlck saw what was wrong with psychological hedonism 
as distinguished from ethical hedonism. Psychological hedonism Involves 
not only the idea of every man seeking his own happiness but the idea 
that it is, as it were, a law of human nature that a person can aim only 
at his own greatest happiness. Sldgwlck recognized that there are "dis­
interested" or "extra-regarding impulses to action, impulses not 
directed towards the agent's pleasure." So that there is a moral sig­
nificance to the ethical "ought" both In relation to Individual happiness 
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and universal happiness. Butler's idea of "conscience" as the arbiter 
seemed to Sidgwick insufficient as a criterion of choice and so he was 
led to explore what he calls the "morality of commonsense" which also 
Sidgwick found to be wanting in clarity as a guide to moral choice. By 
the "morality of common sense" Sidgwick meant practical principles which 
have been seriously put forward as bases of conduct which have been more 
or less satisfactory to the common sense of mankind but which, accord­
ing to Sidgwick, need to be subject to the tests of clarity, self-
evidence of the proposition, and more importantly consistency and 
"universality" or "generality." Sidgwick was thus driven to the funda­
mental moral intuition that the general happiness and not the private 
happiness of any Individual is the categorically prescribed ultimate end. 
This is the fundamental intuition that justified utilitarianism. But 
the rationality and reality of the strong tendency to pursue self-
interest even at the cost of general happiness cannot be denied and 
remained an essential element of Sidgwick's beliefs. 
Economic Thought in Sidgwick's Time--An Outline 
Survey of Influences on Sidgwick 
It is now generally recognized that when Adam Smith wrote the Wealth 
of Nations, industrialization in England was still in its early stages 
and that problems of factory production, increasing substitution of 
machinery for man, technological changes that produced mass production, 
and urbanization and overcrowding in the new industrial centers, were 
only peripheral concerns of the political economist. The latter's pre­
occupations were with abuses of excessive governmental control of the 
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economy, restrictions on free trade and their policy recommendations 
therefore dealt with the abolition of restrictive practices and laws. 
By the eighteen forties, many of these policy recommendations had been 
adopted. Trade became increasingly free of restrictions, until finally 
the corn laws were abolished in 1846. The business class gradually 
succeeded to a position of unimpeded economic power and uninhibited 
enjoyment of its successes. 
But rapid industrial growth created new problems of excessive over­
crowding in the new urban and industrial centers, overwork of men, women 
and children in miserable conditions at the workplace, etc. which led to 
factory legislation protecting women and children, repeal of acts 
prohibiting combinations of workmen, amendment of the Poor Law, etc. 
Politically, there came about a gradual increase in those enfranchised. 
At the very moment when the laissez faire position seemed most success­
ful, the beginnings of state intervention to remedy the consequences of 
Inequalities of power generated by unrestricted freedom of business could 
be seen. 
At the time Sidgwick wrote his Principles of Political Economy 
(published 1883), England was going through a prolonged depression. 
There had been great development of the productive powers of society, 
with some improvement in the standards of living of the working classes 
(when they had work) but this progress was accompanied by much unemploy­
ment, great economic uncertainty for large sections of the population and 
considerable dislocation and misery for groups like the farming popula­
tion unsettled by rapid economic change. Understandably, the strata of 
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population whose existence was threatened by the changes clamoured for 
protection. 
The condemnation of the new ethic of nascent capitalism by voices 
such as those of Coleridge, Carlyle and Ruskin was not merely a romantic 
turning back to a world fast disappearing but symptomatic of the revival 
of the social conscience of the middle and upper classes revolted by the 
human costs of economic progress. The period produced a Marx and was 
dominated by a Mill, both of whom represented in their different ways 
the recognition of the need to adapt to the new civilization as well as 
the revolt against it that demanded change and reform. The number of 
those in sympathy with socialism whether of the Mllllan or later Fabian 
or even of the Marxian—both orthodox and revisionist democratic— 
variety Increased considerably. 
The meeting of the Political Economy Club of London held in 1876 to 
mark the hundredth anniversary of the publication of The Wealth of 
Nations demonstrated the fresh conflicts in economic thought and policy. 
The major issues of debate at the small gathering were "method" and 
"laissez faire" with a clear conflict of views between the "deductive" 
and "inductive" and "historical" schools and somewhat of a cleavage 
between those who feared an extension of the functions of government 
(as they pertained to the economy) and those who saw the compulsive need 
for government to come forward to protect the interests of the weak 
against the strong."It was around 1870," wrote Schusipeter, "that a 
new interest in social reform, a new spirit of 'historicism,' and a new 
activity in the field of economic theory began to assert themselves or 
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that there occurred breaks with tradition as distinct as we can ever 
expect to observe in what must always be fundamentally a continuous 
n49 process. 
The twenty five years before 1870 had been dominated by John Stuart 
Mill's Principles of Political Economy which had successfully blended the 
core of Ricardian doctrines with the important contributions of Adam 
Smith, J. B. Say, Malthus and Senior. As is pointed out by Mitchell, 
"The major part of his (Mill's) economic principles are borrowed from 
his great predecessors, from Ricardo most of all, from whom he got his 
ideas about the theory of value, wages, profits, rent, money and its 
distribution, international trade, the long-term tendencies of rent, 
wages and profits, as well as his theories of the incidence of taxa­
tion.But it is possible to exaggerate, as Mill himself tended to 
do, the extent to which he had merely borrowed other people's ideas. 
Students of economic thought have emphasized Mill's contributions such 
as the more or less complete development of supply and demand analysis 
extended to the theory o£ international values, hia mOùi£icatiùu of the 
strict quantity theory of money in regarding not the quantity of money 
but "expenditure" as acting on prices, etc. But in his own mind. Mill 
regarded his Principles as being "unique" for its "moral tone." Mitchell 
refers to this as the "humanization" of Economics and it is important in 
the context of the vulgarization of economics that had taken place in 
economics in the period immediately following Ricardo, "a vulgarization 
which adapted it to all sorts of partisan use, which made political 
economy in the hands of the well-to-do people a rationalization of their 
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view of the proper treatment of the poor, of their views of the 
ineffectiveness and worse of trade unions, of the undesirability of a 
protective tariff--a process that had made political economy, which 
professed to be a science, practically a weapon adapted to the uses of 
class warfare. 
Mill, for the above reasons, restricted the domain of the operation 
of economic laws to the physical aspects of production. With regard to 
the rest, institutions in particular, he asserted that they are man-made 
and changeable. "Distribution of wealth is a matter of human institu­
tion solely," he wrote, "The distribution of wealth therefore depends on 
the laws and customs of society. The rules by which it is determined are 
what the opinions and feelings of the ruling portion of the community 
make them, and are very different in different ages and countries; and 
52 
might be still more different, if mankind so chose." Mill thus pre­
sented a fresh perspective on economic policy, that of gradual, evolu­
tionary modifications of capitalistic institutions so that social justice 
arid "the most beneficial ordering of industrial affair? for the univer­
sal good" could be attained. 
The lacunae in the Rlcardian doctrine that the very success of 
Mill's Principles exposed, and the changes in the social and economic 
situation of Britain which rendered some of the classical formulations 
questionable, would eventually lead to the revolution of the 1870's. 
The disavowal of the Wage Fund doctrine by Mill in his review of 
Thornton's book On Labor was only the culmination of the "gradual 
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melting away of comfortable mid-century uncertainties" as T. W. Hutchison 
puts it. 
The basis of the wage-fund doctrine is the idea that "wages" are 
provided as an "advance" from capital. The source of the wage-fund is 
savings. The sequence might be visualized as follows: Capitalist's 
savings provided the wage fund which resulted in production. Sales of 
what was produced provided income which, if saved, would result in the 
replenishment of capital to provide the wage fund for the next round and 
so on. Thornton denied that there was such a thing as an average rate 
of wages (a criticism of wage theory in general) and more importantly, 
also denied that there was any definite quantity of money (wage-goods) 
that must under any circumstances go to labor. Mill substantially agreed 
with Thornton in his Review. The reason the admission shocked public 
opinion was presumably because the wage fund idea had been used to assert 
the impossibility of raising wages. 
The Malthusian theory of population, another pivot of the classical 
system (and Mill did Indeed attach exaggerated importance to this theory) 
also could be salvaged in the period we are considering (1850-1870) only 
by robbing it of almost all its content. For this period witnessed a 
rapid increase in population accompanied by some increase in living 
standards. Senior, Hearn, Bagehot, and many other economists of the 
period were therefore highly critical of the theory. The rise in living 
standards, modest though it was, also threw overboard the "minimum means 
for living" theory of wages. 
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Other aspects of the Ricardian analysis came in for increasing 
criticism as well. The most obvious was the theory of demand. Mill had 
refined the concept to that of a schedule but the paradox of value, the 
link between use and exchange value could not be resolved without intro­
ducing the concept of the margin. Moreover, the Ricardian model which 
sought to reduce all costs to labor quantities created problems and 
contradictions which would also ultimately lead to a different framework, 
especially as the Marxian development of the Ricardian doctrine was 
regarded as both unsatisfactory and unpalatable. 
In addition, there was an onslaught on the methodology of economics, 
centered particularly on Rlcardo. "It Is," as Schumpeter has pointed 
out, "only when a field had grown into an established science that its 
votaries will develop an interest, not untlnged with anxiety, in problems 
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of scope and method and in logical fundaments generally." Rlcardo had 
carried very far the principle of "isolating" economic phenomena and 
sorting out the implications of hypothetical constructions by long chains 
of reasoning in order to thro*? soce light on an aspect of reality: 
Schumpeter, who had a strong aversion to everything Ricardian, describes 
the Ricardian method as follows : "The comprehensive vision of the 
universal inter-dependence of all the elements of the economic system... 
never cost Rlcardo as much as an hour's sleep. His interest was in the 
clear cut result of direct, practical significance. In order to get this 
result he cut that general system to pieces, bundled up as large parts 
of it as possible and put them in cold storage--so that as many things as 
possible should be frozen and given. He then piled one simplifying 
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assumption upon another until, having really settled everything by these 
assumptions, he set up simple one way relations so that, in the end, the 
desired results emerged almost as tautologies."^  ^ There is a certain 
amount of truth in what undoubtedly is a caricature because without 
sufficient testing by reference back to facts, this method may be very 
misleading. "It is a valid criticism of Ricardo that save in regard to 
the phenomena of money and the foreign exchanges, his own practice was 
often seriously defective in this respect," declared Lord Robblns, "The 
strictures of the Historical Method, were not without considerable justi­
fication in this connection. 
The historical school did not, indeed, deny the necessity for 
explanatory hypotheses, but felt that the "essence" of phenomena was 
lost when we isolated particular aspects such as the economic. The 
economics of the historical school was thus really an all-comprehensive 
sociology of man. In this form, "historism" is perhaps disreputable but 
in the form of the warning that the abstractions of the mathematical mode 
of expression yield rêâultû, Chê âuVàîitâgcS of which are of ulmlnlDulng 
importance as the reality to which they are applied becomes more compli­
cated, it is of great importance even today. Sidgwick was to sound a 
similar caution in applying the conclusions of economic theory to the 
needs of practical policy. 
The German historical school did not inspire but reinforced method­
ological criticism In England. But the attack on Ricardlan methods came 
not only from historicists like Cliff Leslie and Darwinian evolutionists 
like Hearn (whose book, Plutology. was quite influential at the time) but 
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also from moderates like Toynbee and Bagehot who attacked not the deduc­
tive method but the lack of explicitness in the assumptions on the basis 
of which the Ricardian system was built. 
Â fairly influential defense of the classical system was attempted 
by Cairnes in his Leading Principles of Political Economy (1874). 
Caimes had earlier in 1870 attacked the close relationship between 
Political Econony and laissez-faire. In his Leading Principles. Cairnes 
largely defended the classical system, but in the process of amending it, 
attacked J. S. Mill—for example, Mill's concepts of supply and demand 
which Cairnes, perhaps wrongly, regarded as ex post, realized defini­
tions.^  ^ This and similar corrections led Sidgwick to write of Cairnes' 
defense of Mill, "As a controversialist, Cairnes, though scrupulously 
fair in intention, was deficient in Intellectual sympathy; he could 
hardly avoid representing any doctrine that he did not hold, in such a 
way as to make it almost inconceivable to his readers that it could 
possibly have been held by a man of sense; and when this treatment was 
applied to some of his masters' (Mill's) ûicst iîr.pcr£snt ststcssnts, the 
expressions of personal regard for Mill by which it was accompanied only 
made the result more damaging to a reader who was convinced by Cairnes' 
reasoning. 
Even though it went unrecognized at the time, William Stanley 
Jevons, was perhaps decisive in heralding the revolution in economics 
(in England) that ultimately established the new orthodoxy that has been 
called the "marginal revolution." Jevons had a strong aversion to Mill's 
principles and came to the "marginal" half of his theory, as Hutchison 
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has pointed out, from consideration of practical problems of railway 
rate fixing and railway development. He came to the "utility" half of 
his theory as a result of the direct influence of Bentham and the English 
utilitarians. In the preface to his Theory of Political Economy (1871) 
he wrote, "In this work, I have attempted to treat economy as a calcu­
lus of pleasure and pain, and have sketched out, almost irrespective of 
previous opinions, the form which the science, as it seems to me, must 
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ultimately take." 
Evolution of Sldgwick's Economic Thought 
In the preface to his Principles of Political Economy. Sidgwlck 
points out that next only to the influence of John Stuart Mill, the 
greatest impact on his thinking on economic subjects was that of Jevons' 
Theory of Political Economy. However, he rejects as totally false 
Jevons' angry characterization of Mill as "wrongheaded though able" and 
disagrees vehemently with Jevon's conclusion "that the only hope of 
attaining a true system of economics is to fling aside, once and forever, 
the mazy and preposterous assumptions of the Ricardian School. 
Clearly, Sidgwlck accepted many parts of the Ricardian system especially 
as they found a place in Mill's Principles and felt obliged to defend 
them. 
It was under Mill's influence that Sidgwlck was led to study politi­
cal economy, "It was under Mill's influence," he wrote in an entry 
included in the 'Memoir' that "I was strongly led as a matter of duty to 
C f \  
study political economy thoroughly.""" Sidgwlck also refers with 
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admiration to Sir James Steuart's Inquiry into the Principles of 
Political Economy (1767). Alfred Marshall's Economics of Industry also 
influenced Sidgwick, as also some then unpublished papers of Marshall. 
Sidgwick thus comes in the period between Jevons and Marshall and may be 
an important link between the two. 
Sidgwick was also concerned to set in perspective the controversy 
regarding the methodology of economics, especially in regard to the 
attack of Cliff Leslie on the deductive system of Ricardo. 
Moreover, events in England had overtaken the faith in laissez 
faire" as an a priori system of inflexible rules that sought to restrict 
government intervention to a minimum. As we have noted earlier, increas­
ingly in England the state had been compelled to intervene in some 
aspects of social and economic life such as protecting child and female 
labor. It was a time that stirred people to consider "reform" through 
governmental intervention as a serious theoretical proposition. As we 
shall see in the ensuing pages, Sidgwick was to provide for this move-
ethical and economic thought of the time. Sidgwick recognized perhaps 
more than anyone else in the academic world of economics of his time, the 
antagonism of working class leaders to the doctrines of classical politi­
cal economy and the need for the latter to come to terms with the desire 
for happiness and a share in power of all the people, and how it might 
best be promoted by a combination of self-interest working through 
competition and public policy. 
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Sldgwick also saw the need for economic theory to take into its 
purview the tendency of policy makers on the European continent to turn 
away from free trade to protectionism. 
Sldgwick's Principles was therefore in part an attempt to vindicate 
his "guru" at least to some degree, after the attacks of Thornton, 
Cairnes and Jevons on Mill, in part to bring some balance to the 
methodological controversy reestablishing in the process the debt of 
English political economy to Adam Smith, David Ricardo and J. S. Mill. 
But above all, Sidgwick sought to bring to the branch of political 
economy that deals with the role of government, a fresh approach to the 
problems of equity and distributive justice. 
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CHAPTER II. THE ETHICS OF HENRY SIDGWICK^  
Henry Sldgwick's conception of ethics is that of an area of study 
that is concerned with determining what "ought" to be, and with rational 
procedures to determine what Individuals ought to do. The emphasis is 
on 'rational,' for Sidgwick thought that it is possible to derive what 
ought to be from a study of what is. Ethics is viewed empirically. The 
good, moreover, that is defined or rationalized must be a good realizable 
by human effort. The distinctive characteristic of an ethical problem 
lies in the fact that knowledge of what is right does not necessarily or 
even usually, lead to right action. 
The purpose of the study of ethics, for Sidgwick, is an examination 
of the alternative ways in which the human mind seeks to regulate con­
duct and tries to harmonize these rules into a more or less harmonious 
system. The resulting synthesis even of moral philosophers has often 
been a forced one. This is at least partly because moralists have 
allowed their search for a scientific and detached ethic to be marred by 
their desire not to upset the existing moral order. They have obscured 
the issues between the known and the unknown or failed to ask the right 
questions, because the difficulties of providing an answer were apparent. 
Sldgwick's own task, as he sees it, is to expose alternative ethical 
systems to the scrutiny of a method which will establish their mutual 
relations and lay bare the conflicts they may imply for conduct at any 
given time. In doing so, he seeks to reveal the processes of thought 
which determine the adoption of first principles. 
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Sldgwlck regards the connection between ethics and politics to be 
vital. The relationship arises from the fact that government may lay 
down laws and enforce them, and government may regulate the social re­
lationships of men where appropriate only in harmony with morality. 
Generally also the law of the state determines the details of one's moral 
duty beyond the sphere of legal enforcement. For example, we think "we 
should give every man his own" even when the other party cannot legally 
enforce his right, but in deciding what is the other man's due, we tend 
to be guided by the law of the state. Moreover, ethics should determine 
the grounds and limits of obedience to government. It influences the 
concept of political duty. 
The Nature of Moral Judgements 
Sldgwlck seeks to define the meaning of "ought," the nature and 
source of ethical judgements, Hume had contrasted the faculty to dis* 
tingulsh truth from falsehood with the motive to action which he regarded 
as nonrational desire. But Sldgwlck contends that in the kind of actions 
Involved in ethical judgements, the moral "ought" is distinct from our 
feelings and sentiments. There is of course a prudential "ought" which 
is often regarded as part of the moral "ought" but a clear distinction 
has to be made between judgements of duty, and judgements of "what is 
right" in view of the agents' private Interest or happiness. The moral 
"ought" is moreover, not just an attribute of means, referring to the 
best means to obtain given ends. We do hold certain kinds of actions as 
right or wrong unconditionally, as we hold certain ends to be right. The 
moral "ought" is different from the legal "ought" as no punishment is 
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obviously involved in the infraction of a moral "ought." Sidgwick holds 
that the source of the moral ought lies in what he calls "reason," the 
faculty or "sense" of moral cognition. Admittedly, there is an element 
of circularity involved here—what is moral is what reason says is moral. 
And reason is the capacity to recognize what is moral. Sidgwick moreover 
believes that the cognition of what is right will act as a spur to act 
accordingly. It would perhaps clarify matters to suggest that Sidgwick 
sees the need for recognizing some end or ends such as the "general 
happiness or well-being differently understood" as ultimately reasonable 
and does so postulating the existence in men's consciousness of a 
"categorical imperative." Even if critics could not accept such a cate­
gorical imperative, they could not object to the existence of a "hypo­
thetical imperative" which prescribes the fittest means to any end that 
we may have determined to aim at. Sidgwick himself believes in the 
"categorical imperative" as the end we can all agree upon. 
Pleasure and desire 
If psychological hedonism, that pleasure or pain to oneself is the 
actual ultimate end of one's action, is true, then obviously reason cannot 
prescribe otherwise than psychological nature dictates. But a person's 
pleasures and pains are not independent of moral judgements and psycho­
logical hedonism is different from egoistic hedonism in that a person's 
own greatest happiness or pleasure is for him the right ultimate end. 
Psychological hedonism, which states that men in actual fact always aim 
at their own happiness says how men in fact behave and is a psychological 
theory. Ethical hedonism, asserts that pleasantness and painfulness are 
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the only characteristics in virtue of which any state of affairs is 
intrinsically good or bad, and that nothing is ultimately worth aiming 
at but pleasure and the absence of pain. The ethical egoist regards it 
as self-evident that the individual ought to aim at a maximum balance of 
happiness for himself, even if necessary, by sacrificing other people's 
happiness in order to increase his own. Utilitarianism, to anticipate 
a little in order to clarify the present discussion, asserts that each 
individual ought to aim at the maximum balance of happiness for all 
sentient beings present and future, and that he even ought to be ready 
to sacrifice his own happiness provided he will thereby produce a net 
increase in the general happiness. Bentham asserted both psychological 
and ethical hedonism as well as utilitarianism. Critics have argued that 
psychological and ethical hedonism are inconsistent with one another and 
we shall see later that the desirability of promoting one's own happiness 
is not necessarily and not always compatible with the desirability of 
promoting the general happiness. 
J. S. Mill qualified Bentham's psychological hedonism and pointed 
out that men do in fact often choose the lesser good deliberately. Since 
there is no logical way of inferring the ethical principle from the 
psychological, the ethical principle is regarded by Sidgwick as an ideal 
which is pointed to by the psychological principle. 
This is because, the obtaining of pleasure or the prospect of 
pleasure from any course of conduct, may be dependent on its being 
regarded as right or otherwise. This at any rate is how Sidgwick views 
it. He holds it even true of persons whose moral sensibility is weak. 
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that their expectation of pleasure from an act may well be the neces­
sary consequence of the judgement of their rightness. 
Sidgwick distinguishes between pleasure—"the kind of feeling which 
stimulates the will to actions tending to maintain or produce it"—(and 
its contrary, pain) and that which stimulates us to act so as to obtain 
pleasure which he calls desire (with its contrary, aversion). Hobbes 
wrongly identified, according to Sidgwick 'pleasure* with 'desire.' 
Even J. S. Mill confused the two. Butler distinguished between self-
love and the impulses to honor, power, the harm or good of another and 
held that the pursuit of pleasures involved desire for something other 
than pleasure, a view similar to that of Hume and Hutcheson. Sidgwick 
also asserts that the pleasures of pursuit are more important than the 
pleasures of attainment and the two are separable and distinct. However, 
for the pleasure of pursuit, a certain subordination of self-regard is 
essential. The fundamental paradox of hedonism is that you have to 
forget that you want pleasure out of something, in order to get pleasure 
from it. 
Are benevolent affections stimulated by sympathetic pleasure or 
pain? Not to any considerable extent, answers Sidgwick. "Self-regard­
ing" and "extra-regarding" impulses in us are distinct and separate. 
They alternate in us, with self-regarding impulses usually in dominance. 
The main point is that men do not normally desire pleasure alone but to 
an important degree other things such as virtue which do conflict with 
the desire for pleasure. 
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Free will versus determinism 
The question is a complex one and important from a religious point 
of view because it helps to determine a person's duty and fix responsi­
bility. However, from an ethical point of view as well, it is important 
for the theory of justice and the allotment of rewards and punishments. 
But for ethics, an empirical and not a theological approach is appropri­
ate. 
Sidgwick avers that an action or conduct of a person determined by 
causes antecedent or external to his condition does not make it any less 
rational. Rational action need not be free action. But if a person is 
free in acting rationally in the sense that the seductive appeals of 
appetite or passion are successfully resisted he cannot also be free in 
acting irrationally in the sense that he is governed by appetite or 
passion. Those who argue for free will refer to a person's acting irra­
tionally as exercising his free will which is not correct. They do this 
to emphasize that man is free to choose between right and wrong (he is 
free to choose wrong) and is therefore responsible for the choice he 
makes. 
For an action to be free, it must be voluntary and conscious and 
responsibility for foreseen results of choice must rest with the agent. 
Sidgwick puts the question of free-will versus determinism as follows: 
"Is the self to which I refer my deliberate volitions a self of 
strictly uêterinlnate moral qualities, a definite character partly inheri­
ted, partly formed by my past actions and feelings, and by any physical 
influences it may have unconsciously received; so that my voluntary 
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action for good or evil, is at any moment completely caused by the 
determinate qualities of this character, together with my circumstances, 
or the external Influences acting on me at the moment--including under 
this latter term my present bodily conditions? Or is there always a 
possibility of my choosing to act in the manner I now judge to be 
reasonable and right, whatever my previous actions and experiences may 
2 have been?" 
The arguments for determinism are strong. Impulsive actions are 
more or less determined. And it is difficult to separate "impulsive" 
from "conscious" actions. In our behavior, we assume other people's 
actions are at least partly determined, for this is the basis of our 
generalizations about their reactions* We assume a certain predicta­
bility. Even if our predictions go wrong we impute it to our lack of 
knowledge, rather than to their "free will." Even in the case of our 
own actions, they seem ex post to have been predictable in terms of our 
nature, education and circumstances. Additionally, the possibility of 
moral self-uêVèlopmêuL depends upon the assumption that a present voli­
tion can determine to some extent our actions in the future. 
But, it does seem as though in the moment of deliberate action, 
there is an Immediate affirmation of consciousness. Normally, we seem 
to have choice, though later, the choice may turn out to have been 
illusory because my nature had predetermined that choice. But to take 
the latter perception alters the nature of my action. The Idea of my 
"self" itself becomes different. 
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Thus the question is very complex. It is Sidgwick's view that the 
ethical importance of deciding between the above two conceptions may be 
exaggerated; and those who emphasize free will exaggerate more. 
They do so because if it is not true that "I ought" means "I can," 
and if all actions are events in a chain of causation that goes back 
forever, the actor can have no merit or demerit. He cannot be praised 
or blamed; he cannot be rewarded or punished. Sidgwick, himself, while 
providing all the arguments for determinism, then, suggests that free 
will is supported by practical considerations. At the moment of choice 
between an alternative he judges to be right and that he regards as not 
right, the individual cannot doubt that he can choose the former. No 
matter if the supposed choice was not a real choice. It was predeter­
mined all along. It would still be essential to act as if one had a 
choice, if we did not want to throw overboard common sense ideas of 
merit and demerit, praise and blame, remorse for wrong-doing. 
The importance of free will to moral action may be separated from 
it? importance to punishing end regarding. The detersinist grants that 
a man is morally bound only to do what is "in his power"—meaning thereby 
that "the result in question will be produced if the man chose to pro­
duce it." This sense is generally accepted. "What I ought to do I can 
do" is understood as "What I ought to do I can do if I choose," not 
"what I ought to do I can choose to do." The question "Can I choose to 
do what I think is right for me to do?" is answered by Sidgwick, "I can 
choose." To this extent he accepts the Free Will School, for to regard 
the choice as illusory will weaken the moral motive. But since it is 
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rare that a person will deliberately choose that which is unwise, the 
determinist argument is not very much weakened. The question then, from 
the point of view of the will, is not whether we can do what we choose 
to do, but whether we can choose our own choice, whether the choice was 
predetermined. Sidgwick seems to opt for a feeling of freedom as 
regards choice. 
Ultimately, thus, Sidgwick, by and large, a determinist because the 
intellectual argument for determinism is so strong, submits to a free 
will position because he sees that it will otherwise do away with the 
notion of moral choice. This is indeed a major weakness in Sidgwick's 
discussion of determinism and free will, leading to such logical contra­
dictions as of a determinist "choosing" only because we are looking 
forwards and not backwards. 
It is Sidgwick's contention that unless the affirmation of free will 
or determinism modifies one's view of what it would be reasonable to do--
and he believes that it does not--as regards the ultimate ends of 
rational action Such às hûpplûêââ or excêllênec, the controversy between 
free will and determinism is not relevant except in the limited sense 
noted above (weakening of the moral motive). The adoption of determinism 
will not, except under exceptional grounds or on the basis of theological 
assumptions, alter a person's view of what is right for him to do. 
With regard to the effect of belief in free will or determinism on 
allotment of reward or punishment, the common notions of 'merit' or 
'demerit' and 'responsibility' have rested on the idea of free will. But 
the determinist can also define responsibility for a harmful act and 
64 
decree punishment for it. What is harmful could for example be defined, 
as Sidgwick does, from a utilitarian point of view. Fear of punishment 
might then be a deterrent for harmful action in the future. A deterrent 
could harmonize the interests of justice with the need for benevolence. 
The desire to encourage good and discourage bad conduct would then 
replace the desire to "requite" the one or the other. 
Apart from the free will-determinist controversy, the question of 
the power of will is an important one because the limits of the power 
of the will defines the range of ethical judgements. In answer, it seems 
that we can to some extent control our thoughts and feelings. To some 
extent resolutions as to future conduct, especially as they lead to 
changes in present conduct, do affect conduct in the future. But in 
practice, each resolve has only limited effect. 
However satisfactory this kind of reconciliation of the determinist 
view with free will a century ago, we may no longer regard the contro­
versy as being of quite such limited relevance. The full dimensions of 
Skinner: "Science has probably never demanded a more sweeping change in 
a traditional way of thinking about a subject, nor has there ever been a 
more important subject. In the tradit_onal picture a person perceives 
the world around him, selects features to be perceived, discriminates 
among them, judges them good or bad, changes them to make them better 
(or if he is careless, worse), and may be held responsible for his action 
and justly rewarded or punished for its consequences. In the scientific 
picture a person is a member of a species shaped by evolutionary 
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contingencies of survival, displaying behavioral processes which bring 
him under the control of the environment in which he lives, and largely 
under the control of a social environment which he and millions of others 
like him have constructed and maintained during the evolution of a 
creature. The direction of the controlling relation is reversed; a 
person does not act upon the world; the world acts upon him." 
Skinner has described the unsettling consequences of "the wounded 
vanity" of man at the dethronement of something he calls "will power," 
his loss of faith or "nerve" at his freshly revealed powerlessness, etc. 
To accept "determinism" with all its implications would be shattering. 
It would transform the nature of law, the definition of "responsibility" 
in law and other views on justice and punishment. It would fundamentally 
alter the terms of our moral discourse: both with regard to our 
"actions" and our "situations," Our view of ourselves and others would 
have to change drastically. If the actions of people—whether they are 
highly motivated, bright, hardworking achievers who overcome all 
0bstBCl6S nf the environment or defeatist, procrastinating, dull. 
failures who don't even dare to begin--are a result of a character rooted 
in their genetic makeup, upbringing during infancy, family environment 
in early years, for none of which they are responsible, then surely the 
lucky ones can take no credit except to thank their luck and the defeated 
ones carry no blame but curse their ill fate? One may even speculate 
whether if the poor are not to blame for their misfortune and the rich 
merely lucky, whether a planned scheme of readjusted rewards, positive 
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and negative, to compensate for the antecedent causes of poverty and 
riches, would not be in order. 
This is not an argument in favor of determinism. When eminent 
scientists like Heisenberg and Eddington, on the one hand and Planck and 
Einstein on the other, take opposite sides on the issue of determinism 
versus indeterminism, it would be foolish to choose a side. The above 
brief exposition was rather intended to point out that Sidgwick's 
attempted reconciliation of the claims of determinism and free will 
would be highly controversial in the contemporary setting. 
Definitions of Terms 
Egoism is understood by Sidgwick mainly as a method 
equated to quantitative egoistic hedonism. It is a system which pre­
scribes actions as means of the individual's happiness or pleasure. 
Pleasure is understood in its widest sense including all varieties of 
delight, enjoyment and satisfaction. The term quantitative signifies 
of a common property of pleasantness. Qualitative differences in 
pleasure may moreover, be resolved into quantitative. 
Egoism as used by Hobbes means "self-preservation," at best a 
combination of pleasure and self-preservation. Spinoza, like Hobbes, 
identified the principle of rational action as egoism, which he defined 
as seIf-preservation. But the individual aims not at pleasure but at the 
mind's perfection, at what is sometimes also called "self-realization" 
or "self-development." Pleasure is an accompaniment of striving towards 
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perfection for Spinoza. But it is, says Sidgwick, inappropriate to 
regard egoism as seIf-development for it can mean, except where there 
is conflict between impulses, yielding to our impulses--high and low. 
Similarly, egoism in the sense of the 'good' of the individual ought to 
be avoided as 'good' may cover all possible views of the ultimate end of 
rational conduct. The object of self-love and the end of egoism is 
particularized by Sidgwick as "pleasure" in the Benthamite sense. 
"Happiness" is best used in this sense as "pleasure" including every 
species of delight, enjoyment or satisfaction. One might, as J. S. Mill 
does, take account of quality as well as quantity of pleasure. Sidgwick, 
like Bentham and Mill, holds that qualitative differences can be con­
verted into quantitative differences. Thus "...the rational agent 
regards quantity of consequent pleasure and pain to himself as alone 
important in choosing between alternatives of action, and seeks always 
the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain, which without 
violation of usage we may designate as his greatest happiness."^  
XntuiwiOii is dsfinsd Sio a method iu ethics vhich regards 
the conformity to certain rules or dictates of duty as uncondi­
tionally prescribed as the ultimate ends of moral actions. But the 
rightness of moral actions cannot entirely ignore the effects of actions 
to the extent they are foreseen. The dividing line between acts and 
their consequences is a difficult one to draw. Nevertheless, the 
intuitive method does maintain the existence of moral intuitions that 
are categorically imperative. 
68 
Contrary to most writers of the hedonist school, Sidgwick holds that 
the conduclveness to pleasure which is the criterion of moral action for 
the hedonist cannot itself be derived empirically as the ultimate basis 
for moral judgement. The ultimate principle of hedonism therefore rests 
on a moral intuition, very similar indeed to Shaftesbury's "moral sense." 
There is a "first intuitional" method which postulates that particu­
lar judgements are best made by conscience. The conscience can and must 
dictate all particular actions. This method may be regarded as hostile 
to systematic morality because the dictates of conscience are not always 
clear and definite. They may be different for different people, even on 
the same problem at the same time. And so they must be subjected to 
general rules, which are sometimes derived by reason, sometimes dictated 
by an external authority; but in all cases the source of authority of 
these rules is intuition. This is the 'second' intuitional method which 
postulates that the general rules which ought to be obeyed can be dis­
cerned by most people with "really clear and finally valid intuition." 
Ths bwsis of this Tucthcd is thus wh&t Sidgwiclc cslls ths mor&lity of 
common sense." But even if one shares the general experience which has 
led to the moral precepts that constitute the rubric of this morality, 
and in general accepts it, one might want to probe further to find the 
apex of the system as it were in one or two fundamental principles from 
which all the rest of the rules may be more or less derived. This is the 
third kind of intuitionism. The three phases of intuitionism are chris­
tened by Sidgwick—perceptional, dogmatic and philosophical intuitionism. 
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Sometimes the moral Ideal is presented as attractive rather 
than imperative. Virtue then is a good. The emphasis is on 
Intrinsic goodness of moral action and character and not merely on good­
ness as a means to an end. The definition of good comprehends both 
'good' as an end in itself and as a means to an end. One view of good 
is that it is a source of pleasure which leads to the question--what kind 
of pleasure is derived and has a right to be regarded as good? One has 
then to establish a general criterion which is in the nature of an ideal 
in order to measure the goodness of actual conduct. The criterion may 
or may not be related to "pleasantness." Estimates of goodness of con­
duct may not In general be taken as estimates of pleasure derived from 
it. "Good" as a noun does not mean 'pleasure' or 'happiness.' But 
taking into account the fact that the "objects of desire" can in general 
be identified with perceived consequences, i.e., 'apparent good' and that 
the desires have to be practicable, the good becomes the desirable which 
can be attained by voluntary action. Sldgwick agrees with Butler that 
such good is authoritative. If desires are in harmony with reason, It 
is rational to aim at good. 
As for other 'good' things which are sought by men, they are sought 
only for the happiness they are expected to yield or the perfection of 
human existence. 
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Egoistic Hedonism as Ethical Method 
Even though egoistic hedonism at first sight seems unsatisfactory 
from a moral point of view, most moral philosophers have held not only 
that it Is a strong motive in people but also that an enlightened pursuit 
of individual happiness is proper and reasonable. The egoistic hedonists 
have gone further in asserting an empirical view of happiness--that 
pleasure and pain are measurable. This measurablllty Is essential to the 
concept of greatest happiness. It is assumed that pleasures can be 
arranged on a scale as being greater or lesser. Defining 'pain' as 
negative pleasure, Sidgwick formulates the concept of a 'neutral state,' 
a 'hedonistic zero,' a state of Indifference arising from a combination 
or bundle of positive and negative utilities that corresponds to zero 
utility. The normal state of persons is one of positive happiness. 
Sidgwick rejects the Spencerian view that would measure utility by 
the stimulus to action of anticipated pleasure; Spencer viewed pleasures 
to be greater and less exactly in proportion as they stimulate the will 
to actions tending to sustain them. The term "motive power" was used to 
signify the degree of stimulus by a contemporary psychologist. There is 
a resemblance to the modern concept of "revealed preference." Pleasure 
is measured by how powerfully it stimulates to actions tending to sustain 
it—by purchase of the commodity in question in the context of an 
exchange economy. Sidgwick rejects the concept for the reason that 
exciting pleasures are apt to exercise a disproportionately large stimu­
lus- -a reason that makes "motive power" more exact than Sidgwick's own 
measure "desirability." But he returns to the concept of preferences 
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because he postulates that desirability is measured by "preferences." 
But it is still a subjective concept. 
He defines pleasure quantitatively as a feeling which is apprehended 
as desirable or "preferable." Sldgwick skirts the question as to whether 
what Is pleasurable Is desirable. He asserts "that the preference which 
pure hedonism regards as ultimately rational should be defined as the 
preference of feeling valued merely as feeling, according to the estimate 
implicitly or explicitly made by the sentient individual at the time of 
feeling it without any regard to the conditions and relations under which 
it arises."^  Thus, Irrespective of the moral nature of the choice, 
happiness is regarded as expressed by preferences. 
Essential to hedonism is the view that in the quantitative manner so 
defined, an individual can by "foresight and calculation" Increase his 
pleasures and decrease his pains. Sldgwick is aware of the complexity 
Involved in such probabilistic estimation but feels that by rejecting 
"manifestly imprudent conduct 'beforehand', and neglecting the less 
iupcrtast contingencies" the calculation prcblen: can be reduced tc 
manageable limits. One objection to the above is that pleasures will not 
give the same amount of happiness if they are deliberately pursued. Also, 
to the extent that impulses that are exclusively directed to personal 
pleasures are given full rein without some balance with "extra-regarding" 
Impulses, maximum happiness, which is the aim of self-love, is not 
attained. But experience does teach most persons to forget temporarily 
the ends as they engross themselves in the means. 
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Moreover there is very great possibility of diminishing pleasure, 
especially at its intensest, by the attempt to observe and estimate it. 
There are other difficulties. In choosing between two or more 
courses of conduct, comparisons are made not of actual but foreseen 
states of happiness (of at least some of the alternatives) and therefore 
the possibility of error is great. It must be remembered that alterna­
tives are compared quantitatively in terms of estimates of happiness. 
Moreover, even ruling out judgements on happiness of different persons 
(interpersonal utility comparisons) the same person's judgements of the 
comparative value of his pleasures at different times are not generally 
consistent. The mind is not a neutral medium for imagining different 
kinds of pleasures. It is organic and changing. As persons as well, 
we are changing as a result of new circumstances and influences. What 
is more Important, we can change ourselves by training so that our sus­
ceptibilities are very different at varying periods of time. Obviously, 
the 'empirical-reflective' method as Sidgwlck calls it, of subjective 
quantitative evaluation of pleasure, is net adequate. 
Could it be replaced by an objective evaluation of pleasures pro­
vided by objects, according to the common experience of particular 
societies? The answer is in the negative. Common sense evaluations 
relate to so called "average" individuals and the divergences from the 
average may be considerable. Common sense is subject to "biases" of the 
tribe. It does not separate clearly enough moral from hedonistic con­
siderations and the pronouncements of common sense are contradictory. 
Self-indulgent men pronounce on the virtues of abstinence. Wealthy men 
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are fond of waxing eloquent on the virtues of poverty and hard work. Men 
of status disclaim the importance of position for happiness. Powerful 
men complain of the headaches of power and so on. Most important of all, 
minorities who cannot be disregarded hold dissenting opinions on what 
constitutes happiness. In many cases common sense morality does provide 
a tolerably coherent set of judgements, which may be flouted, if neces­
sary, only with good reason. But common sense morality should at best 
be regarded as providing indefinite general rules. 
To what extent does the performance of duty conduce to happiness? 
That aspect of duty which is self-regarding tends to promote one's happi­
ness. So the question should be answered with regard to social duty. 
The performance of social duties involves "sanctions" which Bentham 
defined as the pleasures following from conforming to moral rules and 
the pains of nonconformity. Sanctions are of two kinds—external and 
internal. External sanctions are in turn: 1) legal, arising from the 
penalties imposed by the sovereign and 2) social, arising from the 
approval or otherwise of public opinion. The internal sanctions of duty 
lie in the pleasure of doing right or freedom from remorse. If we look 
at how people act In the normal situation of peace and orderliness in 
societies, men will, if they can get away with doing wrong without being 
detected, do so. Even the social sanction Is not so powerful as to 
ensure the observance of the law. In other words, external sanctions, 
legal and social, are not always sufficient to identify duty with self-
interest, both in the sphere of law and In the area of moral duty not 
included in law. To some extent, the individual's duties coincides with 
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his social duties. We act in ways that impress other persons, ensure 
their trust in us. But we do so for the sake of appearances rather than 
out of a sense of duty. Society itself has a double standard—a stricter 
morality that is publicly avowed and a laxer code that is admitted to be 
the only practicable one. 
Internal sanctions then must be the basis by which conduct pre­
scribed by duty and rational self-love coincide. But this is not so. 
It is not often that doing one's duty produces happiness if one excludes 
the faith of the religious believer in the rewards of heaven when duty is 
done. As Butler put it, the interests of rational self-love and con­
science are often divergent. We do sometimes, to some degree, subordi­
nate rational self-love to conscience because there is a certain amount 
of pleasure in fulfilling the call of the moral sentiment. But this 
does not mean duty will prevail over self-interest. In the majority of 
people, the opposite happens a great deal of the time. 
Herbert Spencer tried to build the structure of egoistic hedonism 
xxfOui à biological view ol Cue ôOurCêô of plêdûUrê âuu pâlû. But tliê 
argument that what conduces to the welfare of the organism constitutes 
pleasure and vice versa does not take account of the nonpreservative 
aspects of the human system which are nevertheless sources of pleasure. 
Sidgwick therefore concludes with respect to his discussion of egoistic 
hedonism, "there Is no scientific short cut to the ascertainment of the 
right means to the individual's happiness."^  Though the empirical method 
is at best an imperfect method, full of difficulties, it is the best we 
have. 
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Intultlonlsm as an Ethical Method 
It Is the general view that most people know what they ought to do 
in the light of foreseen consequences though they may not know certainly 
what will lead to their happiness when considering particular actions. 
In determining rightness of actions, intentions in the light of all 
foreseen consequences of the action are primary. Motives, in the sense 
of what the agent desires, are secondary. Some Intuitionists hold that 
the desire to act rightly for its own sake is also essential to moral 
action. But others have Included some self-regard, if at least in the 
nature of desired effects, in right action. Locke, for example, held 
that moral rules are laws of God that we obey mainly from fear or hope 
of divine punishments and rewards. Butler went much further in regard­
ing reasonable self-love as much as conscience "a chief or superior 
principle in the nature of man" so that in general an act should not 
violate the principle of self-love. 
The question of moral rightness is not only one of objective right­
ness but also of belief in the agent that he is doing right. But in 
general it Is not possible to take this distinction very far. It Is 
important, however, that there is a criterion of rightness beyond one's 
personal conviction, such as is provided by Kant's categorical impera­
tive. Sidgwlck feels that Kant's categorical imperative is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for rightness. All conscientious persons 
act in the belief that what is right for them is right for others as 
well. But they may all disagree as to what ought to be done in particu­
lar circumstances which leads to the situation of each person being 
76 
right because he believes so. Thus, assuming the existence of intuitions 
is different from asserting their validity. Intuitions may turn out to 
be wrong. Impulses deriving from other than moral intuitions are apt to 
be confused with the latter. Once the possibility of error of personal 
intuitions is admitted, ways of evaluating them such as by the morality 
of common sense or by yet other criteria where common sense is inadequate, 
are needed. 
Before moving beyond the morality of common sense, it is necessary 
to examine what it has to say with regard to particular virtues. 
Virtue and Duty 
The first step in this detailed examination is the relationship 
between virtue and duty. In common usage duties are defined as "those 
right actions or abstinences, for the adequate establishment of which a 
moral Impulse is conceived to be at least occasionally necessary."^  
With regard to virtue, some actions such as generosity might under cer­
tain cijfCumâLàncêâ bè objectively wrong because of unanticipated conse­
quences. It would, therefore, be appropriate to restrict virtue to 
"qualities exhibited in right conduct." Obviously, virtuous conduct must 
be voluntary, and attainable by all ordinary people. But not all people 
can attain to the highest forms of certain types of action like courage 
or charity. Duty cannot involve performance of the latter type of 
action. Subject to this type of limitation, the demands of duty and 
virtue should coincide. 
A virtuous act may be done from a sense of duty but not necessarily 
so. Emotions of love and aversion may be involved. 
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The conflict of impulses Involved in realizing virtue is an 
Important element in our evaluation of virtue though this does not mean 
that In the rare cases where virtue comes naturally, its worth Is any 
less. As a matter of fact, realizing virtue is more difficult than doing 
one's duty when one knows it. And it is necessary to cultivate virtue 
and develop the capacity to act virtuously without deliberation. 
Wisdom 
Among the more important and comprehensive particular virtues is 
that of wisdom. The Greeks regarded it as the highest virtue, including 
in it intellectual excellence as well as practical wisdom. In intellec­
tual terms, wisdom refers to the capacity to take a comprehensive view, 
attending to all aspects of a problem without bias and arriving at 
practical decisions. Practical wisdom refers to the ability to see in 
the conduct of life the best means to the achievement of ends decided 
by human motives, and the ability to judge in respect of ends as well as 
of means. In prescribing choice among ends, common sense opts for those 
ends that lead in turn to the ultimate end of right conduct. But there 
is an assumption of harmony among those ends which when it does not 
exist calls for a fresh approach. 
Wisdom is a virtue because the apprehension of right Involves con­
trol of violent passions and sensual appetites and demands some mastery 
over fear and desire. Wisdom Involves self-control. Self-control is 
also important in moving from cognition of right to right action, over­
coming the power of impulse. 
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Benevolence 
Next In importance only to wisdom (but by some regarded as a supreme 
and overarching virtue, comprehending and summing up all others) is the 
virtue of benevolence. Benevolence may be defined as the moral obliga­
tion "to love all our fellow creatures," the will to do good to others. 
Common sense morality prescribes the obligation to do good to those in 
special relationships with us. The utilitarians and the intuitionists 
who both attach great importance to benevolence look to different sources 
for the nature and extent of the obligation—the one in terms of what 
conduces to the general happiness and the other in terms of self-evident 
truths. 
Benevolence is to be distinguished from justice. Benevolence is 
thought to begin where justice ends. But to the extent that benevolence 
is regarded as enjoined by moral considerations, the dividing line 
between benevolence and justice is blurred. Justice can be claimed as 
a right whereas benevolence is not generally compelled. However, the 
diotlnction is not so clssr cut, ss the clsiws en bcnGvoloncs cftsn 
made in terms of 'rights' of the recipient. The notion of justice comes 
to be applicable also in the realm of benevolence. 
Sidgwick's discussion of benevolence is restricted to relations of 
affection between persons, where there may be said to be duties estab­
lished beyond the obligations set by law or contract. 
Common sense morality usually regards as a virtue that character 
which renders positive services to fellow human beings and promotes their 
well-being. It regards highly the members of society who promote the 
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welfare of the community. But the opinion of common sense is more 
ambiguous with regard to whether concern for and help to the family, 
friends and neighbors are to be regarded as moral excellences. There is 
general agreement about the minimal obligations of parents towards chil­
dren and vice versa and of the need for gratitude on the part of recipi­
ents for help rendered in times of need, etc. But when these obligations 
are sought to be made more precise, there is considerable divergence. 
For example, whereas in the case of marriage, common sense lays down 
principles such as monogamy, permanence at least in design, and prohibi­
tions of marriages within certain limits set by consanguinity, it is not 
clear that they are self-evident. Even in cases of special need, the 
obligations of common humanity are not so clear cut. The question of 
how much one's help--except in situations of dire emergencies--will 
interfere with the inflictions of penalty in the interests of social 
order or with the incentives to work and thrift, necessitate analysis of 
the economic consequences of aid to the needy which takes us far away 
frcs any given intuitions. 
Justice 
Justice is among the most difficult concepts to define. Sidgwick's 
discussion of justice from the intuitional and utilitarian points of view 
is among the most important of his contributions to practical policy. 
The concept of justice is related to law but justice does not mean 
merely conformity to law. Law, as it exists, does not fully realize 
justice. Justice is the standard by which law is judged and there is a 
part of just conduct which lies outside the sphere of law. 
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Laws that seek to realize justice are "laws which distribute and 
allot to individuals either objects of desire or liberties and privileges 
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or burdens and restraints, or even pains as such." In practice, the 
above distribution ought to realize justice but does not. 
Just laws must be equal. All laws ought to affect all persons 
equally. By the principle of equal treatment or nondiscriminatory appli­
cation of law, a certain type of injustice is excluded. But excluding 
unequal treatment does not preclude injustice. Justice as a matter of 
fact may call for special types of inequality. But preventing arbitrary 
unequal treatment prevents a type of injustice. The question then is 
what kind of inequality is admitted by justice. 
It is interesting to look at the notion of justice as applied to 
private conduct that lies beyond the sphere of the law. Here justice 
involves impartiality on the part of a person with regard to claims on 
him which he regards as valid whether or not they are embodied in written 
contracts. But the concept fails when it comes to claims which are in 
the nature of expectations if chey have arisen reasonably out of exist­
ing relationships. But it is important to estimate or meet these claims 
with exactness. Common sense morality has no general criterion. There 
are no clear intuitive principles of guidance. 
As in the case of private conduct, so in the realm of law, changes 
in the law might hurt those who expected it to continue unchanged, who 
then expect to be compensated, or changes in the social system give rise 
to expectations and there is no way of meeting them. This is the heart 
of the problem of political justice. Sidgwick puts it very well: 
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"...from one point of view, we are disposed to think that the customary 
distribution of rights, goods and privileges as well as burdens and pains, 
is natural and just; and this ought to be maintained by law, as it usually 
is; while, from another point of view, we seem to recognize an ideal 
system of rules which ought to exist, but perhaps have never yet existed, 
and we consider laws to be just in proportion as they conform to this 
idea."^  
Ideal justice 
One answer given to the question of an ideally just distribution of 
rights and privileges, burdens and pains was that natural rights were to 
be given to all and that law should embody these rights and protect 
them. But common sense morality had no agreed view of what these 
natural rights were. 
Freedom as Ideal Justice 
One way in which the question of natural rights was answered was 
that they could all be coalesced into the one principle of freedom. 
Freedom from interference is the whole of what individuals apart from 
contracts, owe to each other. The sole aim of law is the protection of 
this freedom (including enforcement of free contract). The establishment 
of freedom becomes then the realization of justice. 
Sidgwick argues forcefully against this view. Firstly, if it is 
conceded that the principle that no one should be coerced for his good 
âlûnê is uot of universal application, for example, where people are not 
regarded as sufficiently intelligent for their own good, and exceptions 
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to noninterference are allowed for, the principle becomes a particular 
case of the wider one of aiming at general happiness. Secondly, in 
determining the extent to which persons may be prohibited from interfer­
ing with one another, one evil is balanced against another. Whereas, on 
the basis of a utilitarian criterion, the justification for restriction 
of freedom would have to come from demonstrating the prevention of a 
greater evil. Thirdly, the right of enforcing contracts is not inherent 
to the idea of realizing freedom and the right of limiting freedom to 
enforce contracts has itself to be limited to cases of permissible con­
tracts. Fourthly, if from the personal realm, we extend the view of 
freedom to the area of economic life, the only legitimate freedom that 
one person can have is his right to the things he can use but not the 
right by virtue of 'prior acquisition' to deny forever to all others the 
right to use them for all time. By 'prior acquisition,' Sidgwick means 
the right to property acquired historically by the first settlers, how­
ever they did so. Sidgwick also disputes whether the right of property, 
acquired by initial aCquiaitiori, Includes the right of the disposal of 
one's possession after death, "...it is paradoxical to say that we 
interfere with a man's freedom of action by anything we may do after his 
death to what he owned during life."^ *^ '^  ^ Finally, and most importantly, 
in a society where the means of gratification (resources) are denied by 
virtue of prior appropriation by some, to all others, freedom is 
unequally distributed. It is true that under a system of free contract 
a person can sell his services in exchange for wages but the truth is 
that 1) he can often get only insufficient subsistence from doing so and 
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2) he may not be able to sell his services at all. In any case, the 
above is not a proof that society has not interfered with the freedom of 
its poorer members but only that it compensates them for such interfer­
ence. 
An equal distribution of freedom, even if it existed, would not be 
equivalent to ideal justice which would require not only freedom but all 
other benefits to be distributed justly, i.e. without arbitrary inequal­
ity. 
Justice is defined by Sidgwick as the principle that men ought to 
be rewarded in proportion to their deserts. This would be the general 
basis of distribution except where modifications are called for by con­
tract or custom. On the basis of this principle, the principle of free­
dom can indeed be derived, though in a less absolutist sense, that the 
best way of requiting desert is to let men freely work for their reward. 
The principle of property would also be legitimized, though in a more 
limited way, on the basis that to the extent that property acquired 
corresponds to effort expended in discovering it, it is proper. 
Sidgwick bases the principle of reward for work, requital for 
desert, on the worth of services, equitably determined or the "just 
12 price" of labor. He rejects the notion of just as customary. With 
respect to market price, he thinks that deviations from a competitive 
price occur in many cases due to Ignorance on the part of buyers and 
sellers, and the existence of monopoly. In particular, in the case of 
workers, Sidgwick thinks that their relative weak bargaining position 
as a class leads to a wage that deviates from their 'desert' as 
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determined by a competitive market. Sldgwlck, of course, assumes as 
perhaps he could do in his time but we may not in ours, that the 
"requital for desert" was an expression of justice. But obviously, if 
the worker is in no way responsible for his status, education, upbring­
ing, skill, motivation and even performance, remuneration by the last 
criterion alone is not just. 
The socialist ideal of paying labor according to some measure of the 
intrinsic value of their labor, faces inordinate difficulties of appli­
cation. The notion of justice as defined by Sldgwlck is unable, he 
admits, to comprehend these difficulties. And he postulates the concept 
of the demand price of labor--"what reward can procure them" (the ser­
vices of labor) and "whether the rest of society gain by services more 
than equivalent reward." Sldgwlck concludes that an ideally just social 
order is not realizable. The general fairness of distribution has to be 
left to bargaining. 
The uncertainties and anomalies of criminal justice are just as 
great. It is not easy to proportion punishment to the gravity of the 
crime, where this is felt to be the just thing to do. Motives of crime, 
when they are good, are not taken into account. There is no clear basis 
on which to establish the gravity of crimes. 
Sldgwlck examines in great detail the pronouncements of common 
sense on other principles of conduct such as obedience to laws, keeping 
promises, veracity, etc. They are subject to the criteria of 1) clarity 
and precision, 2) the se If-evidence of the propos ition--more important 
in ethics because of the tendency in human conduct to pronounce as 
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desirable what we desire and the difficulty of distinguishing between 
known principles and external rules which become internalized to the 
point of being regarded as moral intuitions of rlghtness, 3) the consis­
tency of propositions accepted as self-evident and 4) general consent or 
universality. In all cases from wisdom, benevolence and justice to the 
less important virtues, the maxims do not fulfill the above criteria 
especially as the generalities of these principles are sought to be 
converted into valid judgements of conduct. Common sense cannot decide 
in many concrete cases between alternatives. We are compelled to go 
beyond intuition and common sense to some other criterion such as 
general happiness. It is necessary to emphasize that Sldgwlck does not 
deny that we are endowed with distinct moral impulses that prescribe and 
prohibit and that in general, there is agreement among people about these 
principles. He agrees that in the ordinary course of things, common 
sense does give adequate moral guidance. But he suggests that the 
attempt to raise these principles into intuitionally known absolutes 
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Motives 
Some moralists hold that desires and affections rather than actions 
are the proper subjects of ethical judgement. The intuitional view with 
regard to motives defined as "desires of particular results, believed to 
be attainable as consequences of our voluntary acts» by which desires we 
are stimulated to will those acts" is that there is a natural way, pre­
scribed by our intuitive knowledge by which motives may be scaled ss 
higher and lower. 
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There is only one bad motive, the desire to inflict pain on others, 
though even in this case, there may be extenuating factors such as 
righteous indignation prompting malevolence. Other motives may be merely 
"seductive" in prompting to forbidden conduct. The moral judgement of 
motives, however, is as difficult as the judgement of acts in which they 
result. Ranking them involves additional difficulties. The difficulty 
is compounded if the motives of the moral sentiments are included because 
having decided that the impulse to one of these sentiments is better than 
to some other, we have still to decide what the action implied by the 
moral sentiment involves. The question is of the consequences to which 
particular sentiments lead--for example, do they lead to individual 
happiness or general happiness. Hutcheson held that those impulses which 
involved universal good will to all were superior to sentiments such as 
veracity and fortitude. Hutcheson's view is indistinguishable from 
utilitarianism. Therefore, one gets polar opposites between the Kantian 
view that all actions not done from the right motive (for duty or to do 
right) àré wtong and the Hutcheson vie* that those mctives that lead to 
general happiness are the best. There is a similar divergence of con­
viction among moralists with regard to self-love, Kant and Butler stand­
ing at the two extremes. 
Apart from such divergences, there may be a kind of minimal agree­
ment that benevolent affections and intellectual desires are superior to 
bodily appetites or that "extra-regarding" impulses are better than 
impulses that aim only at individual well-being. Beyond these generali­
ties when an attempt is made to concretize the hierarchy of particular 
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Impulses arranged in order of their merit, the differences among 
moralists are very great. Intuition is not much help. The complexity 
of motives add to the perplexity of the problem. 
The view of common sense morality is that every natural affection 
has its appropriate sphere within which it should be normally operative. 
The question of whether a higher motive should be substituted for a 
lower one cannot be answered except in the context of the particular 
conditions and circumstances of the conflict between the two motives. 
Also, as the character of a person becomes better, the sphere of opera­
tion of the higher—to the extent we can speak of one--becomes greater. 
The substitution of higher for lower—to the extent such gradation is 
possible and relevant--is also contextual, and possibilities of substi­
tution without danger limited by the state of development of the moral 
agent. The moral agent and the motives upon which he acts constitute 
a system and the merit of any particular system cannot be judged except 
in the context of ends also regarded as parts of the total system. 
Philosophical Intuitionism 
The moral philosopher's task is to generalize from common sense, 
go beyond it, and enunciate the primary intuitions of reason. Sidgwick 
believes that there are such general principles, universal in scope, 
which however, are abstract in nature. These principles are in particu­
lar cases not much help and particular duties have therefore to be 
determined by some other method. 
These general principles are as follows: 
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1. Whatever action any of us judges as right for ourselves, we 
judge to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances. 
2. Whatever we judge fit to be done to us, we judge as appropriate 
to be done to all other persons in similar circumstances. The essence 
of these principles is the familiar maxim: Do unto to others as you 
would have them do unto you. It is possible however that one might wish 
for cooperation in sin and be willing to reciprocate it. Also circum­
stances may be different so that what is appropriate for A to do to B 
may not be appropriate for B to do to A. The principle has accordingly 
to be modified to allow for difference in circumstances. An application 
of this principle is in the administration of justice: The principle of 
impartiality or fairness. However, impartiality in justice is a clear 
criterion only if the rules to be judged are unambiguous. 
3. The principle of fairness may be extended to "one's good on the 
whole"--"an impartial concern for all aspects of one's life," a concern 
for the future as much as the present, allowance being made for uncer­
tainty = 
4. Moreover, just as the above principle regards the good of an 
individual through his entire life, the good of all individuals may be 
considered together in the notion of universal good, which yields the 
axiom that the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from 
the point of view of the universe, than the good of any other, unless 
there are special reasons to believe that more good is likely to be 
realized in the one case than in the other. 
5. The principle of benevolence can now be inferred—that each 
person is bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as 
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his own, except if on an impartial view, the latter is less or less 
certainly knowable or attainable by him. 
Thus in the principles of justice, prudence and rational benevolence 
there is an axiomatic element, cognizable by abstract intuition. 
The apprehension of these truths is what makes the fundamental rules 
of morality reasonable. Sidgwick denies that maxims like "I ought to 
speak the truth" are self-evident like the above propositions. Sidgwick 
also interprets intuitionists like Clarke as postulating the fundamental 
intuitions of equity and benevolence. He concedes that Kant's ethical 
theory may not fully justify the self-evidence of the above propositions. 
He gives a restricted interpretation of Kant's proposition that each man 
as a rational agent is bound to aim at the happiness of other men as 
justifying the intuitive truth of benevolence. (Kant, however, denies 
the validity on intuitional grounds of self-love in so far as it con­
flicts with general happiness.) 
Sidgwick feels he has demonstrated that the intuitional schools 
lead to the âamê prlïïciplcâ of pruucûCc Implied In rational êgciSïïi, 
justice, and rational benevolence as in the utilitarian system, though 
utilitarians like J. S. Mill had not taken advantage of the results of 
philosophical intuitionism. We have noted in the introductory chapter 
that Mill's "proof" of utilitarianism is inadequate, if not wrong. When 
he states that general happiness is desirable, he means that an individ­
ual ought to desire general happiness. Each person in an aggregate 
desiring his own happiness does not, however, connote each person in the 
aggregate desiring other people's happiness. Therefore the principle 
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that general happiness ought to be desired by each individual has to be 
established via the philosophical intuitionist route. 
But is general happiness also the universal good? This is by no 
means self-evident. One cannot deduce as J. S. Mill did that because 
men desire their own happiness, therefore happiness is desirable or good. 
We saw in the discussion of "good" earlier how Sidgwick, by defining 
ultimate good as desirable consciousness demonstrates that good is the 
same thing as general happiness. 
Utilitarianism 
By utilitarianism, Sidgwick means universalistic hedonism—"the 
ethical theory, that the conduct which under any given circumstances, is 
objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of 
happiness on the whole, that is taking into account all those whose 
13 happiness is affected by the conduct." Utilitarianism is a combination 
of two principles: 1) the consequentialist principle that the Tightness 
ur wrOngneaa, of ân action iâ decermined by the goodness, or badness of 
the results that flow from its end and 2) the hedonist principle that the 
only thing that is good in itself is pleasure and the only thing bad in 
itself is pain. The utilitarians have generally assumed that happiness 
is a sum of pleasures. 
The fact that the ultimate standard is universal happiness does not 
mean that universal benevolence is the only right or always best motive 
of action. Other motives than universal philanthropy, if more satisfac­
tory in the attainment of the goal, may be preferred. As we have noted 
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previously, happiness is commensurable but only imperfectly, The 
interests of posterity are as important as the interests of the present, 
subject to the fact of uncertainty about the future. On the whole, an 
individual human being enjoys through life net positive happiness. It 
is important for the utilitarian criterion of right conduct to estimate 
for different alternative distributions of the same happiness in order to 
consider which is preferable. To know the latter, the principle of 
justice or right distribution of happiness has to be added to that of 
greatest happiness. Sidgwick's principle of justice is equality, but as 
he makes clear in a footnote, equal distribution of happiness and not 
equal distribution of the means of happiness. 
One of the more striking aspects of Sidgwick's discussion of 
utilitarianism is his demonstration that utilitarianism corresponds to 
and coincides with the morality of common sense and solves the difficul­
ties and anomalies produced by the practical applications of the latter. 
Arguing for the correspondence between utility and common sense, 
Shaftesbury had already shown that the moral sense is in harmony with the 
balance of affections that tended to the good or happiness of the whole. 
David Hume had gone even further in pointing out that the perception of 
utility was the source of all moral likings and aversions. Adam Smith 
had emphasized the objective coincidence of tightness and utility. 
Sidgwick recognizes that there are many voluntary actions, that, while 
not being virtuous, are certainly more useful than virtues. Common sense 
morality is therefore based on imperfect utilitarianism. 
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Utilitarianism resolves many of the difficulties that a merely 
intuitive view of common sense morality produces. For example, utili­
tarianism resolves the problems in the relationship between moral excel­
lence and moral effort. Certain acts are done happily without any effort 
and naturally, without regard to duty. Certain acts done for the sake of 
duty achieve the triumph of duty over momentary inclination, promoting 
happiness in both cases. The problem of choice between the two is also 
eliminated. A utilitarian would decide on the basis of the consequences 
of the acts. 
Sidgwick subjects all the virtues such as wisdom, benevolence, 
justice, etc. to the criterion of utility when common sense morality Is 
not clear and comes up with the conclusion that the "fellclflc" calculus 
does Indeed rationalize and complete common sense. 
Wisdom and general happiness are not so directly related. Wisdom's 
significance is not directly utilitarian but utilitarianism does not 
contradict wisdom. 
The difficulty with regard to benevolence, that it Implies the dis­
position to promote the good rather than the happiness of individuals, 
is overcome by the fact that the virtue that good means does tend to 
promote one's own or other people's happiness. A second difficulty is 
that utilitarianism goes beyond the standard of duty in prescribing that 
the moral agent consider other people's happiness as equally important to 
his. But in fact, since an Individual is regarded as knowing the means 
to his own happiness better than other people's, the practical emphasis 
is on the pursuit of one's own happiness primarily. Moreover, 
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self-interest is the major engine of effort. To reduce the stimulus of 
self-interest would reduce happiness considerably. So that, according 
to utilitarianism, the individual will in fact concern himself and should 
concern himself with other people's happiness only secondarily to his 
own. In practice, the concern for other people extends only to a few 
other persons, but suppression of the affections for the few because 
these affections are not broader will only destroy the basis of existing 
affections. Therefore, both on theoretical and practical grounds, the 
benevolent impulses are limited in their application. 
Sidgwlck's setting up of a hierarchy of importance of happiness 
from one's own to those close to one, to more distant people, is not 
entirely satisfactory. Beyond one's own family and friends and neighbors, 
how does one set up a hierarchy? Moreover, there is a logical difficulty. 
Either the two principles of pursuit of one's own happiness and the pur­
suit of the general happiness are consistent with the prescriptions of 
intuition and reason, or one of them at least, must be false. 
The utilicarian view u£ juaciCe also lêâdâ to â ïïiOi'c concrète view 
of justice. As we have seen in the introductory chapter, for David Hume, 
justice meant "order" in the widest sense of the term, "the observance of 
the actual system of rules, whether strictly legal or customary, which 
bind together the different members of any society into an organic whole, 
checking malevolent or otherwise injurious impulses, distributing the 
different objects of men's clashing desires, and exacting such positive 
services, customary or contractual, as are commonly recognized as matters 
of debt."^  ^ The assertion that order or law observance conduces to 
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social happiness needs no proof. The limits of obedience to law are also 
set by utilitarian considerations. The problem of the source of legiti­
macy of the political sovereign is also resolved by examining the effects 
rather than the causes of governmental power. The argument between 
different forms of government and laws may be better dealt with by bring­
ing in utilitarian considerations. 
Utilitarianism supports equality of treatment under the law and 
simultaneously defends inequality to the extent that freedom of action is 
a source of happiness to the individual person and conduces towards 
socially useful actions. The sanctity of contract, whether embodied in 
actual agreements, or in legitimate expectation can be defended on 
utilitarian grounds, on the basis of the respective harm or gain to 
individuals and to society. Exceptions to the rule of good faith can 
be similarly defended or opposed on utilitarian grounds. Justice is 
thus subordinate to considerations of social utility, not absolute as in 
the intuitional case which creates many problems in application. 
It is also possible to consnent from a utilitarian point of view on 
the concept of ideal justice which is used by the proponents of absolute 
freedom and socialism. The utilitarian rationale for freedom is that 
each person is best qualified to provide for his own interests and that 
he pursues these latter more effectively in freedom. At the same time, 
the limitations on absolute freedom are such as are required on the 
utilitarian principle. 
Ideal justice requires the exclusion of arbitrary inequality in the 
distribution not only of freedom but of all other burdens and benefits. 
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On the modification of the system of expectations and rewards produced by 
the market system in order to realize ideal justice, the practical con­
sideration when there is a conflict of utilities involved will be one set 
of advantages against another reckoned in terms of happiness. 
The importance of utilitarianism as the ultimate standard of 
individual moral conduct and social policy thus established, the method 
of utilitarianism may then be defined as empirical hedonism. The dis­
cussion of the role of common sense morality, with its inadequacies in 
concrete situations and its need for a criterion such as universalistic 
hedonism leads to the conclusion that the rules of common sense morality 
actually constitute the middle axioms of the utilitarian method. The 
rules of utilitarianism are required only to settle the questions where 
common sense is uncertain but they are essential because the rules of 
common sense are inadequate. 
Can utilitarianism in fact deduce general rules that are valid for 
concrete situations and applicable to the variety of human beings and 
societies that constitute mankind? Sidgijick is such more of a moral 
conservative than Bentham or Mill, He does not believe in a clean sweep 
of existing moral convictions. Therefore his answer is, there cannot be 
a newly constructed code devised that can then be presented for the 
acceptance of all men. For men live in societies that already have moral 
codes which have a certain measure of general acceptance. They live in 
societies that are constantly changing, requiring corresponding changes 
in moral sentiments and rules. Therefore, in devising the rules of 
morality for an existing society, we have to start with the existing 
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social order and the morality that is part of that order and examine the 
question how the society may be modified, to the extent feasible, given 
the initial conditions. The utilitarian rules should take into account 
the effects on the society of the attempt to modify it on a utilitarian 
basis. Thus Utopian attempts at reconstruction have to be ruled out and 
only gradual modifications, small changes from the existing code of moral 
rules, attempted. The utilitarian should take an attitude of reverence 
towards the existing moral code. It is imperfect admittedly; therefore, 
the utilitarian is obligated to improve it. The only method to ascertain 
what practical modifications in existing morality to work towards, would 
be that of empirical hedonism. This amounts to a consideration, however 
imperfectly, of the total quantities of pain and pleasure that may be 
expected to result from continuing the existing rule and from attempting 
to change that rule. 
Chapter IV examines the inadequacies of the utilitarian view both as 
an operational guide to individual conduct and social policy and the 
LUclJUl muuiiccu vu UilC J.CtUJ.DlU UJL tJXUgWJ.CtS,  uy lUUUCLLl 
philosophers and theorists such as Hayek, Nozick and Rawls. But it must 
be said at this point that the claims made by Sidgwick for his modified 
utilitarianism are exaggerated. The literature on the social welfare 
function is ample testimony to the difficulties of quantifying the con­
cept of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." The prescrip­
tions of utilitarianism are often ambiguous and always involve exceptions 
to rules of thumb. The considerable literature of the fifties and six­
ties developing "rule-utilitarianism" arose precisely from this inability 
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of act-utilitarianism to specify the required course of action unambigu­
ously. The issue is therefore of how one may supplement the large 
amount of usual guidance that moral thought of a utilitarian character 
provides by other principles. 
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T^he chapter is based entirely on H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics 
(New York; Macmillan and Co., 1907). 
2 H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan and Co., 
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Sidgwick takes a more radical position than John Stuart Mill. 
Compare: "Nothing is implied in property but the right of each to his 
(or her) own faculties, to what he can produce by them, and to whatever 
he can get for them in a fair market: together with his right to give 
this to any other person if he chooses, and the right of that other to 
receive and enjoy it. It follows, therefore, that although the right 
of bequest, or gift after death, forms part of the idea of private 
property, the right of inheritance, as distinguished from bequest, does 
not." J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy (New York: The 
Colonial Press, 1900), vol. 2, pp. 215-216. 
12 In feras of the final conclusion regarding requital for desert, 
compare J. B. Clark "...where natural laws have their way, the share of 
income that attaches to any productive function is guaged by the actual 
product of it. In other words, free competition tends to give labor what 
labor creates, to capitalists what capital creates, and to entrepreneurs 
what the coordinating function creates." J. B. Clark, The Distribution 
of Wealth (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920), p. 3. J. B. Clark 
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establishes the above on "positive" grounds. Sidgwick argues that the 
conclusion is defensible on moral grounds. 
Sidgwick, op. cit., p. 411. 
Sidgwick, op. cit., p. 440. 
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CHAPTER III. THE ECONOMICS OF HENRY SIDGWICK 
Introduction 
The Principles of Political Economy (1883) of Henry Sidgwick stands 
in the transitional phase between the classical economics of Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo and J. S. Mill and the neoclassical revolution in economics 
heralded by W. S. Jevons' The Theory of Political Economy (1871) and 
culminating in Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics (1890). Its 
central concerns, which it shares with the latter, are method, the theory 
of exchange and distribution regarded as aspects of a general theory of 
value, and a separation of the scientific or analytical aspects of eco­
nomics from policy aspects which involve political as well as economic 
considerations. Economics underwent a major shift of emphasis between 
Adam Smith and J. S. Mill who were greatly concerned with the growth of 
national income (wealth) and Alfred Marshall who turned the primary atten­
tion of economic theory to problems of resource allocation. Sidgwick 
stands intermediace between the classical economists and Mârëhâll la this 
shift of emphasis. 
Henry Sidgwick made distinctive contributions to the theory of 
governmental Intervention in the economy by emphasizing the failures of 
the competitive system in cases where public goods, externalities and 
provision for the future were involved. His attempt to synthesize what 
he regarded as the essential need to promote greater equality by govern­
ment policy with the necessity to maintain economic efficiency unimpaired, 
provides the starting point for the modern discussion of social justice. 
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His theory of property which combines moral, political and economic 
considerations, is of considerable relevance for economic policy as 
well. 
In reducing to proper proportions the dimensions of the attack on 
the classical political economy of Ricardo and Mill by the historicists 
led by Cliff Leslie and by the theoretical contributions of Jevons, 
Sidgwick prepared the way for the new consensus of economic theory that 
evolved around Marshall's Principles. In delineating the creative con­
tinuity of economic thought since Adam Smith, not excluding Jevons' 
signal contributions, Sidgwick was a precursor of Alfred Marshall. 
For example, due to preoccupation with method that was character­
istic of economics in the sixties and seventies, Sidgwick started by 
defending the place of deductive reasoning in economics. He argued that 
it (deductive reasoning) should not be judged in terms of Ricardo's 
use of it. Ricardo was not faultless, states Sldgwlck, but Ricardo's 
doctrines, stated with proper qualifications and reservations "ought 
lO Li.tiû â piâCê xfi etuy Cumpxêuê cXpub i.i. luû ui euuuuuixc , &ic 
goes on to show that Mill supplemented Ricardo in giving due place to 
the operation of supply and demand in the determination of market price. 
In his own treatment of demand, Sldgwlck explains the law of demand in 
terms of Jevons' concept of 'final utility.' The integration of 
classical political economy with the emerging concept of the 'margin' 
is similar to and preceded Marshall's attempt to establish Ricardo's 
substantial correctness and the Injustice of Jevons' attack on Ricardo 
and Mill.2 
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Scope of Political Economy 
Sidgwick was greatly concerned that political economy as it had 
developed since Adam Smith's time had served to defend the established 
order and thus roused the antagonism of the leaders of workers. Though 
Sidgwick defended the classical economists as advocates of the system of 
natural liberty, he avers that they did so "sadly rather than trium­
phantly." Nevertheless, he admits that: 
It remains true that English political economy has been 
an advocate of laissez-faire not only in regard to foreign 
trade but also in regard to wages. They have opposed all 
attempts either by law or public opinion to introduce a dif­
ferent distribution of wealth. They have not gone the length 
of maintaining that distribution by free competition is per­
fectly just, as proportioning reward to service but have 
maintained that it is the best mode of dividing the produce 
of the organized labor of human beings." 
He therefore regarded it as essential that the investigation of 'what is' 
(laws that determine actual prices, wages and profits) should be separate 
from a consideration of what 'ought to be' (what is desirable regarding 
wages and profits). 
By economics as an art, Adam Smith meant the end of making national 
4 
wealth as great as possible. But Sidgwick felt that usage justified 
including also the art of distribution of which the aim is "to apportion 
the produce among the members of the community so that the greatest 
amount of utility or satisfaction may be derived from it.This would 
take eceneaics beyond the area of exact measurement, but according to 
Sidgwick, the exactness of economics as compared with the exactness of 
other political estimates was Overrated.^  
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At the heart of the problem of economics as an art, said Sldgwlck 
is the question: Should distribution be on the principle of "economy" 
so as to obtain the greatest utility or on the principle of justice or 
equity? It is essential to see how far the application of the latter 
would coincide with and diverge from the pursuit of the economic ideal. 
He thus regarded political economy as the study of government policy for 
improvement of national production and for mitigating inequalities in 
distribution of produce. 
While political economy as an art had since Adam Smith been a 
defender of laissez faire, since Ricardo's time and certainly since 
J. S. Mill's time, defense of the idea of the minimum interference of 
government in the distribution of wealth resulting from free competition 
has not been on the ground that the inequalities are satisfactory but 
that "any such Interference must tend to impair aggregate production more 
than it could increase the utility of the produce by a better dlstribu-
7 8 tlon." ' Sldgwlck*s conclusion was that political economy had to be 
fègûruêu both ââ SClcîiCc âûu ââ âZt but thût tuè lâttêr âSpêCt hâu tO 
9 be kept distinct from the former. 
Marshall too was concerned that economics should not be used to 
defend property or exclusive class privileges but he held that the 
"founders of modern economics were men of gentle and sympathetic temper, 
touched with the enthusiasm of humanity. They cared little for wealth 
for themselves; they cared much for its wide diffusion among the masses 
of people.The errors of classical economics were rather used by 
ignorant pamphleteers like Miss Martineau, a prolific writer of 
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anti-factory legislation tracts. People like Senior who had opposed 
factory legislation had done so when they had little knowledge of 
economics (Senior, according to Marshall, later recanted and McCulloch 
had not opposed factory legislation).^  ^ Marshall was eloquent in defense 
of economists who, he asserted, 
...supported the movement against the class legislation which 
denied to trade unions privileges that were open to associa­
tions of employers, or they worked for a remedy against the 
poison which the old Poor Law was instilling into the homes of 
the agriculturalj^ n^d other laborers; or they supported the 
factory acts.... 
Sidgwick held that economists had indeed defended laissez-faire not only 
in treating of production but of distribution. Even when they had not 
gone to the length of maintaining that distribution by free competition 
was Just, as proportioning reward to service, they had maintained that 
it was the best mode of dividing the produce of labor, from a practical 
point of view. They had, in defending the doctrine of noninterference 
aligned themselves with those men of policy who stood opposed to any 
attempt to restrain or modify the action of free competition in the 
interests of reducing the worst forms of deprivation or injustice. They 
had elevated the "scientific" ideal of perfectly free competition into 
a "practical" ideal. Thus, Marshall disagreed with Sidgwick about the 
actual role of economists in concrete policy matters in the 19th century. 
It is perhaps such different perceptions of the uses or misuses of the 
conclusions of classical political economy in policy debates that led 
Marshall to regard economics as "a science, pure and applied, rather 
13 
than a science and an art." Humanitarian though he was, Marshall did 
not share Sidgwick's passionate concern for greater equality. At any 
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rate he (Marshall) anticipated that economic progress would look after 
the problem of inequality and poverty. 
There Is thus a fundamental difference of view between Sldgwlck and 
Marshall as to the scope of political economy which led Marshall to 
regard "economics" as a better term to describe the area of study and 
Sldgwlck to emphasize the paradox among British economists (Smith, Mill 
and McCulloch) that whereas they regarded the study of production as 
having a practical aim. Increase of material abundance, they regarded 
distribution as something that hardly admitted of any improvement. 
Sldgwlck as a matter of fact is of the opinion that In the theory of 
production the relation between 'what is' and 'what ought to be' is much 
closer than in that of distribution. It is impossible to consider dis­
tribution as it ought to be without entering into the most fundamental 
controversies as to the ultimate basis and end of political union whereas 
in production the obvious and uncontroverted aim of all rational effort 
Is to produce as much as possible in proportion to the cost. It is 
therefore squally impcrtant to separate the sphere of scicr.cc and art in 
production, as in distribution. But since government in a laissez faire 
state, affects Industry and trade through laws of inheritance, bank­
ruptcy laws, patent laws, etc., the principles which ought to govern 
governmental interference in the economy—political economy as an art— 
is an essential aspect of economic study. 
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Method of Economics 
Sidgwick, following J. S. Mill, recognized the interdependence of 
economic phenomena with general social phenomena. In the study of 
industrial organization, a separate and historic inductive study was 
justified. But in treating the present, one might legitimately assume 
the structure of society as given. With regard to the theory of dis­
tribution and exchange--the static theory of resource allocation which 
Ricardo was concerned with--economics should be regarded as an abstract 
science. In distribution, wrote Sidgwick, we are concerned with the 
here and now, the vast differences in the division of the products of 
industry among different classes of persons and what the effect of any 
particular change in the determining conditions may be on the distri­
bution, other things being equal. With regard to exchange, we are con­
cerned with why prices are what they are and how far any particular 
event, other things remaining the same, would tend to raise or lower 
prices. In these matters, political economy is concerned to derive 
general laws governing the determination of remuneration and prices on 
the basis of a simplified world with freedom of exchange, freedom of 
occupation, etc. 
By means of this simplification we obtain exact answers 
to our general economic questions through reasonings that 
sometimes reach a considerable degree of complexity. It is 
obvious that answers so obtained do not by themselves enable 
us to accurately interpret or predict concrete economic 
phenomena, but it Is commonly held that when modified by a 
rough conjectural allowance for the difference between our 
hypothetical premises and the actual facts In any case, they 
do materially assist us in attaining approximate correctness 
in our interpretations and predictions.^  ^
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The applicability and utility of economic theory would then depend 
upon 1) the realism and simplicity of the assumptions, 2) divergence of 
reality from facts of the abstract case, and therefore the insight and 
skill shown in conjecturing the effects of modifying causes whose effect 
cannot be traced. Sidgwick thought that accurate knowledge of facts was 
needed to secure success in terms of the above conditions (1) and (2). 
He endorsed the basic behavioral assumption that individuals strive 
for maximum return--"universality and unlimitedness of the desire for 
wealth." While economists might justly be charged with not mentioning 
work done for power, reputation, family affection, patriotism, esprit 
de corps, in industry rarely is work totally uncompensated by monetary 
reward and such motives are found mainly in areas of charitable acts, 
government functions, etc. which supplement the deficiencies of distri­
bution. 
Sidgwick does object to the assumption of universal aversion to 
labor in the theory of distribution because many persons can get more 
happiness Out o£ wOrk thàû Out Of êxpêriuiture. (For example Jevons : 
"Labor is the painful exertion which we undergo to ward off pains of 
greater amount or to procure pleasures which leaves balance in our 
favor.Marshall does not disagree that work might be pleasurable to 
start with but since wages are determined by labor at the margin, he 
argues that it is correct to regard the labor at the margin as being 
"a disutility" (a term used by Jevons). (To be fair to Jevons, he also 
has the utility curve of labor showing positive utility in the early 
stages of work.)^  ^
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Sidgwick emphasized that thorough explicitness with regard to 
assumptions is needed. Given such explicitness, the deductive method, 
though limited in its utility to explain concrete situations, is valid 
in abstract and hypothetical model-building whose value depends upon its 
being used with as full knowledge as possible of the results of obser­
vation and induction. Moreover, the deductive method has great utility 
as a means of training the intellect in the kind of reasoning required 
for dealing with concrete economic problems. 
The Problem of Definition 
Sidgwick has a considerable discussion on the process of definition 
and suggests that common usage should be kept in mind as far as possible 
and that definitions should be adapted to the doctrine expounded. He 
distinguishes between what we commonly mean and what we ought to mean--
the meaning that for scientific purposes ought to be attached to the 
term.^  ^
Production 
The starting point of Sidgwick's discussion of production is its 
interdependence with distribution, "...the kinds of wealth produced in 
any society depend largely on the manner in which wealth is distributed 
among the members of society," he writes 
In a community where there is a large middle class, there 
will probably be an abundance of cheap luxuries, while where 
there are only a few rich persons among a multitude of poor, 
we shall expect to find a production mainly of necessaries with 
a small amount of costly and elaborate commodities. Similarly, 
distribution cannot fail to influence the amounts of wealth 
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produced; since both the nature and the intensity of the 
motives that normally prompt men either to labor or save, vary 
considerably according to their position in the scale of 
wealth and poverty. ° 
Though he treats of production, distribution and exchange separately, he 
disagrees with J. S. Mill and asserts that production and distribution 
are inextricably linked together for the only way of obtaining a precise 
idea of wealth is by devising a scientific way of "measuring" it. 
Measurement of what is produced is influenced by income distribution. 
Sidgwick here made an important point that has been taken up in modern 
19 development economics. 
Laws of Production 
Sidgwick tended to agree with the Malthusian theory of population, 
which he regarded as relevant to production theory only from the point 
of view of the law of diminishing returns. Tiie proposition about popu­
lation tending to outrun means of subsistence, he regarded only as a 
tendency. However, he did accept the proposition that was almost 
axiomatic with J. S. Mill that population increased with an increase in 
the means of subsistence. He followed Carey in limiting the operation 
of the law of diminishing returns. 
The point at which diminishing returns begins to operate, 
varies with the development of the industrial arts and the 
accumulation of capital; it tends to be removed continually 
further back by the progress of invention, provided that 
through the accumulation of capital, the improvement of proc­
esses which invention renders possible is actually realized.20 
Diminishing returns were manifested in agriculture, he believed, even if 
labor and capital increase proportionately, a point on which Alfred 
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Marshall who described the law of diminishing returns in terms of "an 
21 Increase in the capital and labor applied in the cultivation of land" 
is in agreement with him. Marshall also viewed It as a general tendency 
applying to any factor of production which is fixed in supply. 
Sidgwick also distinguished clearly between average and marginal 
product of labor. He writes "...ceteris paribus, any considerable 
increment of capital-aided labor, applied with average skill would be 
less productive than the average of capital aided labor actually 
22 
applied" i.e., marginal product of labor is less than average product. 
The law of diminishing returns is moreover an abstract statement which 
is a statement of a tendency and not a fact because inventions are made 
and the area of exchange widens. It describes a force whose operation 
is counteracted by another force. The net effect of diminishing returns 
and increasing returns due to "capital, invention and cooperation is an 
23 
empirical and not a theoretical matter." 
Value 
Sidgwick defines value of a thing, whether or not exchange is 
involved, as what one would give if necessary to gain or keep it. Where 
exchange is involved, it would mean whet other people would give for the 
article in question. (It would appear that Sidgwick had an idea of 
'opportunity cost.' In his discussion of wealth, he refers to goods 
with an opportunity cost of zero as follows: "This is the case of 
products which from their special adaptation to unique uses, could not 
Ill 
possibly be transferred without losing most of their utility, and there­
fore of their value. 
A problem arises when values of the same thing are compared at 
different times. For then, one can no longer take anything one likes as 
a standard of value. If individual values are compared with value of 
things in general, there is the problem of aggregation and if value of 
one thing has to be compared with something that has not changed in 
value, there is the problem of defining what "not varying in value" 
means. 
Sidgwick rejects the Smithian notion, as he perceives it, of labor 
as the standard of exchange value, as well as the view of J, S. Mill that 
evaluating exchange value relative to things in general is impossible. 
To enable the money price of a thing at two different 
periods to measure the quantity of things in general which 
it will exchange for. Mill had written, "the same sum of 
money must correspond at both periods to the same quantity of 
things in general, that is, money must always have the same 
exchange value, the same general purchasing power. Now not 
only is this not true of money, or of any other commodity, but 
we cannot^ |uppose any state of circumstances in which it would 
be crue." 
Sidgwick reasons that it had been possible historically to establish 
variations in the value of gold between two points in time and that to 
this extent, it would be possible to estimate the value of the same thing 
at different times, relatively to things in general. He considered it 
important to examine the adequacy of measures of the purchasing power of 
money and was thus led to consider the question of the usefulness and 
limitations of index-numbers. 
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Sidgwlck examines Ricardian value theory, noting the inconsistency 
in the latter which defines the real value of things as measured by 
labor, while at the same time drawing attention to the different values 
of products due to the different degrees of durability of the capital 
employed in producing them. He rejects the view of the socialists who 
he thinks have "ingeniously perverted Ricardo's inconsistency into an 
argument against the remuneration of capitalists" and suggests that cost 
should consist of 'labor and delay' and not just of 'labor' only. Thus 
modified, he accepts this Ricardian notion of real value. (Marshall in 
a similar defense of Ricardo against Rodbertus and Marx wrote "...it 
seems difficult to imagine how he (Ricardo) could more strongly have 
emphasized the fact that time or waiting as well as labor is an element 
26 
of cost of production." ) 
Sidgwick has an additional reason for accepting the Ricardian "real 
value" which is based on the Ricardian analysis of an invariant measure 
of value and of the Ricardian attempt to generalize the idea of a 
ccnKscdity whose cost of production and therefore price is invariant 
through time so as to serve as an absolute yardstick against which to 
measure price changes in other commodities. Sidgwick writes, 
...in the comparison of equivalents which I hold to be essen­
tially implied in the common notion of value, the exact nature 
of the equivalents compared is not determined; when, however, 
we think of the value of a particular product, we ordinarily 
consider it as exchanged for money or some other material 
wealth. But when we consider the valuable products of human 
labor (including money) in the aggregate, this kind of com­
parison seems inappropriate, since there remains no material 
thing outside the aggregate for which we could consider the 
aggregate exchanged, in this case then it is natural to com­
pare the aggregate of products with the labor (and delay) 
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that it would cost to reproduce them--so far at least as we 
would desire to reproduce them. 
Important as it might be to know the varying amounts of labor and 
time required to produce a given commodity, he admits that such knowledge 
helps us little in measuring its variations in exchange value relatively 
to things in general, which also leads him to consider the problem of 
measuring changes in the general purchasing power. 
Sidgwick has a sophisticated discussion of changes in the general 
purchasing power over a period of time in terms of index numbers. He 
adopts one of Jevons' solutions of weighting-considering different 
articles as differently important in proportion to the value of the total 
quantities bought and sold. He opts for the weighted sum of prices 
rather than the geometric mean of price ratios advocated by Jevons. 
28 
Alfred Marshall followed Sidgwick in this regard. 
Sidgwick also points to the difficulty that for a community as for 
individuals, patterns of consumption change. People will buy more of 
cheaper things at a different point in time. So he writes, 
Under these circumstances, the proposed method (of cal­
culating index numbers as representative of changes in general 
purchasing power--R.V.) presents us with two alternatives; we 
may either take the total amount of things purchased at the 
latter period and consider how much they would have coat twenty 
years before, or we may exactly reverse the process. It is 
manifest, however, that these alternative procedures might lead 
to different and even opposite answers to the question. 
What change has occurred in the general purchasing power of money? 
"Since it may easily be that men would have both had to pay more for 
what they buy now, also more now for what they bought twenty years 
ago."29 
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Sidgwick laid stress on the progress of the industrial arts which 
complicated the picture because of the changes in the quality of goods 
they bring about. New kinds of products bring about particularly acute 
difficulties. Similar problems exist also in comparing values in two 
different places by the method of index numbers. 
Wealth 
Sidgwick's discussion of wealth bears such a close resemblance to 
that of Marshall later, that one may suggest the possibility that 
Marshall may have been influenced by Sidgwick's discussion of the 
30 problem. Wealth of an individual is defined as his net asset position 
taking into account all useful things whether material such as food, 
clothes, houses, or immaterial things such as debts, patents, copyrights, 
etc. which are valuable and transferable and can be sold at a price. 
The valuation of assets would be in terms of exchange value using money 
as a convenience. There are the same problems of aggregation of dis­
similar ccjinmoditiea iii terms o£ vàluë âs iïi êVâluàulrig tue gêiiêrâl ptiCc 
level. Wealth by definition includes only purchased commodities and 
excludes unpurchased and useful things like sun's light and heat, air, 
the rain, etc. 
The Ricardian measure of labor is not adequate, he suggests, but 
utility also cannot be the sole standard of wealth because even from the 
point of view of a single person, utility depends upon availability and 
level of consumption. He raises also the difficulties of measuring 
wealth arising from the declining marginal utility of wealth because the 
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latter means that wealth distribution would partly determine the amount 
of wealth. Without attempting to resolve these difficulties, Sidgwick 
accepts the second best solution of measuring amounts of same wealth by 
their quantity, and wealth of different kinds by their exchange value. 
With regard to services, he clearly sees no difference between the pro­
duction of a material good and that of a service and therefore is clear 
that both should be reckoned in current production or aggregate income 
but not in wealth. Sidgwick concluded that education is significant for 
wealth and that the skills of a population do constitute wealth -
Investment of capital and "perhaps" wealth. (He was hesitant In his 
assertion that skill is wealth. Marshall excludes from wealth all 
personal qualities and faculties, even those which enable a person to 
31 
earn his living, because they are internal to people.) Debts of 
various kinds constitute wealth only to the extent that they are debts 
of foreigners. But one has to take into account the potential for en­
hancing productivity that is generated by a sophisticated or well-
32 developed monetary and credit system. 
Capital 
Sidgwick defines capital as wealth employed in production so as to 
yield a profit from an individual point of view and wealth used produc­
tively, i.e. "in adding utility to matter." Wealth becomes capital when 
used in production. He felt that Ricardo and James Mill had adopted a 
too restrictive view of capital as "food and other articles consumed by 
the laborers, the raw material on which they operate and the instruments 
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of all sorts which are employed in aiding their laborers." Inventory 
is part of capital as well as the man-made improvements on land but not 
land itself. Capital includes human capital but human capital is recog­
nized to be nontransferable and distinctive and called "personal 
capital." 
Without denying that funds used to pay labor may have been a part of 
the capital of the employer in the previous period, Sidgwick suggests, 
though tentatively, that accumulation refers not to wage goods (the wage 
fund) but to the instruments of production, buildings, machinery, 
improvements in land, etc. Savings and accumulation have to be embodied 
in goods used in further production in order to be called capital. 
Sidgwick was equally clear that the consumption-savings-investment 
functions have to be performed in a socialistic economy as well as a 
capitalistic economy. 
Like Jevons,^  ^Sidgwick regards durable goods like houses as capi­
tal and as a matter of fact all goods kept in stock as inventory, as 
1. wd 1. • 
Thus, Sidgwick appears simultaneously to accept two views of capi­
tal—the broader one of regarding as coextensive, wealth (in a social 
sense) and capital, and the narrower one of the store of things, the 
result of past labor devoted to securing benefits in the future. 
Sidgwick's analysis contains the concepts expounded later by 
Marshall, the "prospective" as well as the "productive" views of capital. 
By "prospectIveness" Marshall meant the "faculty of realizing the future" 
or of "waiting" for it: by "productiveness," the extra benefit of 
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"productiveness of efforts wisely spent in providing against distant 
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evils or for the satisfaction of future wants." Marshall was later to 
point out that while technically and rigorously the broader view of 
capital which was adopted by Walras, Jevons and Fisher was the correct 
one, the narrower one that limits capital to "all things other than land, 
which yield income that is generally reckoned as such in common dis­
course; together with similar things in public ownership, such as govern­
ment factories; the term land being taken to include all free gifts of 
36 
nature such as mines, fisheries, etc. which yield income" was the mean­
ing he proposed to give to it. 
Savings 
Given the demand for capital, supply of savings depends only to a 
limited extent on the interest rate. Sidgwick improves upon J. S. Mill 
who had emphasized that savings depended on 1) the surplus--"the amount 
of the fund from which saving can be made" and 2) the interest rate— 
"the greater the profit can be made from capital, the stronger is the 
motive to its accumulation.""' Along with these, Mill had also referred 
to the cultural and social environment, the general state of society and 
civilization which, given the above two factors, produced varied inclina­
tions to save. Sidgwick suggests that savings depend upon 1) "how far 
the community can afford to labor for remote results" and 2) expected 
rate of return--"so far as it can afford this, for what amount of 
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economic gain it will be willing to postpone immediate consumption." 
He recognizes the importance for savings of factors like the stability 
society, family affection, habit and custom as well as the complexity of 
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the motives to save and spend; for example, if saving is for the purpose 
of obtaining income from savings, the savings would go up with a fall in 
the rate of interest. Saving by poorer classes is not affected by the 
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rate of interest. 
"In the first place" he writes, "the amount that may be 
saved by a community within any given period tends to be 
increased, ceteris paribus, by any cause that increases the 
real income of the coimunity during that period." 
Thus, Sidgwick may well have anticipated John Maynard Keynes. 
À rather distinctive point made by Sidgwick is that the social 
benefit from new investment may be different from the private return as 
reflected in the interest rate. Just as new investment may render old 
capital obsolete rendering social gain less than private gain, if as a 
result of new Investment lower prices result, social gains can be 
greater than private return. 
Distribution and Exchange 
The subject of distribution is treated as part of the subject of 
exchange value. Sidgwick differed in this respect from J. S. Mill who 
not only discussed distribution separately from and prior to exchange 
but felt that a discussion of distribution needed only "anticipating 
some small portion of the theory of value, especially as to value of 
labor and of land."^  ^ Marshall, of course, treated the problem of dis­
tribution as One of the general theory of exchange and of the twin 
forces of supply and demand. 
Sidgwick distinguished between functional atiu personal dlBtrlbutlcn 
of income. The functional distribution of income he regarded as a 
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matter of abstract economic analysis, based on a consideration of the 
principles which determine the exchange value of the productive services 
of capital (including land) and labor. 
He defined carefully gross national product which he called 
"produce," ("the new increment of commodities" continually produced by 
labor and capital and nearly equivalent to the "real income" of the 
community--nearly equivalent because produce did not include the 
utilities a person derives from his own labor and the unpaid labor of 
the members of his family) as inclusive of investment and government 
expenditure in addition to consumption. He felt that for consideration 
of the problem of distribution, the services of durable consumer wealth 
like houses and the imputed value of goods and services not exchanged in 
a market such as services to oneself including cooking and cleaning, 
washing clothes, etc. had to be considered. He assumed "free bargaining 
among persons seeking each his private interest" and suggested that 
therefore the theory of distribution was only applicable in a partial 
and qualified manner to societies in which prices were determined by law 
and custom. (J. S. Mill also attached a great deal of importance to 
the forces of law and custom in distribution.) Sidgwick distinguished 
the categories of distribution as 1) wages and salaries; 2) profits of 
entrepreneurs who own capital and land and whose returns include 
interest and rent and wages of management; 3) interest on borrowed funds 
and 4) rent on hired land. The theory of distribution is regarded there­
fore as a theory of the prices of the services of land, labor and 
capital. 
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Theory of Exchange Value 
Sidgwick distinguished between two types of market structures--
monopoly and perfect competition and tended to regard as free competition 
any situation not involving monopoly. He assumed Jevons' law of indif­
ference that there is only one market price per unit for all quantities 
sold of a given commodity. 
The meaning of perfect competition is not clearly specified. 
Sidgwick adopted Cairnes' distinction between "commercial competition" 
among traders and "industrial competition" involving mobility of factors 
between regions and industries. The former he regarded as relevant to 
market values or prices as determined by demand and supply and inter­
preted it as the interactive process between different sellers confronted 
with the buyers. Industrial competition, he regarded as setting "natural 
values" so far as they are determined by cost of production. 
Sidgwick clarified much of the framework of J. S. Mill's discussion 
of value in Book III, Chapters I to VI of his Principles of Political 
Economy but in many cases improved upon Mill considerably. 
Sidgwick assumed constant purchasing power of money, thus being 
able to substitute the term 'price' for 'value.' He saw demand as a 
schedule (Jevons has come close to such a concept in his Theory of 
Political Economy when he speaks of 
"The aggregate, or what is the same, the average consump­
tion, of a large community" as "varying continuously or nearly 
so" and again when he writes that "Any change in the price of 
an article will be determined not with regard to the large 
numbers who might or might not buy it at other prices, but by 
the few who will or will not buy it accordingly as a change is 
made close to the existing price." 
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a downward sloping one which he christened the "Law of Demand." 
"We assume," he wrote, "that for any given price there is 
a certain amount which purchasers are willing to take at that 
price; and that so long as all else remains unchanged this 
amount will be greater when the price is lower, and less when 
it is hi^ er. What the exact extent of any such variation in 
demand will be, for any given change in price, we have no means 
of knowing a priori and we make no general assumptions with 
regard to it."43 
Sidgwick explains the law of demand in terms of Jevons' concept of 
"final utility." He refers to the fact that unequal distribution of 
wealth will mean that the same price will represent different degrees of 
utility to different purchasers so that the increase in quantity demanded 
as a result of lower price is a sum total result of a diversity of esti­
mates of marginal utility made in a wide variety of conditions. 
Distinguishing between changes in demand and changes in quantity 
demanded, Sidgwick writes. 
But when we sepak of 'price rising as demand rises' 
(J. S. Mill) we are contemplating not the effect of a given 
law of demand (used to mean a given demand schedule-R.V.) 
but a change in such a law. We are supposing that owing to 
some change in social needs or desires, or in the supply of 
SCÎÏÏC CwhciT Cvuttiiodity, ox psrhsps in the gSwGral WG&lth of 
society, a new law of demand (a new demand schedule-R.V.) 
has come into operation and the amount of the commodity 
demanded at any price has increased.^ 4 
He suggests for clarity "extension of demand" for movements along a 
demand schedule and "rise in demand" for a shift to the right of the 
demand schedule (and 'reduction' and 'fall' in the opposite senses). 
Paradoxically, he did not discuss the concept of elasticity of 
demand in relation to domestic demand but in his discussion of inter­
national values. In this respect he follows J. S, Mill who also intro­
duces the concept of elasticity of demand which he (J. S. Mill) called 
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"the influence of cheapness on demand"--"that the demand would be in­
creased more than the cheapness, as much as the cheapness or less than 
the cheapness," only in the section on International trade in discussing 
the division of benefits of trade between two countries following tech­
nological progress.Sidgwick introduces the concept of "extensible" 
or "elastic" demand (both terms are used) as follows: 
...in proportion as the demand in either country for the 
foreign wares of the other is more extensible or elastic 
(emphasis mine-R.V.) than the corresponding demand on the 
other side, that is, in proportion as the law of demand 
(given demand schedule-R.V.) for the foreign wares is of 
such a kind that a comparatively small fall in their prices 
causes, ceteris paribus, a comparatively large extension in 
the demand for them.... 
With regard to supply Sidgwick improved upon J. S. Mill and points 
out that supply is not a fixed amount independent of price but is also 
a schedule of quantities offered at different prices. 
As pointed out earlier, Sidgwick follows closely J, S. Mill's dis­
cussion of value and is somewhat limited by its ambiguities and lack of 
clarity. In order to follow Sidgwick, it is necessary to take a brief 
look at Mill's discussion. 
Mill distinguished between 'market value' (temporary value) which 
depends upon demand and supply and 'natural value' (permanent value) 
towards which market value tended to return "after every variation." 
With regard to the natural value of commodities. Mill had three cate­
gories. 1) Cases of things whose supply would not be increased at all 
or which could not satisfy the quantity demanded at their cost of pro­
duction (wages plus profits). Such commodities might be few but arti­
ficial limitation of supply under monopoly could make this category 
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larger. The case of monopoly thus Is subsumed in this category. 
2) The case of commodities ("embracing the majority of all things bought 
and sold")^  ^which can be increased without limit at the same cost--the 
constant cost case. 3) Those "commodities which can be multiplied to an 
indefinite extent by labor and expenditure, only a limited quantity can 
be produced at a given cost; if more is wanted, it must be produced at 
greater cost"^ ® the case of increasing cost. 
With regard to case 1, according to Mill, price would be determined 
by demand, given the fixed quantity of supply. In case 2, the necessary 
minimum (cost of production) would also be the maximum "if competition 
is free and active." Cost of production would determine value. 
It is therefore strictly correct to say that the value of 
things which can be increased in quantity at pleasure, does not 
depend (except accidentally, and during the time necessary for 
production to adjust itself) upon demand and supply; on the 
contrary, demand and supply depend upon it. 
In regard to the third category, natural price is determined by marginal 
cost--"the cost necessary for producing and bringing to market the most 
costly portion cf the supply required. 
Henry Sidgwick discusses monopoly in terms of slowly rising marginal 
cost or constant costs and elasticity of demand. He anticipated Alfred 
Marshall by relating elasticity of demand to changes in total revenue 
following changes in price. He suggests that inelasticity may be more 
characteristic of demand where monopoly exists and if this is the case 
the monopolist will learn to restrict the quantity supplied. 
There is an Interesting discussion of duopoly with an example of 
two mineral springs with the same quality of water and two persons 
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working them. He comes to the conclusion that competition between the 
two sellers will bring the price down to marginal cost (the spring owners 
have a horizontal marginal cost curve). There are, however, no refer­
ences to Cournot or any other economists in this discussion. (In the 
posthumously published 1901 edition of his Principles. Sldgwlck acknowl­
edged his debt to Cournot.) 
With regard to Mill's constant cost case, Sldgwlck discusses the 
fluctuations of market price and suggests that quantities brought to the 
market for sale are decided by price prevailing in the market. Given 
that the goods are durable and that there is a uniform rate of produc­
tion, assuming full information and perfect foresight, such goods will 
be sold under competition 
...at price at which there Is equal expectation of advantage 
in selling or holding back, i.e. at which any expected rise 
in prices is estimated as just sufficient to compensate for 
expense and loss on the stock kept back. 
Moreover, 
Supply that is kept back in any market partly depends 
on differences of cpinicn cn the part cf different dealers 
as to the future prospects of supply or demand. 
as well as differences in rates of interest charged to different 
borrowers, 
Sldgwlck anticipated Keynes, it would seem, in emphasizing expected 
rather than actual profits in the concept of cost of production. It is 
variation in expected profits which lead to flows of capital into 
industry, and determine supply changes. There is therefore a certain 
interdependence between demand and supply in the long run because higher 
demand leads to higher profits which in turn leads to the expectation of 
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higher profits and greater demand for skilled labor and higher costs. 
But economies of scale may exist, so that the increase of demand leading 
to increased production may reduce costs. Due to this interrelationship 
between demand and cost of production, there is no single natural price 
determined by cost of production. Moreover, it is Sidgwick's view that 
the situation of long run constant costs ("products of which the cost of 
production remains uniform while the supply is increased indefinitely") 
is not as general as Mill supposed. Constant costs might be a result of 
two opposed forces—economies of division of labor and increased prices 
of labor and resources best adapted to industry as industry expanded. 
Sidgwick shows that when marginal cost is equal to price, profit is 
at a maximum. 
Competition will obviously lead the producers to extend 
the supply until the price is brought down to the point at 
which the most costly portion is only just remuneratively 
produced. And it is further evident that there can be only 
one such point.^ 3 
However, the meaning of competition, referred to as 'free 
competition' is not always clear beyond the fact that it 
excludes combination. Sometimes as in the following passage 
there is even the suggestion that you can fix prices under 
competition. 
"Now it is manifest," writes Sidgwick. "that under a 
system of free competition, where production on a gmall scale 
is the more economical, the small employer ought to be able to 
keep his rate of profit (percent of capital) above the rate 
current in other industries, by keeping up the price of his 
commodity. 
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Theory of International Values 
Sidgwick's exposition of the theory of international values, apart 
from its elaboration of the concept of elasticity of demand, does not 
add much to Mill's discussion and in some respects may be regarded as 
obscure. He does however point to the need to estimate a standard of 
value common to two countries engaged in international trade and feels 
that such a standard could be obtained by estimating and allowing for 
the differences in the value of actual money. This could be done in 
terms of an index which is a weighted sum of prices in both countries. 
Implicit Is a purchasing power parity view of exchange in International 
transactions. 
Money 
Money is defined as including coin, banknotes, and demand deposits, 
Bagehot's Lombard Street being Invoked as authority for the last. 
Sldgwick thus disagreed with J. S. Mill's definition of money which 
included coined money or coin and paper substitutes but excluded bank­
notes (legal tender) and convertible banknotes—not legal tender—which 
Bagehot had called money of account (present demand deposits). Interest­
ingly, Marshall writing almost forty years later, makes no specific 
mention of demand deposits in his account of money though his statement 
that "when nothing is implied to the contrary» 'money' is to be taken 
as convertible with 'currency' and therefore to consist of all those 
things which are (at any time and place) generally 'current', without 
doubt or special inquiry as means of purchasing commodities and 
127 
services, and of defraying commercial obligations"^  ^does not exclude 
them. There are, however, definite suggestions in Marshall's treatment 
of money that checks economize in the use of currency and that banks can 
and do expand money supply. 
The restriction of supply by government is what determines the 
value of Inconvertible paper money, the value of coins (except of token 
coins) is dependent on the value of the metal, say gold (in the case of 
gold coin). The value of gold is dependent on the marginal cost of 
mining gold and upon demand. Because gold is durable, and all the gold 
in monetary use is in the market, changes in supply take long to affect 
price. Demand, therefore, has the greater influence. 
The demand for gold consists of the monetary demand including 
demand for bullion in international trade, the demand for ornamental or 
technical use and the demand for hoarding. The last is unimportant In 
Industrially developed countries and the demand for ornamental or tech­
nical use is generally stable and so that the value of money may be 
regarded as mainly dependent on the monetary demand for gold and its 
substitutes. Sldgwick concludes that 
So far as the quantities and relative values of the 
commodities exchanged remain the same, the quantity of gold 
demanded for the work of mediating exchanges may be taken 
to vary simply in reverse ratio to its purchasing power— 
for the obvious reason that as the price of anything rises, 
a proportionally larger amount of money is required to buy it. 
He thus adheres to the quantity theory of money although he sees Its 
effect modified because a fall in the purchasing power of money, being 
favorable to borrowers and particularly to industry» will tend to 
stimulate the economy. 
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"In this way," he writes, "the effects of our increase 
in the proportion of gold to commodities may be somewhat re­
duced, or at least spread over a longer period, by the 
stimulus to industry which the transition from the smaller to 
the larger relative quantity gives; a decrease may similarly 
act as discouragement."57 
One also has to take into account the effects of changes in the quantity 
of money on the distribution of income, which will in turn modify the 
work that money has to do. Sidgwick also considers the changes in price 
level that may be brought about by the extension of the use of credit 
in purchases, without any changes in the quantity of monetary gold. 
Sidgwick seems also to have been of the opinion that expenditure was an 
important element in determining the general price level. In arguing 
against Mill who wanted banknote currency issues to be regulated so as 
to maintain full convertibility (because Mill worried about the tendency 
of governments to overissue convertible currency), Sidgwick stressed 
that while banks may make loans or be prepared to issue loans, they 
cannot ensure expenditure. The latter was the important aspect for 
prices. 
The Rate of Interest 
J. S. Mill had essentially a loanable funds theory of the interest 
rate. "The rate of interest will be such as to equalize the demand for 
58 loans with the supply of them," he wrote. He regarded the demand for 
capital as the acquisition of purchasing power over commodities to be 
used as capital. 
Sidgwick distinguishes between cost of borrowed capital which he 
regards as interest and return on owned capital which includes wages of 
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management in addition to interest. This is very much like Mill's 
concept of profits as composed of three elements—remuneration for risk, 
for trouble and for the capital itself or insurance, wages of superin­
tendance, and interest. Sidgwick felt that the rate of interest in the 
money market is not the correct concept of the interest rate because 
it includes remuneration for the labor of those whose business is 
lending money. The true Interest rate is the price of capital borrowed 
from the public. 
Capital gains or losses have to be added to or subtracted from the 
interest but they are themselves caused by changes in the interest rate. 
The increase in nominal wealth is important from the point of view of 
distribution but Sidgwick ignored the problem temporarily by the static 
assumption of constant Interest rates. In a manner anticipatory of 
59 
Marshall, Sidgwick regards the interest rate as the rate on freshly 
applied capital. He also distinguished between nominal interest rates 
which varied greatly and actual yields which were not so different. 
Actual diffsrs2C22 in the interest rats correspond to differences in the 
general estimate of the probabilities of rise or fall in future yields or 
selling values of such investments. Some securities were accepted at 
lower yield because they were widely known and safe. Some Investors 
are moreover risk averters and seek safety and security while others 
seek adventure and risk. 
Sidgwick had a supply and demand theory for the determination of 
the price for the use of capital. Demand for the use of capital arises 
from Industrial and nonindustrial loans. Borrowing for production 
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generally is greater than borrowing for consumption. He therefore 
regarded the demand schedule as dependent mainly upon borrowing for 
industrial purposes. With the exception of borrowing for building 
houses, borrowing for consumption is regarded as largely Independent of 
the interest rate. Like Jevons, he explained the demand for capital as 
based on the "free and unfettered" choice made by the entrepreneur based 
on his expectation of the productivity of capital. He had a Bohm 
Bauwerklan view of the productivity of capital. "The general function 
of capital employed in Industry is to enable the ultimate net produce 
of labor to be Increased by processes which postpone the time of obtain­
ing it."^ ° 
Given that the use of capital Increased the produce of labor, 
demand for the use of capital depended upon marginal productivity 
...the rate of Interest on floating capital generally will tend 
to be equal to the ratio borne to the last Increment of such 
capital by the value of the average additional produce expected 
to be obtained by employing it—allowing for the varying Inter­
val that may elapse before the produce is obtained, and sub­
tracting what we may call "the employer's fee" i.e., the portion 
of produce that the employers of capital will retain as their 
remuneration for the labor of management. 
From a secular point of view, industrial opportunities recognized 
as such by employers determine the productivity of capital. These 
opportunities themselves depend on: 1) natural resources not yet 
exploited; 2) technology which determines natural resource exploitation 
potential; 3) the Iridustrial and political organization of sociaty-
whether or not it permits exploitation of potential as seen by "insight­
ful people," akin to the Sehuapeteriaa "social climate." 
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Sidgwlck refers to the existence of external economies which lead 
to "bunched" or related, complementary investments. For example, 
agricultural development makes investment in railways profitable. With 
railways further agricultural development and further development of 
manufacturers is made possible. 
Invention and innovation increase demand for capital. But in their 
absence, demand for capital depends on growth of population. But 
increase of capital under these circumstances might involve diminishing 
returns. There are thus two opposing tendencies-'diminishing returns 
and improved productivity through technological change and expanding 
international trade. Sidgwick recognized that progress might not be 
capital using. 
With regard to the supply of capital, Sidgwick postulates a rela­
tionship between savings and the rate of interest expressing the rate 
of time preference. "The rate of interest will express the average 
estimate formed in the conmunity of the comparative advantages of present 
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and future enjoyment of wealth."'" Given the motives for saving such as 
degree of foresight and control, capacity for being influenced by remote 
pleasures, habits and attitudes with regard to posterity, savings is a 
function of real income and the interest rate. It was Sidgwick's view 
that in the short run, savings are not much influenced by the interest 
rate so that in the short-run, the interest rate is determined by the 
demand for capital. But in the long-run, the interest rate is deter­
mined by demand for the services of capital and supply of savings as 
functions of the interest rate. 
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Rent 
Sldgwick defined rent as follows: 
Rent denotes the payment made for the use of 'immove­
ables' that is, either the surface of land as used in agri­
culture or buildings erected on it, or of the minerals it 
contains together with the right of removing or selling 
them.GS 
It is impossible to separate man-made improvements on land and "the 
original and indestructible properties of the soil." In practice, rent 
would exceed interest on Investment by present costs of maintenance, 
depreciation in the sense of compensation for ordinary deterioration of 
structures. Insurance against possible depreciation through technological 
change or change of fashion, as well as against other risks and wages of 
management of the land. He also points to the similarity in returns 
between land rent and the revenues of a railway company as demand grows, 
or the returns to patents or the return to good will. He thus seems to 
regard rent partly as return to special advantage fixed in supply. 
Wages 
Sidgwick understood by wages an average rate or amount of wages, 
such average being of all labor, not merely of unskilled labor as was 
postulated by J. S. Mill. Wages at subsistence (including cost of 
raising a family) do not constitute a maximum because labor can increase 
wages beyond subsistence by bargaining. Nor do they constitute a mini­
mum because employers, while prepared to pay subsistence to labor, may 
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not feel they should do so for the family from whom they do not get a 
return. 
Sidgwick did not hold the wage fund theory. Firstly, he saw that 
the wage fund theory would mean that the demand for labor did not depend 
upon the demand for the good which labor helped to produce (and hence 
marginal utility) but merely upon the funds available for hiring labor. 
Secondly, he recognized that there is very little relationship in Mill's 
theory of distribution between exchange value of products and that of 
factors of production. 
Actually he denied that wages are paid out of capital at all. It 
comes out of finished products for the consumption of laborers and 
others. The initial investments of capital and labor continually re­
sults in the product which is the source of payment of real wages, as 
well as real profits, interest and rent. The transaction (payment of 
wages in return for labor), said Sidgwick, is a purchase; not a loan; 
an exchange, not an advance. À distinction has to be made between 
'capital' and 'produce.' 
Sidgwick visualized the production process as a continuous flow. 
The assistance rendered to labor as purchased by the employer leads to 
output, a part of which passes on to laborers as their share or produce. 
An increase of capital in production Indirectly Increases wages by 
increasing "produce" (national income), 
"Thus we should regard each addition to the total stock 
of capital in the country," he wrote, "as containing an addi­
tion to the wages fund; but only as tending to increase wages 
indirectly so far ââ it; 1) incirêàûêS aggregate produce by 
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supplying industry with additional instruments; 2) increases 
the laborer's share of produce, in consequence of the lower 
rate of interest on the increased supply of capital."^ 4 
In the light of the above, it is somewhat surprising that Sidgwick 
postulates that given the supply of labor, the share of labor in the 
aggregate is determined by the residual of national income left after 
paying interest and rent. As population increases, this share of labor 
falls if capital is stationary—a conclusion similar to that of the 
wage fund theory. But his reason is that with population Increase, and 
capital constant, demand for capital goes up, interest rate goes up and 
thus the share of capital goes up. At the same time due to diminishing 
returns, the share of labor will be lower. Invention may Improve the 
share of labor aided by capital and human capital may similarly push 
up the share of labor. "Improvements in the physical, moral or intel­
lectual qualities of labor tend primarily to increase the share of the 
produce that falls to labor, leaving the share of capital unaltered. 
Marginal productivity is approved as an explanation for wages only 
tangencially at the end of the book where Sidgwick discusses dlutribu-
tive justice. 
With regard to the supply of labor, Sidgwick adduces factors like 
labor force participation rate given population, and population growth 
rate. The supply of labor is regarded as being affected by the wage 
rates through its influence on the population growth rate, a surprising 
reversion to J. S. Mill which ignores Jevons' relatively modernistic 
theory which incorporated both the work-leisure choice and marginal 
productivity.^  ^
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It Is also somewhat paradoxical that having described wages as the 
residual after payment of interest and rent, Sidgwick should also regard 
profits--resulting from the foresight and "prescience" of the entrepre­
neur and a reward for risk and uncertainty—as a residual too. 
...under the existing conditions of industry, profits are the 
leavings of wages so that the capitalist employer mostly bears 
the shock of unforeseen losses, and only passes on a part of 
the blow to his employees; and in the same way, he mostly 
secures the lion's share of unforeseen gains. ' 
Sidgwick has a clear theory of human capital and points out that 
given the rate of interest, the normal differences in wages due to train­
ing could be computed. 
"It would be sufficient," he says about such differences, 
"if continued for the average working period of life of such 
a skilled laborer, to replace with interest the wealth expended 
in teaching the worker and maintaining him during the extra 
years of his education--subtracting, of course, whatever was 
earned by the pupil before his education was completed--in 
short the sum so expended would tend to yield, precisely in 
the same way and to the same extent as any other capital, a 
return proportioned to the amount and the period of invest­
ment."68 
However, because of inequality of wealth, certainly highly skilled 
professions tend to be much better paid than would be justified by the 
investment. There is a built-in advantage for better-off people, who 
alone can afford the investment. 
Anticipating Marshall, Sidgwick regarded the return to labor of 
superior quality to the extent it represented "natural aptitude" as 
something analogous to rent. He cites lawyers and physicians as examples 
of those whose remuneration includes elements of rent as well as 
monopoly price. 
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Where the commodity produced by rare skill is valuable 
on account of its special qualities, real or supposed, the 
reward of such skill may be compared to the high rents 
obtained by the owners of famous vineyards...while again, so 
far as the services of any one individual have—or are 
believed to have unique qualities, his remuneration is of 
course determined under the conditions of strict monopoly. 
Sidgwick discusses the issue of monopoly in connection with 
combinations of workers and their effect on wages. He thinks that the 
only way to raise wages of combination above wages in industries for 
similar skills is by restricting supply. Where wages are fixed by the 
union, demand for labor may go down sharply if there is a substitute 
for labor. Fall in profits may cause movement of capital to other 
industries, or if demand in product market should be inelastic, burden 
of higher wages would fall on consumers. He concluded that in general, 
combination did result in higher wages. This is in marked contrast to 
Marshall, who though he generally emphasizes the principle of substitu­
tion, argued in the case of trade unions attempting to raise wages that 
the attempt would only depress the economy. 
Like J. S. Mill, Sidgwick attached considerable importance to 
custom in determining distribution and suggests that material diver­
gences from competition are due to custom and often related to prevail­
ing notions of equity. 
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Case for Government Intervention in the Economy 
Sidgwick agreed that there is a great deal of truth in the defense 
of the system of natural liberty as leading to the greatest social 
utility for consumers (society) and minimum cost production by producers. 
Obviously, however, even at its best, a number of qualifications must be 
made to the postulate that the theoretical system of perfect competition 
Is best and that government Interference should be at a minimum. 
According to Sidgwick, this is so when the utilities of economies 
Include not only immaterial and material utilities but also utilities 
derived from love of power, love of ease, etc. Secondly, while people 
may be relied upon to make the best judgement about use of wealth for 
themselves they do not necessarily provide for such best use ('produc­
tive of greatest utility') in their bequests which are made subject to 
conditions of their use. The question is whether bequests should be 
subject to restrictions. The answer would depend upon the balance of 
the gain in utility from freedom to use capital of those who inherit 
against the possibility that testator will have less Inducement to 
produce and preserve wealth. A similar dilemma exists in respect of 
enforcement of contracts. For example, restriction has to be placed on 
men contracting themselves into slavery. Where is the line to be drawn 
for enforcement or nonenforcement? Thirdly, and here Sidgwick antici­
pates welfs&s economics, economic production involves outlays in the 
present for results in the future. Persons may not have the capacity 
for making such outlays. This is causcd by existing inequality and 
causes greater inequality in so far as the scarcer higher skilled labor 
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is paid more highly than if wealth were more equally distributed. This 
means that society also suffers because such services are rendered less 
abundantly than would be the case if the labor and capital of the 
community were most productively employed. For society would pay a 
price more than sufficient to repay the outlay necessary to provide 
these skills but it would not be profitable for anyone to make the 
investment to be repaid out of the educated laborer's salary. "In this 
way it would be profitable for the community to provide technical and 
professional education at a cheap rate, even when it would not be 
72 profitable for any private individual to do this." 
Moreover, Sidgwick was clear that laissez faire does not mean that 
an individual is the best guardian of his children's interests. The 
law has to protect children and oblige adults to look after children. 
Education may be too expensive for the poor so that the government can­
not compel a universal minimum of education without assistance. There 
is moreover an improvement in efficiency for society which cannot be 
appropriated by employers. 
"...the community derives an economic gain from the education 
of its younger members," wrote Sidgwick, "so far as they are 
thereby rendered more efficient laborers which the self-
interest of private employers cannot be relied upon to pro­
vide, owing to the difficulty of appropriating the advantage 
of the increased efficiency. Hence, a national provision for 
education may to some extent be considered and justified as 
a measure for improving national production."73 
Sidgwick recognised the cssa of education as one of a larger class 
which involved nonappropriability by private entrepreneurs of the social 
benefits conferred. 
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"The above is only one of a large and varied class of 
cases" according to Sldgwick, "in which private interest cannot 
be relied upon as a sufficient stimulus to the performance of 
the most socially useful services, because such services are 
incapable of being appropriated by those who produce them or 
who would be otherwise be willing to purchase them. For 
instance, it may easily happen that the benefits of a well-
placed lighthouse must be largely enjoyed by ships on which 
no toll could be conveniently imposed."74 
Thus Sidgwick adds public goods to goods which involve positive exter­
nalities such as education, which call for governmental intervention. 
Other examples cited by him are forest preservation to equalize and 
moderate rainfall, scientific discoveries, protection to native indus­
tries in so far as this is justified (the short-term cost to the con­
sumer is justified by the long-term gain; the justification for govern­
ment protection lies in the fact that the original entrepreneur makes 
it profitable for later entrepreneurs), and streets and bridges. 
The case for government ownership is further justified on the basis 
that the entrepreneur might otherwise appropriate the social gain. 
Private enterprise may sometimes be socially uneconomical 
because the undertaker is able to appropriate not less but more 
than the whole net gala of his enterprise to the ccii3mur.ity, 
for he may be able to appropriate the main part of the gain of 
a change causing gain and loss, while the concomitant loss 
falls entirely on others.75 
Thus, Sidgwick also has the case of negative uncompensated effects on 
third parties which justify government intervention. 
Finally, Sidgwick points out that monopoly reduces supply below 
competitive supply and raises price above it. But sometimes monopoly 
is inevitable as in provision of water and supply of gas to urban areas. 
Tliere is a definite conflict of private and social interest here which 
calls for regulation by government in order to protect the public 
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interest. Sidgwick does not deny that it might be expedient for govern­
ment to help private joint stock companies liberally even where monopoly 
migjit arise. But in such instances government should have the right to 
regulate rates after the initial period or nationalize the companies with 
payment of compensation. Thus where monopoly has advantages, the govern­
ment has to choose between government regulation and management. 
Sidgwick is careful to point out that failure of the competitive 
system is not ipso facto justification for government intervention which 
must be decided upon in the light of, 1) the danger that growing power of 
government will be wrongly used; 2) the danger that the economic function 
of government will be exercised in favor of special interest groups, and 
3) the danger of wasteful expenditure by government. 
Functions of Government in Relation to Industry 
Sidgwick's outline of government functions went beyond defense, 
law and order, protection of property, enforcement of contracts, and 
tnairitenancs of coaaunicationB in clearly defining the right of property 
and limiting it, in supporting government ownership and management of 
transportation and means of communication, and in requiring measures 
such as labelling of products and licensing of qualifications and 
standards of occupations such as physicians and surgeons where qualifi­
cations and standards are vital to preservation of life, and prescribing 
safety regulations for dangerous work such as in mines, 
He struggled with the question of the limits of the rights of 
property according to the system of natural liberty. The right to 
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property is defined as the right to deny absolutely use and enjoyment 
of any material thing over which the right has been acquired. He saw 
the ri^ t to land as limited by the land required for common use. But 
more importantly, he felt that the right of bequest was based upon posi­
tive rather than natural law and therefore the limits to the right of 
property should be set from practical considerations such as extent and 
feasibility of evasion by gifts before death, necessity to maintain 
incentive for production after death, etc. What perhaps was unusual for 
his time was his opinion that government restrictions on private prop­
erty in the contents of the earth might become important in the context 
of exhaustion of natural resources. 
His arguments for government ownership and management of transpor­
tation included; 1) economies of scale under unified management; 2) the 
prospect that some important utilities would not otherwise be provided 
at all or be of inferior quality or more expensive; 3) prevention of pri­
vate monopoly, and 4) the fact that social benefit exceeded private bene­
fit. 
The Principles of Distributive Justice 
Sidgwick is unique among classical economists before Marshall, if we 
except the socialists, for his discussion of the role of government in 
the economy and of the principles of distributive justice. He confronted, 
as the Marxian socialists often did not, the concrete problems involved 
in attempts at too rapid systematic change. Neither did he, like the 
laissez faire economists, take the principle of private property for 
granted. 
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Sldgwlck did not attack private property because it was historical­
ly rooted in the aggression of one man or group of people against others. 
"Any plausible attack on private property," he wrote, "must 
be based on objections not to its origin, but to its actual 
operation; and similarly, if the absolute justice of the insti­
tution is to be maintained, it must not be merely because it 
actually exists, but because it is abstractly reasonable."76 
Sldgwlck examines the view that the full right of private property 
is an indispensable element of the right to liberty. The libertarians 
of the 18th and 19th centuries held that a just social order secures to 
individuals equal freedom but that whatever inequalities in the enjoy­
ment of material means of happiness might actually result from the exer­
cise of this freedom, while perhaps to be deplored, was not to be 
forcibly prevented by the action of government. 
Sldgwlck argues that if by freedom is meant simply the antithesis 
of physical coercion, then "the most perfect realization of the freedom 
of each so far as compatible with the freedom of others" would not 
include the establishment of private property at all. It would entitle 
the individual to protection from interference while actually using any 
portion of material wealth in the same way as he is protected while using 
roads, commons, etc. But this amount of freedom, said Sldgwlck, is 
compatible with the extremist communism. If on the other hand, the 
notion of equal freedom Is extended to include equal opportunity for 
gratifying desires, then "it does not appear how equality of freedom can 
be realized so far as any appropriation is allowed which renders things 
of the kind appropriated unattainable, or more difficult of attainment 
by others." To grant the latter would result in taking away the basis 
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of private property in land and through land, all other property built 
up from appropriated land. 
While disputing thus that the right to equal freedom implies the 
right of private property, Sidgwick is equally in opposition to the 
socialists who interpret freedom as the right of labor to its produce. 
This involves, says Sidgwick, the right to preliminary appropriation of 
the material which labor fashions. He argues that the conclusion of 
economic theory that wages are equal to the final utility of the ser­
vices contributed by the worker is not entirely satisfactory from an 
economic as well as a moral point of view. It is unsatisfactory from an 
economic point of view because the workers' wages, if governed by mar­
ginal product of labor, are subject to the unforeseen decreases in the 
demand for the product labor produces or some increase in the supply of 
the particular kind of labor involved. The worker is not responsible 
for either of these kinds of changes and yet is their victim. The moral 
point of view suggests that labor should be rewarded not by achievement 
but by "effort," in harmony with the notion that the merit of an act 
lies in intention rather than result, but the principle involves many 
difficulties in application. He therefore concludes that if the demand 
for equity is to be included in distribution, it would mean that 
"differences in remuneration due to causes other than voluntary exer­
tions of the laborers' remunerated should be reduced as far as pos­
sible. Fair wages are then defined as "market wages obtained under 
78 the condition of the least possible inequality of opportunity." His 
general conclusion is thus that marginal productivity is an appropriate 
144 
criterion under conditions where inequality of opportunity, whether due 
to natural circumstances or due to the institutional makeup of society, 
is at a minimum. 
Herein lies the basic difference between Sidgwick and the laissez 
faire school. The latter believed that the system would reduce 
inevitable inequalities of opportunity to a minimum and free mobility, 
etc. would ensure that labor got market wages. But Inequalities of 
income would continue to exist which is only appropriate because people 
should be entitled to the results of ancestor's labor and care. Sidgwick 
did not recognize any natural right to property and felt that practical 
considerations of efficiency and equity should determine the extent and 
limits of property rights. He believed that since it is difficult to 
prevent the effects of monopoly, nationalization of monopolies is 
justified by considerations of production. Similarly, nationalization 
of land Is justified as the community is entitled to the unearned incre­
ment of land but cannot easily appropriate it under a system of private 
property in land because of the difficulty of separating earned from 
unearned parts of rent. (He did not, however, recommend for most 
communities immediate nationalization because he felt that the gains from 
private ownership exceed the gain in equity of distribution. There is 
no doubt that Sidgwick's predilections towards socialism were more often 
than not overcome by his fear that change would reduce the productivity 
of the society.) 
Sidgwick defends trade unions' efforts to reduce the profits of 
employers by combinations to raise wages but again, does not recommend 
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it as an acceptable principle for the equitable distribution of 
produce. 
We have earlier noted that Sidgwick recommends government provision 
of cheapened education not only because the cost would be repaid to the 
community in increased productivity but also as an offset to the extra 
return--over and above interest on investment in human capital--obtained 
by the children of capitalists from the scarcity value of their skills. 
Sidgwick justifies an interest rate for "delay" because labor has 
gained by this delay due to the increase in its productivity. But at 
the same time he points out that private ownership of this producer's 
wealth is not a condition of this gain. Savings could be made before 
distribution of the national product to the community. Accumulation 
does not depend upon private ownership, said Sidgwick. The community 
could make the decision as to division of "produce" between saving and 
investment, "...all the 'saving* required could (emphasis Sidgwick's) 
be done without being paid for, if it were done by the community pre­
vious to the division of the produce." There are no principles o£ 
abstract equity that require the continuance of the existing system of 
distribution which first allows individuals to divide up the whole 
national income and then promises them future payments for saving. The 
only basis of objection is that a system that disappointed expectations 
might not be conducive to economic growth. "I object to socialism, "he 
writes, "not because it would divide the produce of industry badly but 
79 because it would have so much less to divide." Thus his objections to 
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socialism are moved away from considerations of abstract justice, to 
those of "economic" ones which are utilitarian. 
The Principles of Economic Distribution 
Sidgwick interpreted equity as "proportionnent of the individuals' 
share of produce according to desert" which he understood to mean, 
according to marginal productivity in a situation of minimum inequality 
of opportunity. From the point of view of abstract justice removal of 
inequalities would be justified by the principle of equity only as a 
means to this primary end. 
On the other hand, from an economic point of view, he interpreted 
the Jevonian utility principle to imply that the more equal distribution 
is the more economic. The principles that; 1) increase of wealth leads 
to increased happiness to its possessor, and 2) the resulting increase 
of wealth, but stands in a continually decreasing ratio to it led, 
according to Sidgwick, to the 'obvious' conclusion that "the more any 
society approximates to equality in che distribution ox wealth auoug 
members, the greater on the whole is the aggregate of satisfactions 
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which the society in question derives from the wealth It possesses." 
Sidgwick is careful to point out that the above conclusion is subject 
to the conditions; 1) that national income is not affected by the change 
in distribution and 2) the change does not diminish the happiness of 
the community from other sources than increase of wealth. But at the 
same time, it is clear that he assumed as true the possibility of 
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Interpersonal comparisons of utility as well as the diminishing 
marginal utility of wealth. 
In fact, Sidgwick perceived that increased utility might lead to 
lower produce (national income) due to increased preference for leisure 
of those whose incomes had Increased. Moreover, greater equality might 
reduce total savings. Even though under a socialist government, savings 
would not depend upon individuals, investment might not go up because 
government was not particularly enterprising. 
Sidgwick also feared that culture, which he felt is a product of 
the leisure activities of the rich, would suffer from greater equality. 
And so, drastic and quick (revolutionary) reductions of equality were 
81 to be avoided. 
He viewed favorably a gradual movement towards government ownership 
of capital and control. Only consumers' capital would eventually be 
owned privately. His ideal seems to correspond to that of the German 
socialists (followers of Bernstein). Socialism is regarded as desirable 
because of the ocny dcfccts of the laissez faire system both from the 
production and consumption points of view. But the desirable aspects 
of socialism would of necessity be based on the evolutionary nature of 
movement towards It. The ownership by government of all Industry would 
remove all causes of inequality of income except the contribution of the 
services of labor, especially if the state financed education so as to 
make it available to all. Government fixing of wages could not be by 
reference to a market price of labor as no market for labor would exist 
outside of government. Therefore wages would have to be fixed by 
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estimating the amount necessary to stimulate adequately to the acquisi­
tion of the required qualifications and to compensate for any special 
outlay or sacrifices involved in such acquisition. 
But Sldgwick could not entirely transcend the nineteenth century 
prejudices of bourgeouis intelligentsia with regard to the moral charac­
ter of the poor. His socialism had no place for "right to work" or 
"minimum wages," as they might erode the workers' Incentive to work hard. 
Moreover, government enforcement of a minimum wage would clearly need to 
be supplemented by a government guarantee of employment and he was un­
ready to accept both the financial burdens and disincentive effects 
involved. He did, however, endorse a tax on the employed to provide 
insurance for periods of unemployment. 
Public Finance 
Sldgwick's views on public finance show the same caution as 
exhibited in his espousal of evolutionary socialism. In the foreseeable 
future of his Own country, he visualized government provision through 
manufacture of goods in competition with private industry as well as 
exclusive government production of goods where there was a danger of 
private monopoly. He thought that government monopoly is better than 
private monopoly. If the good produced by the government monopoly was a 
dangerous luxury, the pricing principle would be one of maximum gain. 
In other cases, some gain to the treasury would be the normal rule. 
Normally price should be what it would have been if the commodity or 
service had been produced by private industry. This could be a 
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competitive price. In such a case, the price might involve a subsidy to 
the buyers of the government produced product. As there would be no 
justification in equity for government to provide a bounty for such a 
special group, compensating adjustments should be made in the whole 
system of taxation. Sidgwlck also considered the case of services to 
different classes of consumers such as provided by railways and regarded 
price discrimination based on differences of demand as legitimate. 
Where government provision of services Involved direct and 
measurable benefits to Individuals, taxes should be on the basis of 
amount of services rendered. But since a large part of government 
expenditure is not of this kind, the equal sacrifice principle is 
appropriate for taxation, except so far as it is thought desirable to 
make taxation a means of redressing the inequalities of income that 
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would exist apart from governmental interference. Sldgwick was how­
ever extraordinarily cautious about fully endorsing redlstributive 
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taxation because of its adverse impact on capital accumulation. He 
did Support thê ëxëuipclûri o£ û mliïIuîUiu lucûïuc frOm pcïSOnâl inCOtiic uôX 
as well as with considerable trepidation, progressive taxation of 
Income. He had no such reservations about an inheritance tax as he did 
not think it had the same adverse effects on investment as taxes on 
income (even excluding savings). The limits of inheritance taxes 
should be decided on the basis of practical considerations of degree 
of evasion by gifts that was likely. 
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Political Economy and Private Morality 
Sidgwick felt that the art of political economy is incomplete 
without some consideration of the principles that ought to govern pri­
vate conduct in economic matters. And it was his conclusion that the 
"morality of common sense" discussed in detail in Chapter II had indeed 
been modified by economic considerations. 
Firstly, economics has modified the view of charity by showing the 
circumstances under which charity is opposed to the interests of the 
community. Secondly, "Economic considerations," said Sidgwick, "have 
had an important part in defining the current conceptions of the more 
stringent duties of justice and equity. 
As pointed out in Chapter II, the idea of justice is associated 
with precise claims for the nonfulfillment of which a man is liable to 
strong censure, if not to legal interference. Equity on the other hand 
is often beyond the sphere of legal intervention. But the demands of 
equity are equally pressing. One may not expect gratitude for being 
equitable but one should expect blame for not being equitable. 
As was noted in Chapter II, there are claims determined by law 
independently of contract and claims arising out of contract—explicit 
or tacit. In addition, expectations arising out of custom may restrict 
the operation of contract or give rise to claims that are not of a 
contractual nature (claiffis of pareuLS in children, etc.) or give rise to 
claims to reparation for damage inflicted. Usually, the exchange ideal 
is opposed to the sway of custom and economic discussions tend to 
invalidate quasi-moral obligations founded on custom pure and simple. 
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Thus laissez-faire economists in the 18th and 19th centuries, says 
Sldgwlck, supported the idea of selling at the highest price even if the 
buyer were in an extremity but viewed competition as modifying this 
tendency. The competitive price was regarded as a "fair" or a "morally 
right" price. But economics does not and cannot condemn extortion in 
the sense of charging a price higher than competitive price or paying 
lower wages than needed for subsistence. Such a situation is charac­
terized, Sldgwlck remarks, as 'want of benevolence' rather than 'lack of 
justice.' 
If competitive price is 'fair' price, monopoly price is to be dis­
approved but suggests Sldgwlck, disapproval has not been great by 
economists who have merely praised the harmony of the system of natural 
liberty. 
Sldgwlck was troubled by the moral dilemma of capitalism, and the 
difficult question of reconciling the pursuit of material advantage with 
the need to find in Individual work and living, social purpose and ful­
fillment. One is led to fundamental quêâkloûâ, lié eoriClUucô: 
Whether the whole individualistic organization of 
industry, whatever its material advantages may be, is not open 
to condemnation as radically demoralizing. Not a few enthusi­
astic persons have been led to this conclusion, partly from 
a conviction of the difficulty of demonstrating the general 
harmony of private and common Interest even if we suppose a 
perfectly administered system of individualistic justice, 
partly from an aversion to the anti-social temper and atti­
tude of mind, produced by the continual struggle of competi­
tion, even where it is admittedly advantageous to production. 
Such moral aversion is certainly an important, though not the 
most powerful element in the impulses that lead thoughtful 
persons to embrace some form of socialism. And many who are 
not socialist», regarding the stimulus and direction given 
by the existing individualistic system as quite indispensable 
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to human society as at present constituted, yet feel the 
moral need of some means of developing in the members of a 
modern community a fuller consciousness of their industrial 
work as a social function, to the welfare of the whole 
society--or at least of that part of it to which the work 
is Immediately useful.®^  
The dilemma is still present ninety years after Sldgwick wrote 
these words. He was certainly more pessimistic than his great contem­
porary, Alfred Marshall, whose faith in the consequences of economic 
growth for the shared Ideals of human betterment in a society that he 
expected to grow more equalitarian, was more absolute. 
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*^ Henry Sidgwick, op. cit., p. 286. 
^^ Henry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 282. 
^^ Henry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 295. 
""'Henry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 319. 
^^ Henry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 323. 
S. Jevons, op. cit., pp. 188-212, 
^^ Henry Sidgwick, op. cit., p, 373, 
^^ Henry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 334. 
^^ Compare Mill: "...the fact that a course of instruction is 
required of even a low degree of costliness, or that the labor must be 
maintained for a considerable time from other sources, suffices every­
where to exclude the great body of laboring people from the possibility 
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labor-R.V.). J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy» vol. I, 
p. 376. Marshall writes: "The professional classes especially, while 
generally eager to save some capital for their children, are even more 
on the alert for opportunities of investing in them...but in the lower 
ranks of society...the slender means and education of the parents, and 
the comparative weakness of their power of distinctly realizing the 
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84 
Henry Sidgwick, op. cit., p. 581. 
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CHAPTER IV. SIDGWICK'S ECONOMIC ETHICS AND MODERN 
VIEWS ON SOCIAL JUSTICE 
The significance of Sidgwick's application of his moral philosophy 
to economics and political theory makes him an important precursor of 
neoclassical welfare economics, the author of "the last comprehensive 
attempt to restate the principles of a free society in the Elements of 
Politics.^  He is also the expositor par excellence of a utilitarianism 
which at least until the publication of John Rawl's A Theory of Justice 
was the starting point of all discussions of social justice. This 
chapter summarizes the developments from utilitarianism into modern 
welfare economics, the controversy in recent years over the implicit 
contradiction between freedom and the utilitarian goal of maximizing 
aggregate or average utility in a given society and the recent important 
attempts to find an alternative doctrine by John Rawls and Friedrich 
Von Hayek. 
In moral philosophy, utilitarianism as well as other theories faced 
a major challenge from the publication of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
by Wittgenstein in 1922, from the leadership of Moritz Schlick of the 
school that came to be called the "Vienna Circle" and from the logical 
positivism of R. Carnap, A. J. Ayer, and Bertrand Russell. The 
development of Freudian psychoanalysis and the sociology of Vilfredo 
Pareto and Karl Mannheim reinforced this attack in terms of generating 
2 
what may be called ethical skepticism. In economics, the impact of 
logical positivism has been very great, leading to acute controversies 
not only between libertarians, liberals and Marxists but also among the 
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3 libertarians and continues to persist. Logical positivism as a 
4 philosophical method is in eclipse in philosophy. In ethics, with much 
dissatisfaction with both the 'Act' and 'Rule' utilitarian versions 
(explained later) of utilitarianism, it remained more or less dominant 
at least until the publication of John Rawl's A Theory of Justice. 
Sidgwick as Precursor of Welfare Economics 
In the history of economic thought, Sidgwick deserves a place, as 
Hla ïtyint has pointed out, "as a senior contemporary rather than a 
disciple of Marshall."^  We have noted in the previous chapter that he 
anticipated Keynes. In his consciousness of the failures of laissez-
faire and the importance he attached to such failures, he was unique in 
his time, especially as a member of the classical school of economics. 
Professor %lnt has also said about Sidgwick, 
He was the first to stress that far reaching distinction 
between the Production and the Distribution Welfare Economics. 
He also initiated the neo-classical method of concentrating on 
concrete exceptions to the general principle of free competi­
tion. Thus most of Professor Flgou's famous cases of diver­
gences between the social and the private net products may be 
paralleled in Book III of the Principles.^  
My Chapter III has summarized these contributions. 
Sidgwick, and Marshall after him, entered as pragmatists into the 
battle between the classical economists (Adam Smith, Ricardo, etc.) who 
viewed perfect competition as the setting for a dynamic expansion of 
economic activity (free rein to individual initiative, widening the 
area of the market, expansion of division of labor in the setting of 
growing population and widening technological possibilities) and the 
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utility economists (Jevons, Walras, Ménger and J. B. Clark) who con­
ceived of perfect competition as a theoretical model of general equilib­
rium under ideal conditions. Sidgwick's economics was a common sense 
economics that would yield practical results relevant to reforming the 
existing system towards a more just society. He was conscious of the 
concrete cases of the exceptions to the principle of competition as well 
as of the Importance of the institutional framework of competition for 
Increasing production. He was not prepared to regard forces like popu­
lation change and the technical aspects of production as exogenous to 
the 'primary' (in the opinion of the marginal utility school) problem 
of the efficiency of market forces in allocating given resources. 
Sldgwlck, moreover, was never prepared to forego consideration of 
"utilities not embodied in matter" in the interests of concentrating on 
the problem of maximizing material wealth. Since he came to his interest 
in economics from an interest in the relevance of utilitarianism to 
establish the norms of justice, he was profoundly interested in the 
problem of distribution. 
As we have seen in summarizing his economics, Sldgwlck was aware 
of the difficult methodological problems encountered in examining the 
issue of ideal distribution of wealth. His argument for political 
economy as an art rested precisely on the need to move beyond the pre­
cision area of quantitative measurements to the penumbra region where 
we have to make vague and uncertain balancings of different quantities 
of happiness. And he did not therefore hesitate in coming to the view 
that "a more equal distribution of wealth tends prima facie to increase 
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happiness."7 It Is true that because of his awareness of production and 
distribution as Integrally Interrelated parts of the economic process 
which together determined the aggregate product as well as its composi­
tion, he was reluctant to endorse any radical measures of Income redis­
tribution. As we saw in the previous chapter, he hesitated to endorse 
even progressive taxation because of possible adverse consequences to 
production. But where he felt that effects on production might not be 
so great, as in limiting the rights of Inheritance, he was prepared to 
go further. 
In terms of the marginal utility concept, Sldgwlck admitted the 
cardinal measurablllty and Interpersonal comparability of utility and 
concluded that redistribution of income would in fact maximize the 
g 
utility of society, which he regarded as an ethically desirable goal. 
The attacks on this utilitarian prescription for reform came from 
two sides, the positivlst rejection of the acceptability of Interpersonal 
utility comparisons which led to the increasing dominance of the Pareto 
criterion, and the objection from neo-utiiitarians who saw some version 
of average utility as a better criterion for just distribution than the 
maximization of aggregate utility criterion. 
Pareto rejected a "non-scientific" sociology and in his search to 
introduce a scientific conception of welfare, was led to the now famous 
criterion for optimality which states that any situation is optimal if 
all moves from it result in someone being worse off. As has often been 
pointed out, since the subset of choice situations where a movement from 
one to another constitutes an unambiguous improvement in the Paretian 
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sense is extremely small, it is overly restrictive. A few economists 
like Buchanan would restrict themselves to the strict Pareto criterion. 
Buchanan, in fact, would restrict himself further because, as he points 
out, welfare economics assumes "omniscience in the observer" in the 
sense that the observing economist is able to read individual prefer­
ences and such an assumption is not acceptable. No social scale can 
be constructed. Only Individual values exist as revealed through 
behavior. Therefore, the economist can only employ a "presumptive 
efficiency" criterion based on an estimate of his subjects' value 
scales. A specific change proposed on the basis of such a presumptive 
efficiency criterion would then be in the nature of a hypothesis which 
would be proved right or wrong according to whether or not it Is 
accepted either by consensus or a modified unanimity principle. 
Other avenues which have sought to overcome the limitations of the 
unanimity criterion are the Hicks-Kaldor-Scitovsky compensation prin­
ciple and the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function approach. 
12 Even though the ccnipenssticr. priuciplc has been sought to be 
applied in modern cost-benefit analysis, there is considerable dissatis­
faction with it. Rowley and Peacock point out in their recent work 
If transfers of income were costless, and if the process 
of identifying other collections of goods on the same com­
munity Indifference curves also was costless, there would be no 
need to invoke the hypothetical compensation criterion, since 
direct comparisons could be made and the appropriate Paretian 
judgements could be Implemented, In the absence of such con­
ditions, hypothetical compensation becomes a treacherous in­
strument, not least because of the problem of ensuring that 
those affected by the adjustment correctly reveal their 
preferences. 
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Mlshan has also demonstrated^  ^that even in the seemingly clear 
case where one collection has more of any good than an alternative 
collection, the compensation test approach results in contradietable 
alternatives that cannot be ranked by reference to allocative criteria 
and therefore need the introduction of distributional considerations. 
As Samuelson has rigorously demonstrated^  ^the social welfare 
function is free from the objections to the compensation principle, as 
a ranking of all social states should be possible and it is only 
required that the relations between these should be transitive and that 
the function need only be ordinally defined. Certainly, this approach 
peirmits economists to resolve the Faretlan dilemma by choosing welfare 
functions in which the Policymakers' preferences as between different 
income distributions are specified. At any rate, the preferences of 
a representative ruling group with regard to preferred income distribu­
tions are expressed as a value judgement and in a democratic framework 
may be rejected or accepted. (Admittedly, this approach skirts the 
problem of aggregation of individual welfares into social welfare, by 
leaving it to the political institutions of society to generate a con­
sensus on goals which is then viewed as the basis of the social welfare 
function.) Boulding's commenton the importance of making value 
judgements explicit is pertinent: 
One can dismiss fairly curtly the idea of a wertfrel 
system of evaluation; it is obviously preposterous to suppose 
that one can set up criteria for judgement which are somehow 
independent of ethical norms. Indeed, as we have seen, the 
ethical judgements involved in the Hicks-Kaldor variety of 
Welfare Economics—that people should get what they want and 
that trading is ethically neutral—are not merely ethical 
judgements but practically indefensible ones. In this 
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respect the welfare economics of the Bergson-Samuel type 
which postulated a general social welfare function is on 
much safer ground even though its conclusions grow more 
nebulous as they become more general. 
Contemporary Utilitarianism 
It would be useful at this point to briefly summarize some develop­
ments in utilitarianism in the fifties which led to the ethical theory 
of rule-utilitarianism. G. E. Moore had Interpreted utilitarianism, at 
the beginning of this century as "act-utilitarianism"—"the view that 
the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the conse­
quences, good or bad, of the action itself.The act-utilitarian view 
18 prevailed for almost a half century. An early attempt to revise act-
utilitarianism into rule-utilitarianism was that of R. F. Harrod in 
19 
"Utilitarianism Revised." Smart defines rule-utilitarianism as "the 
view that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by 
the goodness and badness of the consequences of a rule that everyone 
20 
should perform the action in the circumstances." 
J. 0. Urmson, in an influential article formulated an explicit 
version of rule utilitarianism in interpreting J. S. Mill as a rule-
21 
utilitarian. The main objection to the act-utilitarian version of 
utilitarianism arises from the belief that it conflicts with the claims 
of justice. À strong case for such a view was made by John Rawls in an 
22 
early paper. Rawls distinguishes between justifying a "practice" 
("any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines 
offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on and which gives 
23 
the activity its structure") and justifying a particular action 
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falling under it. Taking as an example the retributive (wrongdoing 
merits punishment) and utilitarian views of punishment ("punishment is 
justifiable only by reference to the probable consequences of maintain­
ing it as one of the devices of the social order")^  ^RawIs suggests 
that while the utilitarian agrees that punishment is to be inflicted 
only for the violation of the law, the difference between the utili­
tarians and retributivists is that utilitarianism seeks to limit the 
use of punishment only to cases where it can be shown to foster effec­
tively the good of society. This, according to RawIs, raises the ques­
tion whether the utilitarian in justifying punishment in terms of future 
consequences "hasn't used arguments which commits him to accepting the 
infliction of suffering on innocent persons if it is for the good of 
25 
society." Therefore, an additional principle which distributes rights 
to certain individuals has to be added to the simple utilitarian 
criterion, that of the greatest benefit to society subject to the con­
straint that no one's rights may be violated. 
It is therefore essential, says Rawls, to specify a general system 
of rules which are logically prior to particular cases and define 
offices, moves and offenses--in other words, set up a structure which 
involves the abdication of full liberty to act on utilitarian and pru­
dential grounds. These rules would be publicly known and regarded as 
definitive. Rawls concludes that where there is a practice, it is the 
practice itself that must be the subject of the utilitarian principle. 
In a later section of this chapter, we shall note that Rawls later 
abandoned even this concept of utilitarianism as unsatisfactory. 
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Another aspect of the dissatisfaction with utilitarianism was the 
utilitarian formula "the greatest good of the greatest number." C. D. 
Broad puts the objection aptly: 
If utilitarianism be true, it would be one's duty to try 
to increase the numbers of a community, even thougji one re­
duced the average total happiness in the members, so long as 
the total happiness in the community would be in the least 
increased. It seems perfectly plain to me that this kind of 
action.,so far from being a duty, would quite certainly be 
wrong. 
Sidgwick did indeed recognize that the maximum utility principle 
subordinated the question of justice to that of aggregate happiness. 
"It is evident," he wrote, "that there are many different 
ways of distributing the same quantum of happiness among the 
same number of persons, in order, therefore, that the util­
itarian criterion of right conduct may be as complete as 
possible we ought to know which of these ways is to be pre­
ferred..., Now, the utilitarian formula seems to supply no 
answer to this question: at least, we have to supplement 
the principle of seeking the greatest happiness on the whole 
by some principle of just or right distribution of this 
happiness. The principle which most utilitarians have either 
tacitly or expressly adopted is that of pure equality as 
given in Bentham's formula: everybody to count for one and 
nobody for more than one."^  ^
However, Sidgwick brings in the question of ùiâtribuLlùu only where 
there appears to be "no cognizable difference between the quantities of 
28 happiness involved in two sets of consequences respectively." In 
other words, the distribution criterion is not to be employed where 
there is a clear and obvious difference between two amounts of total 
happiness. This is precisely the point about utilitarianism that RawIs 
attacks. According to Rawls, utilitarianism postulates that 
Society must allocate its means of satisfaction whatever 
these are, rights and duties, opportunities and privileges, 
and various forms of wealth so as to achieve this maximum if 
it can. But in itself no distribution of satisfaction is 
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better than another except that the more equal distribution 
is to be preferred to break ties. 
On a charitable interpretation of Sidgwick, it is possible to suggest 
that Sidgwick had in mind the distribution principle as an additional 
choice criterion. But if this is so, it is legitimate to argue as 
Rescher does that the introduction of a new type of consideration, just 
distribution, "requires systematic coordination with the principle of 
utility. To hold Sidgwick's position consistently requires not a 
supplementation, but an abandonment (emphasis Rescher's) of classical 
30 
one-track utilitarianism." Actually, the following quote from Sidg­
wick clearly suggests that he rejected the principle of maximization of 
average utility generally 
"...if we take utilitarianism," he wrote, "to prescribe, as 
the ultimate end of action, happiness on the whole, and not 
any individual's happiness, unless considered as an element 
of the whole, it would follow that, if the additional popu­
lation enjoy on the whole positive happiness, we ought to 
weigh the amount of happiness gained by the extra number 
against the amount lost by the remainder. So that, strictly 
conceived, the point up to which, on utilitarian principles, 
population ought to be encouraged to increase, is not that 
dL which average happiness is the greatest possible,--... 
but that at which the product fortned by multiplying the 
number of persons living into the amount of average happi­
ness reaches its maximum. 
The Average Utility Principle 
32 
Professor J. C. Harsanyi in two seminal articles has argued for 
both a restoration of value judgements of a certain class and of 
cardinal utility. 
"Valus judgements concerning social welfare," he writes ; 
are a special class of judgements of preference, in as much as 
they are non-egoistic impersonal judgements of preference... 
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a value judgement on the distribution of income would show 
the required impersonality to the highest degree if the 
person who made this judgement had to choose a particular 
income distribution in complete ignorance of what his own 
relative position (and the position of those near to his 
heart) would be within the system chosen. This would be 
the case if he had exactly the same chance of obtaining 
the first position (corresponding to the highest income) 
or the second, or third, up to the last portion (corre­
sponding to the lowest income) available within that 
scheme."33 
The above passage is a remarkable anticipation of one of the elements 
of the contractarian view that RawIs was later to espouse. Harsanyi 
conceives that the above choice is clearly a choice involving risk so 
that "the cardinal utility maximized in value judgements concerning 
social welfare and the cardinal utility maximized in choices involving 
risk may be regarded as being fundamentally based on the same prin­
ciple."^  ^ In his 1955 paper, Harsanyi proves the above on the basis of 
the Van Neumann-Morgenstern-Marschak postulates. He thus arrives at a 
"Cardinal Social Welfare Function equal to the arithmetric mean of all 
individuals in the society (since the arithmetrical mean of all 
individual utilities gives the actuarial value of his uncertain pros­
pect, defined by an equal probability of being put in the place of any 
35 36 individual in the situation chosen)," ' 
RawIs objects to Harsanyi's way of estimating probabilities. 
"This question arises," he writes, "because there seems 
to be no objective grounds in the initial situation for 
assuming that one has an equal chance of turning out to be 
anybody. That is, this assumption is not founded upon known 
features of one's society."^7 
The question hinges on the use of subjective probabilities in the absence 
38 
of empirical probabilities estimated on the basis of empirical facts. 
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Harsanyi defends the utilitarian principle on the basis that in those 
cases where the maxitnin principle (explained later) will lead to reason­
able decisions, it is essentially equivalent to the expected utility 
maximization principle in the sense that the policies suggested by the 
former will yield expected utility levels as high as the policies sug­
gested by the latter would yield. But he writes. 
In cases where the two principles suggest policies very 
dissimilar in their consequences so that they are far from 
being equivalent, it is always the expected utility maximi­
zation principle that is found on closer inspection to 
suggest reasonable policies, and it is always the maximin 
principle that is found to suggest unreasonable ones. ^  
Two examples are cited. A society consists of a doctor with two 
patients, A and B, critically ill with pneumonia. There is enough anti­
biotic for only one patient. Of the two patients, A is basically 
healthy whereas B has terminal cancer whose life would be extended by 
several months if he was treated with the antibiotic. By the maximin 
principle, the doctor would treat B with the antibiotic whereas by the 
utility principle, the doctor would treat A. Harsanyi defends the 
latter choice as morally more acceptable. Similarly, if it came to a 
choice between spending money to educate a retarded person who would 
benefit little from it and a brilliant person who would benefit a great 
deal, the maximin principle would finance the retarded person whereas 
Harsanyi would help the brilliant person. 
I confess that in the above set of moral choices, I would opt for 
RawIs rather than Harsanyi because the healthy, able people are better 
able to help themselves, have been the recipients of advantages both by 
nature (genetically), environmentally (family upbringing, etc.) and by 
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history, whereas the Rawlsian would correct inequalities which are 
not inherent but derived from precisely the kind of elitist utili­
tarianism of Harsanyi. RawIs bases his defense on the Kantian prin­
ciple of "treating one another not as means only but as ends in 
themselves. 
41 Nicholas Rescher, assuming cardinal utility and the validity 
of interpersonal utility comparisons, discards the total utility 
principle for what he calls "an effective average" equal to average 
utility minus half the standard deviation from the average (subject 
to the condition that the effective average is equal to greater than 
half the average). Since the effective average equals average minus 
half the standard deviation, the condition amounts to the standard 
deviation being less than or equal to the average. He defends this 
criterion because "it can underwrite the preferability of one dis­
tribution to another without requiring that the preferred distribu­
tion be a Pareto improvement on its competitor.He adds that 
it would support the seemingly competing intuitions as to the 
nature of distributive justice, of Professor Tawney; 1) that in 
certain cases, inequalities can pay for themselves by resulting in 
a situation that conduces to the general good and 2) that "a lower 
average income with greater equality, may make a happier society 
43 
than a higher average income with less." 
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Classical Utilitarianism and the Question of Liberty 
RawIs has another fundamental objection to the maximum utility 
criterion in that it might violate the principle of liberty. 
"Thus there is no reason in principle," he writes, 
"why the greater gain of some should not compensate for the 
lesser losses of others, or more importantly, why the viola­
tion of liberty of a few might not be made right by the 
greater good shared by the many."^  ^
Utilitarians adopt for society as a whole the principle of rational 
choice for one man, thus necessitating an "impartial spectator"--a 
concept in modern welfare economics to which Buchanan, as we have seen, 
45 
also objects. Thus RawIs raises the fundamental issue of freedom 
versus authoritarianism, in the application of the utility principle in 
political economy. "Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinc­
tion between persons," he suggests.He therefore opts for the pri­
macy of justice which takes as given and inviolable basic liberties 
"...the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargain­
ing or to the calculus of social interests," he asserts.He concedes 
that utilitarians as individuals recognize the importance of liberty but 
argues that in principle, it implies the primacy of an individual's 
right to choose for society, in its name. 
"It is customary to think of utilitarianism as individual­
istic," he points out, "and certainly there are good reasons for 
this. The utilitarians were strong defenders of liberty and 
freedom of thought, and they held that the good of society is 
constituted by the good of individuals. Yet the utilitarianism 
Is not Individualistic at least when arrived at by the more 
natural courses of reflection, in that, by conflating all 
systems of desires, it applies to society the principle of 
choice for one man."49 
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In fact, as Rawls recognizees, J. S. Mill argued that the principle 
49 
of utility supports freedom but he is of the opinion that Mills' view 
guarantees equal liberties only under favorable conditions. 
"One must suppose," he writes, "a certain similarity among 
individuals, say their equal capacity for the activities and 
interests of men as progressive beings, and in addition, a 
principle of the diminishing marginal value of basic rights 
when assigned to individuals. In the absence of these presump­
tions, the advancement of human ends may be compatible with some 
persons being oppressed, or at least granted but a restricted 
liberty."50 
But Rawls himself, as we shall see in subsequent pages, assumes that 
his principles of justice apply only to presently developed societies. 
If, then we restrict our attention to the latter, it would seem legiti­
mate and realistic to assume that the tradition of liberty is suffi­
ciently strong to permit policies based on a distributive principle 
which weights such canons of distributive justice as equality (treatment 
as equals), needs, ability or merit, achievements, effort and sacrifice, 
contribution to the public interest and valuation according to the mar­
ket principle^  ^without infringing on liberty itself. The problem may 
not be so complex if the weighting is performed by the political repre­
sentatives of the population, in a constitutional democratic framework 
wherein the preferences of the population are revealed by the voting 
52 process. 
Sidgwick himself was emphatic that a good system of legislation 
ought first of all to impose on the government the obligation not to 
abridge the fundamental rights of individuals such as the right to free­
dom of speech and of the press, the right to freedom of assembly, free 
exercise of religion. He called these rights constitutional rights as 
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53 distinct from civil rights. With regard to the laws defining the 
primary civil rights of citizens, the first principle according to Sidg-
wick should be that "laws ought to be just or not unjust"^  ^not only 
in the sense of just administration of laws but also in the sense that 
all arbitrary inequality is to be excluded ("that persons in similar 
circumstances are to be treated similarly; and that so far as different 
classes of persons receive different treatment from the legislator, such 
differences should not be due to any personal favor or disfavor with 
55 
which the classes in question are regarded by him"). The second 
principle for right legislation to be distinguished from wrong is con-
duciveness to the general "good" or "welfare" interpreted as maximum 
happiness. 
But this still leaves open the question of the scope and limits of 
government with regard to civil rights. 
When we have agreed to take general happiness as the 
ultimate end, the most important part of our work still 
remains to be done. We have to establish or assume some 
subordinate principle or principles, capable of more precise 
application, relating to the best means for àLtaiïiiïig by 
legislation the end of maximum happiness. 
In deriving these subordinate principles, Sidgwick rejects the paternal­
ist view that the state may exercise legal control in the interest of 
the person controlled" "We are all agreed," he writes, "that in the 
main, the coercion of law is and ought to be applied to adult 
57 individuals in the interest primarily of other persons." He examines 
in detail individualism, the doctrine that 
What One sane adult is legally compelled to render to 
others should be merely the negative service of noninterfer­
ence, except so far as he has voluntarily undertaken to 
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render positive services; provided that we include in the 
notion of noninterference, the obligation of remedying or 
compensating for mischief intentionally or carelessly caused 
by his acts--or preventing mischief that would otherwise 
result from some previous act. ° 
As we have seen in Chapter II, Sidgwick denies that the principle 
of individualism can justify the institution of private property. The 
latter can be Justified only on the basis of utilitarianism to the 
extent it acts as an Incentive to production. But even utilitarianism 
does not justify the appropriation by private individuals of natural 
resources in a situation of scarcity (when appropriation by one means 
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nonavailability to another). In a detailed examination from an 
Individualistic-utilitarian point of view of a variety of issues such 
as social relations, property, contract, remedies for wrongs, prevention 
of mischief,he defends his proposals for socialistic interference 
("the requirement that one sane adult, apart from contract or claim to 
reparation, shall contribute positively by money or services to the 
support of others...I also apply this term to any limitation on the 
freedom o£ action or individuals in the community at large, that is not 
required to prevent Interference with other individuals, or for the 
protection of the community against the aggression of foreigners'')^  ^
as follows: 
Now no one who, under the guidance of Adam Smith, and 
others, has reflected seriously on the economic side of social 
life can doubt that the motive of self-interest does work 
powerfully and continually in the manner indicated; and the 
difficulty of finding any substitute for it, either as an impul­
sive or as a regulating force, constitutes the chief reason for 
rejecting all large schemes for reconstructing social order on 
soTûë Other than its present iridlvidualistic basis. The 
socialistic interference for which...I propose to offer a 
theoretical justification is here only recommended as a 
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supplement and subordinate element in a system mainly 
individualistic. ' 
Sidgwick also goes on to establish on a theoretical basis the incorrect­
ness of the conclusions of the "extreme advocates of a system of natural 
liberty" by a detailed consideration of the failures of a system of 
competition such as were outlined in Chapter III. 
Sidgwick's argument for greater governmental action is thus 
extremely cautious. He concludes that even where laissez faire leads to 
a clearly unsatisfactory result, its (governmental interference) expedi­
ency has to be decided in any particular case by a careful estimate of 
advantages and drawbacks, requiring data obtained from special experi­
ence."^  ^ I have dwelt at length with Sidgwick's views of the relation­
ship between utilitarianism and liberty to suggest that his cautious 
gradualism is not only a matter of personal temperament but a direct 
result of the quantitative marginal calculus of utilitarianism. The 
fears expressed about the potential of utilitarianism as a force against 
liberty seem to me to essentially emanate from the totalitarian phe­
nomenon of the twentieth century. The projection to the, at best, half­
hearted evolutionary socialism of Sidgwick's utilitarianism, of the 
dangers seen in Leninist socialism, is perhaps symptomatic of the trauma 
of contemporary experience rather than of any danger stemming from the 
utilitarian philosophy itself, if its undergirding by the guarantees of 
constitutional and civil rights (as in Sidgwick) is given due importance. 
Admittedly, the above is not a satisfactory rebuttal of RawIs from 
à theoretical point of view because utilitarianism does not in fact take 
an absolutist view of liberty. From an ideal point of view, one may, as 
178 
Rawls does, make liberty a prior condition for justice. But from a 
practical point of view, it may well be that the cautious marginalism 
of Sidgwick is a surer guarantee of liberty, at least in developed 
societies, than the fears of perfectionist Utopias would seem to sug­
gest. In a brilliant study of Utopia and revolution, Melvin Lasky 
suggests with much historical evidence that the dream of Utopia has led 
to more erosion of freedom in the past than the gradualism of the 
reformist.And it seems to me, that Sidgwick's utilitarianism is of 
the stuff of prudence of the reformist rather than of the passion of an 
idealist Utopian. 
Utilitarianism and Justice 
One of the reasons that utilitarians were dissatisfied with utili­
tarianism was because it conflicts with justice. Even taking as one's 
starting point rule-utilitarianism, it is not clear that a set of rules 
which enable society to maximize utility would necessarily be just. If 
conformity to rules did not produce just actions, they could not be 
right. And the rules would have to be supplemented to ensure their 
justice. Sidgwick recognized this 
...I think the wider and no less usual sense of the term jus­
tice in which it includes equity or fairness, is the only one 
that can be conveniently adopted in an ethical treatise; for 
in any case where equity comes into conflict with strict 
justice, Its dictates are held to be in a higher sense just 
...I treat equity, therefore, as a species of justice.,,. 
There is a difficulty here which is that if equity is to be a considéra 
tion that prevails over utilitarian considerations, utilitarianism as 
the supreme principle ceases to prevail. 
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Rawls makes an Important point in this regard. In utilitarianism, 
the satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself and this would 
count in deciding what is right. 
Thus if men take a certain pleasure in discriminating 
against one another, in subjecting others to a lesser liberty 
as a means of enhancing their self-respect, then the satis­
faction of these desires must be weighed in our deliberations 
according to their intensity, or whatever along with other 
desires. If society decides to deny them fulfillment, or to 
suppress them, it is because they tend to be socially destruc­
tive and a greater welfare can be achieved in other ways. 
And it is precisely because utilitarianism puts the good (happiness) 
before the right, that Rawls feels that his view of justice is superior. 
As he puts it, in justice as fairness, the concept of right is prior to 
that of the good. 
Rawls' Theory of Justice 
There is no doubt that the most formidable challenge to the utili­
tarianism of Sidgwick to date is that of John Rawls. John Rawls' 
Theory of Justice is of course much more than a critique of utilitarian­
ism. It is actually a more or less complete philosophical structure 
that stands as an enormously impressive intellectual achievement of our 
times. The Theory of Justice is of course the fruit of about twenty 
years of intellectual development in which the author moved from a some­
what utilitarian view to a full contractarian view. Robert Paul Wolff 
has recently raviawad^  ^tha development of Rawls' theory through three 
stages as exemplified in his paper entitled "Justice as Fairness" which 
appeared in the Philosophical Review in 1958, through the 1967 article 
"Distributive Justice" which appeared in Laslett and Runciman's 
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Philosophy. Politics and Society (Third Series) to The Theory of 
Justice. He has examined the three models and the changes made from 
one model to another by RawIs in response to criticism. What I propose 
to do therefore is to briefly summarize the Rawlsian theory of justice 
in comparative fashion with Sidgwick's utilitarianism. The task is made 
simple by the fact that this is precisely what Rawls does throughout 
The Theory of Justice. He juxtaposes his principles against those of 
utilitarianism. Brian Barry, in an interesting comparison of Sidgwick 
and Rawls, writes. 
We might represent Rawls as being to Kant as Sidgwick was 
to Hume and Bentham. Sidgwick turned the off hand references 
of Hume and Bentham to utility into a fully elaborated and 
carefully applied system. Similarly, Rawls may be conceived 
as putting into a rigorous and fully developed form the ideas 
of the utilitarian's main rivals, the men Rawls himself calls 
the contract theorists. 
As a matter of fact, there are many great similarities in the approaches 
of Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics and Rawls' Theory of Justice. 
Rawls believes that the primary subject of justice is che basic 
structure of society, "the way in which the major social Institutions 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of 
advantages from social cooperation,"^  ^ By institutions, he means the 
political constitution and the principal economic and social arrange­
ments. Rawls limits his discussion of the principles of justice to what 
he calls "a well-ordered society"--a society in which everyone is 
"presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institu-
72 tlons." His interest is in setting up a concept of ideal justice. In 
order to do this, he visualizes a state of nature which he endows with 
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particular characteristics suitable to deriving appropriate principles 
which all in the state of nature would agree to be the meaning of jus­
tice. The most Important assumption is that of "the veil of ignorance." 
Rawls describes it as follows: 
Among the essential features of this situation is that 
no one knows his place in society, his class position or 
social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the dis­
tribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, 
strength and the like. I shall even assume that the parties 
do not know their conception of the good or their special 
psychological propensities. The principles of justice are 
chosen behind a veil of ignorance. 
It is because people are not advantaged or disadvantaged in their choice 
of principles, that Rawls refers to the ensuing principles as "justice 
as fairness." The parties in the original position are regarded as 
rational (taking the most effective means for given ends) and not taking 
an Interest in one another's Interests. 
What principles would the parties in the Initial situation choose 
behind the veil of ignorance? Rawls' first approximation of these rules 
is as follows: 
First, each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for 
others. Secondly, social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both, a) reasonably expected to be 
everyone's advantage and b) attached to positions and offices 
open to all.'5 
The ordering between the first and second principles is lexicographic. 
It means that a departure from the institutions of equal liberty cannot 
be justified by greater economic or social advantages. Both these prin­
ciples are regarded as a special case of a more general principle: 
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All social values--liberty and opportunity, income and 
wealth, and the bases of self-respect--are to be distributed 
equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of 
these values is to everyone's advantage.76 
If "equally open" is interpreted to mean careers are open to 
talents (i.e. positions are open to those able and willing to strive 
for them) and is combined with the principle of efficiency (Pareto 
optimality applied to the basic structure of society)one gets the 
system of "natural liberty." The system of distribution that ensues 
from such a system would then be regarded as "fair" within the norms of 
the system. The "fairness" we ascribe to the system involves our 
acceptance as just not only of the results of the competition that 
ensures that income and wealth are distributed in an efficient way but 
also of the initial distribution of income and wealth, and of natural 
talents and abilities. 
If "equally open" is interpreted to mean equality of opportunity 
and is combined with the principle of efficiency, one gets a system of 
"liberal equality." The liberal system recognizes the arbitrary nature 
of the cumulative effect of prior distributions of natural talent, 
abilities and other assets in the existing unequal distribution of 
income and wealth and tries to correct for it by adding to the condi­
tions of careers open to talents the further condition of fair equality 
of opportunity for all. 
Rawls recognizes that welfare economists generally postulate that 
the principle of efficiency cannot serve alone as a criterion of 
justice. Rawls therefore postulates "the difference principle" which 
requires that social and economic inequalities be arranged so as to 
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benefit the least disadvantaged, at the same time that they are attached 
to offices open to all under conditions of equality. A combination of 
equality defined as equality of opportunity combined with the differ­
ence principle would yield what RawIs calls "democratic equality." 
RawIs would build these principles of "democratic equality" into the 
social system so that the question of distributive shares becomes a 
matter of pure "procedural justice"--the ensuring of a fair procedure 
such that the outcome is fair provided the procedure has been followed, 
Rawls then examines the structural characteristics of a just system of 
institutions such as a political constitution which guarantees the 
liberties of equal citizenship, the nature of the restraints on liberty 
(liberty may be rest ained only in the interests of liberty), liberty 
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of conscience, etc. 
Why would people in the original position choose the two principles? 
Rawls' answer is that there is "an analogy between the two principles 
and the maxlmln rule for choice under uncertainty. This is evident 
from the fact that the two principles are chose a person would choose 
for the design of a society in which his enemy is to assign him his 
place. The maxlmln rule tells us to rank alternatives by their worst 
possible outcomes: we are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome 
of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others. The persons 
in the original position do not of course 
...assume that their initial place in society is decided by a 
malevolent opponent... they should not reason from false 
premises. The veil of Ignorance does not violate this idea, 
since ân absence of Informâtiùn iâ nût mlslfiformàtion. But 
that the two principles of justice would be chosen if the 
parties were forced to protect themselves against such a 
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contingency explains the sense in which this conception is 
the maximin solution. 
An important question is, if the people in the original position 
do not know what they want, how will they choose? Rawls answers this 
question by his "thin theory of primary goods." Primary goods are 
defined as goods any rational person would want to have--"rights and 
81 liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth." The least 
advantaged in society are Identifiable because the index of well-being 
and the expectations of "representative men" of various groups can be 
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specified in terms of primary goods. The "representative person" 
needs to be defined. Rawls' problem is one of identifying different 
classes of persons—most disadvantaged, less disadvantaged, etc. He 
does not use for this purpose the concept of class or income groups. 
Instead, he postulates the concept of "the representative person." He 
defines such a person as follows: 
I suppose, then, that for the most part each person holds 
two relevant positions: that of equal citizenship and that 
defined by his place in the distribution of income and wealth. 
The relèvàiîL teprêBêritatlve men, therefore, are the représenta­
tive citizen and those who stand for the various levels of 
well-being.83 
Rawls recognizes that it is not quite satisfactory to identify these 
individuals by their levels of income and wealth. He has to make a 
further assumption that these primary goods will be sufficiently corre­
lated with those of power and authority to avoid an index problem. A 
certain arbitrariness would still remain in identifying "the representa­
tive person." 
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This assumption is not necessarily valid. The same difficulties 
of operationslizing the concept of class would at a minimum face anyone 
attempting to operationalize the concept of a "representative" person, 
especially, if one takes into account besides levels of income and 
wealth, power and influence. 
Utilitarianism and RawIs' Contract Theory Compared 
We have already considered some objections to the utilitarian 
view advanced by RawIs such as that considerations of justice and right 
are subordinate to those of good or utility, that the aggregate utility 
principle ignores the distribution problem, and that the average utility 
principle is also inferior to the difference principle because of the 
former's way of estimating probabilities.®^  Because the classical 
utilitarian is indifferent as to how a constant sum of benefits is dis­
tributed, the utilitarian distribution for the worst off would be worse 
than the distribution yielded by the difference principle. He offers a 
geometric proof of this assertion for a two person case assuming inter-
85 personal comparison of cardinal utility. 
An important point against the principle of utility adduced by 
Rawls is that not everyone benefits in the system, some having to fore­
go greater advantages in the interests of the whole. This would lead 
to instability of the social system. The concept of stability of the 
structure is quite crucial to Rawls. He believes that the two prin­
ciples of contract theory would be stable because 
...when a basic structure of society is publicly known to 
satisfy its principles for an extended period of time, those 
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subject to these arrangements tend to develop a desire to 
act in accordance with these principles and to do their part 
in institutions which exemplify them.®^  
The two principles of justice required, according to RawIs, less 
identification with the interests of others. However, this assertion 
depends crucially on Rawls' assumption of three psychological laws which 
presume a high degree of fellow-feeling and cooperation in family and 
society, and the absence of envy. If, moreover, the principle of 
utility operated in a framework of guaranteed constitutional rights, as 
Sidgwick assumed, the utilitarian society might have the advantage of 
stability with flexibility for change. 
The contract principle does provide for a conception of justice 
that gives expression to men's respect for one another, "...the 
principles of justice," writes Rawls, "manifest in the basic structure 
of society men's desire to treat one another not as means but only as 
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ends in themselves." That utilitarianism does not regard persons as 
ends in themselves is one of the strong arguments against it. Even if 
one goes by Bentham's formula "everybody to count for one, nobody for 
more than one" and concedes that the principle of utility treats persons 
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as both means and ends, Rawls regards the Kantian principle on which 
his distribution principle is based as distinctly superior. 
We have also considered the problem of the impartial observer 
necessitated by utilitarian theory. The approval of the impartial 
sympathetic spectator becomes the standard of justice in the classical 
version of utilitarianism of Hume and Sidgwick. The contract view, on 
the other hand, need not assume the altruism or sympathy of an observer 
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who responds to the conflicting interests of others as if they were his 
own. It need merely define impartiality from the standpoint of the 
litigants in the original position. 
According to Rawls, the utilitarian conception also suffers from a 
lack of definition of an institutional structure that ensures "pro­
cedural justice." 
"...the utilitarian system does not interpret the basic struc­
ture as a scheme of pure, procedural justice," he writes, "for 
the utilitarian has in principle anyway, an independent standard 
for judging all distributions, namely, whether they produce the 
greatest net balance of satisfaction. In his theory, institu­
tions are more or less imperfect arrangements for bringing about 
this end. Thus given existing desires and preferences, and the 
natural continuations into the future which they allow, the 
stateman's aim is to set up those social schemes that will 
best approximate an already specified goal. Since these arrange­
ments are subject to the unavoidable constraints and hindrances 
of everyday life, the basic structure is a case of imperfect 
procedural justice."89 
A major contribution of RawIs, if one does not take the libertarian 
view of Friedrich Von Hayek (considered in subsequent pages) or the 
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"entitlements" view of Robert Nozick, is that the difference principle 
does not provide an automatic premium to individuals who enjoy natural 
advantages because of genetic Inheritance (greater ability, intellectual 
merit, etc.) family inheritance (appropriate environment, etc.). These 
would result in higher incomes only if they are used in such a manner as 
to provide advantages to the least disadvantaged in society. The con­
tract theory agrees with utilitarianism in holding that the principles 
of justice depend upon the natural facts about men in society. But some 
have objected to utilitarianism because it might permit a system of 
slavery and serfdom, or other curtailments of liberty, at a theoretical 
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level. These institutions might be justified if actuarial calculations 
show that they yield a higher balance of happiness. The utilitarians 
argue that these calculations would normally go against infractions of 
liberty. But Rawls suggests that this depends on the validity of the 
utilitarian assumptions of similar utility functions for all individuals, 
diminishing marginal utility, etc. On the basis of such assumptions 
alone, and subject to their validity, can the utilitarians conclude 
that a given total income (ignoring production) is best divided equally. 
Whereas the contract theory which does not postulate private ownership 
(only a competitive economy is regarded as necessary) should not yield 
excessive inequalities. Rawls does not demonstrate this superiority 
conclusively. It is subject to the validity of his psychological laws 
and the absence of envy. It is not certain how helpful the difference 
principle would be in moving society from an actual situation of greater 
inequality to one of lesser inequality. Yet it is an alternative ideal 
to utilitarianism especially in the light of the letter's weakness with 
regard to recugnl^ lug thê claims of equity. 
We have already noted that Sidgwick's utilitarianism to a large 
extent subordinates distributional justice to considerations of economic 
efficiency. He discards any concept of moral deservingness or merit as 
a criterion for distribution as being impracticable because there are 
no criteria for merit which will command universal acceptance. He also 
subordinates any considerations of need to those of economic efficiency. 
(For example, he is even against a government system of poor relief.) 
He is reluctant even to endorse the principle of progressive taxation 
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because it might unduly erode incentives. He endorses distribution on 
the basis of marginal product as an equitable system. Thus Sidgwick's 
utilitarianism does not take us very far in terms of providing any 
substantial movement towards greater equality (though it offered a 
theoretical justification of equality on the basis of cardinally measur­
able diminishing marginal utility of income and interpersonal compari­
sons of utility). As we noted earlier, this is understandable in the 
context of the time in which Sidgwick wrote, and in terms of the British 
suspicion of Utopias since the experience of the Cromwellian common-
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wealth. 
The modern development of utilitarian principles of choice has 
become a very large and technical subject concerned with many of the 
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central questions of welfare economics. While it is possible to 
93 develop as A. K. Sen has done, a rigorous framework for aggregation 
of welfare as an approach to the analysis of collective choice, it does, 
to quote Sen, 
lack the sure-fire effectiveness of classical utiliLâriâïiiôm, 
which is one of its very special cases, but it also avoids the 
cocksure character of utilitarianism as well as its unre­
strained arbitrariness." 
Rawls' view recognizes that an institutional structure not only 
satisfied existing wants but shapes the wants and aspirations of men and 
that therefore the choice of institutions must be made on moral and 
political as well as on econoniic grounds. And ha vary definitely sub­
ordinates considerations of efficiency to the moral and political. 
Once the principles of justice are derived...the contract 
doctrine does establish certain limits on the conception of 
the good. These limits follow from the priority of justice 
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over efficiency and the priority of liberty over social and 
economic advantages (assuming that serial order obtains).95 
In his discussion of the economic institutions required for jus­
tice, Rawls separates the need for a system of markets in which prices 
are freely determined by supply and demand and the system of ownership 
of property. A market system can be based on a system of private 
property or socialist ownership. With regard to the rate of saving and 
the direction of investment, "a collective decision may determine the 
rate of saving while the direction of investment is left largely to 
individuals competing for funds.He separates prices (including the 
interest rate to allocate resources among investment projects and to 
compute rental charges for the use of capital, natural resources, etc.) 
as indicators for achieving efficient allocation of resources and 
incomes paid to individuals. (Wage income would represent market prices 
but he disagrees that the marginal productivity theory is satisfactory 
as a principle of justice. 
"What an individual contributes by his work," he asserts, 
"varies with the demand of firms for his skills and this in 
turn varies with the demand for the products of firms. An 
individuals' contribution is also affected by how many offer 
similar talents. There is no presumption, then, that following 
the precept of contribution leads to a just outcome unless the 
underlying market forces, and the availability of opportunities 
which they reflect, are appropriately regulated. This implies 
that the basic structure as a whole is just."9? 
Rawls thus does not prejudge the issue of the nature of the economic 
system needed to sustain the just society. 
Rawls also confronts the issue of political equality in a system 
of constitutional government. Constitutional government has not his­
torically provided the equality of political liberty. "Disparities in 
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the distribution of property and wealth that far exceed what is com­
patible with political equality have been tolerated by the political 
system," he writes, "Public resources have not been devoted to maintain 
98 the institutions required for the fair value of liberty." But RawIs 
skirts the issue of how to ensure political equality in the actual 
world, on the basis of the argument that his discussion is not intended 
as a theory of the political system but is a "way of describing an 
ideal arrangement, comparison with which defines a standard for judging 
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actual institutions." But he does modify the demands of ideal jus­
tice under certain circumstances as they relate to certain political 
liberties and the rights of fair equality of opportunity. 
To accept the lexical ordering of the two principles 
we are not required to deny that the value of liberty depends 
upon circumstances. But it does have to be shown that as 
the general conception of justice is followed, social condi­
tions are eventually brou^ t about under which a lesser than 
equal liberty would no longer be accepted. 
And he adduces the principle of compensation to those with lesser 
liberty. 
Rawls' well argued case for the two principles have added appeal 
especially because of the inadequacy of utilitarianism which no longer 
can employ the simplicities of cardinal utility and diminishing marginal 
utility and Interpersonal utility comparisons to support economic and 
social policy for greater equality. But Rawls' conception is that of 
an ideal. He has attempted to set an absolute standard which "the 
method of reflective equilibrium," as he calls it, will establish as 
valid, for all, for all time. We may object to his method, by which the 
principles are made to emerge from the original condition and the "veil 
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of Ignorance" by the inclusion and exclusion from the knowledge of 
people precisely the things that are necessary in order to arrive at 
the self-same principles. We may attack the maximln rule as being 
extremely pessimistic as Harsanyi does.^ ^^  But the most important 
objection to it in my view is that as an ideal, it is a Utopian 
vision, with the defect of all Utopias—they do not tell us how we 
get from here to there. The end is now illumined but there is no 
path to get to the light. The clear delineation of the end is no 
mean achievement, but in the absence of some attempt to describe the 
means, the vision is edifying but unhelpful. Robert Paul Wolff put 
it very well, 
When one reflects that A Theory of Justice is 
before all else, an argument for substantial redistri­
butions of income and wealth, it is astonishing that Rawls 
pays no attention to the Institutional arrangements by 
means of which the redistribution is carried out. One 
need not know many of the basic facts of society to recog­
nize that it would require very considerable political 
power to enforce the sorts of wage rates, tax policies, 
transfer payments and job regulation called for by the 
difference principle. The men and women who apply the 
principle, make the calculations, and issue the redis­
tribution orders will be the most powerful persons in 
society,...how are they to acquire this power? How will 
they protect it and enlarge it once they have it? Whose 
Interests will they serve, and In what way will the 
serving of those Interests consolidate them and strengthen 
them vis-a-vis other Interests? Will the organization 
of political power differ according to whether the prin­
cipal accumulations of productive resources are privately 
owned rather than collectively owned?^ ®^  
It is obvious that we need a theory of means as well as ends Co ensure 
social justice. 
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Hayek on Utilitarianism and Social Justice 
A major attack on utilitarianism as well as prevailing concepts of 
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social justice has been mounted by Hayek in his most recent works 
Law. Legislation and Liberty Vol. 1 Rules and Order. Vol. 2 The Mirage 
of Social Justice. 
In order to understand Hayek's view, it is necessary to summarize 
his theory of knowledge and society (I rely entirely on the above two 
volumes, without going back to his previous work). Hayek's starting 
point is his theory of knowledge which postulates that no one in society 
has or can have complete knowledge of all the relevant facts. Society 
functions by constant adaptation by millions of individuals to millions 
of facts which in their totality are not known to anyone. The insti­
tutions of society are not therefore the design of anyone but the 
evolutionary consequence of adaptation to environment so as to increase 
the chances of success of survival of groups. The rules of conduct that 
emerged did so in the sense that they were "observed" in action before 
being articulated as such. They came to be observed because of the 
superior strength they gave to the group. 
This theory of knowledge leads to the social theory that "order" 
in society is a social one. This grown order which is a seIf-generating 
or endogenous order ("spontaneous order" or "kosmos") is distinguished 
froin a directed social order based on a relationship of command and 
obedience ("organization" or "taxis"). Hayek calls the spontaneous 
order in which individual elements follow certain rules in responding 
to their environment on the basis of the success of past experience but 
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in which nobody has full knowledge of the totality of circumstances, 
"a free society." The rules of a free society are applied by individ­
uals in the light of their knowledge and purposes and their application 
104 is independent of any common purpose. The rules of an organization 
are different in that they presuppose the place of each individual in 
a hierarchy whose obedience to them depends on his place and particular 
ends indicated for him by superior authority. 
Interference by command in a spontaneous order, by depriving 
members of the chance to use their knowledge would not improve the 
spontaneous order, though it may be improved by revising the general 
rules on which it rests. The theory of the spontaneous order thus seeks 
to establish the futility of particular measures which political authori­
ty may choose to Impose as part of a program to realize a more desirable 
social structure. It follows that it is not possible to build a better 
society by intervention which seeks particular elements that are in 
themselves desirable. It is the heart of Hayek's thesis that the 
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in Its coercive power by the general principles to which the community 
has committed itself. Such constitutional principles moreover have 
never been fully articulated in constitutional documents but have 
evolved and become part of the vague perceptions of public opinion in 
the countries of the western world. 
These considerations reinforce Hayek's legal philosophy. Deliberate 
change is sought to be brought about in society by legislation. Legis­
lation, however, cannot redesign the entire legal system. 
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"Law making," asserts Hayek, "is necessarily a con­
tinuous process in which every step produces hitherto 
unforeseen consequences for what we can and must do next. 
The parts of a legal system are not so much adjusted to 
each other according to a comprehensive overall view, as 
gradually adjusted to each other by the successive appli­
cation of general principles to particular problems--
principles, that is, which are not even explicitly known 
but merely implicit in the particular measures that are 
taken."105 
It is Hayek's view that law precedes legislation and is 
coeval with society. The rules by which men learned to act as indepen­
dent members of society existed before they were articulated as such. 
They are what Hayek calls "end-independent" rules of conduct that under­
lie the spontaneous order. The judge is called upon to intervene only 
where actions of individuals affect other persons, and give rise to 
conflict because of differing expectations, which are legitimate within 
the existing framework of the rules of just conduct. It is then the 
task of the judge to tell people "which expectation they can count on 
and which not." Some actions such as when an entrepreneur manufactures 
a new product which replaces another, cause losses to producers of 
products displaced but these are necessary adjustments which should not 
be prevented. Thus general rules cannot protect all expectations and 
it is not the task of the judge to prohibit all actions which may cause 
harm to others. 
Hayek does not object to the intervention by legislation to remove 
the unequal weight obtained by some groups s«ch as landlords, amployars. 
etc. which would serve to eliminate discrimination by the law. Nor does 
he deny that social legislation may pgovidê certain services to 
specially unfortunate minorities "the weak or those unable to provide 
196 
for themselves," But he strongly objects to the social legislation 
which seeks to direct private activity towards particular ends and to 
the benefit of particular groups in the name of social justice. Hayek 
agrees that government should provide for some collective needs but 
suggests that there is a great danger that particular needs of groups 
is sought by them to be transformed into the general interest. 
Hayek puts himself in opposition to utilitarianism as it developed 
in the late eighteenth century (Bentham) whereby utility was thought of 
as a common attribute of the different ends served by particular means, 
rather than, as according to the earlier meaning of the term (Hume) an 
attribute of the means. He believes that only act-utilitarianism can 
claim to be consistent in basing the approval or disapproval of actions 
exclusively on their foreseen effects of utility. This implies full 
knowledge of the consequences of the act—we have come across this 
statement before. Hayek calls it "the factual assumption of omniscience." 
Such an assumption, he says, is never satisfied in real life. Should it 
be true, "it would make the existence of those bodies or rules which we 
call morals and law not only superfluous but unaccountable and contrary 
to assumption.On the other hand, 
No system of generic or rule-utilitarianism could treat 
all rules as fully determined by utilities known to the acting 
person, because the effects of any rule will depend not only 
on its being always observed but also on the other rules ob­
served by the acting persons and on the rules being followed 
by all other members of society. 
Hayek juxtaposes the theory of the spontaneous order and the utili­
tarian view, "The trouble with the whole utilitarian approach is that 
as a theory professing to account for a phenomenon which consists of a 
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body of rules, it completely eliminates the factor which makes rules 
108 
necessary, namely our ignorance." And he emphasizes again that the 
necessity of rules is due to the impossibility of knowledge of the 
particular effects of individual actions. 
Man has developed rules of conduct not because he knows 
but because he does not know what all the consequences of a 
particular action will be. And the most characteristic 
feature of morals and law as we know them is therefore that 
they consist of rules to be obeyed irrespective of the known 
effects of the particular action.^  
Rules reflect not only the importance of particular ends but the fre­
quency of their occurrence. "The only 'utility' which can be said to 
have determined the rules of conduct is thus not a utility known to 
acting persons, or to any one person but only a hypostatized utility, 
to society as a whole.The consistent utilitarian is thus driven 
to interpret evolution anthropomorphically as the product of design 
"and to postulate a personified society as the author of these rules. 
Hayek views a new rule as part of a system of rules that leads to 
less disappointment of expectations than the established rules. More­
over, he says, rules on which we count are mostly not prescribing 
particular actions but rules restraining actions—not positive but nega­
tive rules. Rules are relative to the society one lives in, and they 
"are a device for coping with our ignorance of the effects of particular 
actions. 
Rules of just conduct refer to such actions of individuals as affect 
others. But since in a spontaneous order, the position of each individ­
ual is the result of the actions of many other individuals and since no 
one has the power to assure that the separate actions of many will 
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produce a particular result for a certain person, rules of Individual 
conduct cannot determine what anyone's particular position ought to be. 
They determine only certain abstract properties of the resulting order 
but not its particular concrete content. The particulars of a spon­
taneous order cannot be regarded as just or unjust (only situations 
which have been created by human will can be called just or unjust) 
since they are not the intended results of particular actions. Thus 
what is called social or distributive justice has only meaning in an 
organization and is meaningless within a spontaneous order. 
Hayek's view of justice is that "...justice is an adaptation to our 
113 ignorance." The rules are independent and abstract. There are no 
positive criteria for justice, only negative criteria which show us 
what is unjust. Persistent application of the negative test of univer-
salizability attempts to eliminate conflict between rules, changes the 
system inherited by a generation but the negative test will not help to 
justify the entire system itself. 
"Social justice" is different £tOm "justice." As wc have seen, for 
Hayek justice is an attribute of human conduct which we have learned to 
exact because a certain kind of conduct is required to secure the forma-
114 tion and maintenance of a beneficial order of actions. It refers to 
the agreement to maintain and enforce uniform rules of procedure which 
"improves the chances of all to have their wants satisfied, but at the 
price of all individuals and groups increasing the risk of merited 
failure. 
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But there is no meaning to the word "social" in "social justice" 
according to Hayek. To attempt to examine the meaning of the attribute 
"social" only leads into "a quagmire of confusion nearly as bad as that 
which surrounds 'social justice' itself.Social justice as a term 
is meaningless as well in the context of a spontaneous order, because 
it is impossible to conceive of a set of rules by which individuals 
could govern their conduct so that "the joint effect of their activities 
would be a distribution of benefits which could be described as just, or 
any other specific and intended allocation of advantages and disadvan­
tages among particular people or groups.Hayek moreover contends 
that it is impossible for a free society to maintain itself while 
enforcing 'social' or 'distributive' justice because "for its preserva­
tion, it is also necessary that no particular groups holding common 
views about what they are entitled to should be allowed to enforce these 
views by preventing others to offer their services at more favorable 
118 terms." Hayek concludes "the current endeavor to rely on a spon­
taneous order according tc principles of justice ascunts to an attempt 
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to have the best of two worlds which are mutually incompatible." 
Many would not agree with the pronouncement of failure by Hayek on 
all attempts to combine the elements of freedom in the polity and the 
marketplace with elements of organization. Hayek's purist vision of a 
spontaneous order is only that and reality has found ways of combining 
both elements which far from being mutually incompatible may be essen­
tial to the social order of a developed society. We may note, in a 
brief personal comment on Hayek, that his justification of the 
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spontaneous order in which only 'justice' in terms of 'rules' for indi­
vidual conduct is meaningful depends crucially on his assumption of the 
impossibility of full knowledge. It is in marked contrast to Sidgwick's 
faith in reason, our ability 'in reflective equilibrium' (a term used by 
Rawls but very similar as a method in ethics to Sidgwick's morality of 
common sense. Brian Barry suggests that Rawls' reflective equilibrium 
"is surely a concept that Sidgwick would have acknowledged as a way of 
120 
characterizing his own aim") to arrive at not only what is good for 
the individual but for society. And surely, our ignorance is not so 
great that we cannot achieve an improvement in the conditions of life 
for all people in our societies. As we have noted in the section on the 
conflict between liberty and distributive justice as societal goals, it 
is not Utopian to work for the latter without jeopardizing the former. 
Rawls has gone further than anyone in explicating the meaning of 
ideal social justice, and in showing how far we are from the ideal even 
in the developed societies of the western world. Admittedly, the 
problem of means--the answers to the kinds of questions that Robert i'aul 
121 Wolff raises in connection with the means to attain justice is a 
very difficult one. But some societies in the modern world have surely 
shown that it is possible to ensure the fulfillment of "the right to 
survival" and to "eradicate poverty," without impairing political 
122 liberty. In any case, no society, least of all the affluent ones, 
can escape the responsibility to provide these minimum conditions. 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
Sidgwlck's Utilitarianism 
Henry Sidgwick's signal contribution, apart from providing a 
systematic critique of the intuitionist schools of ethics, consisted in 
his building out of the nonsystematic observations of Bentham on the 
felicific calculus, the well-argued, comprehensive system of utili­
tarianism. John Stuart Mill, in his influential Utilitarianism, had 
attempted to do the same, but because of a sense of fairness that per­
ceived only too clearly the flaws in Bentham, made so many qualifica­
tions in the latter's utilitarianism as to almost destroy the basis of 
the concept of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." More­
over, Sidgwick attempted to undo the harm done by Mill theough his 
introduction of the concept of quality of pleasure by reasserting the 
measurability of all kinds of happiness, by postulating a concept close 
to the modern idea of "revealed preference." 
Neither Bentham nor Mill had adequately reconciled the claims of 
egoism with universalistic hedonism. They had assumed that it was 
somehow natural for human kind to work for the good of the whole. 
Sidgwick refused to take this path. He recognized the claims of egoism, 
the discussion of which is elaborate and detailed. He also recognized 
that individuals are motivated by the claims of altruism, other peoples' 
happiness. Thus he confronted the conflict involved in these two values 
and sought a reconciliation between the two in his particular formula­
tion of utilitarianism. In doing so, he postulates what he regards as 
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the self-evident principle that the good of anyone, from a universal-
istic point of view, is of no more importance than the good of any 
other. Sidgwick's utilitarianism thus comes to rest on an "intuition" 
as to the fundamental principle underlying all morality. Sidgwick 
recognized that even when rationally developed, the basis of morality 
must be a fundamental intuition which seems reasonable to most persons. 
The question this raises is whether a Kantian imperative of the kind 
suggested above has to be restricted to one principle or may consist of 
many principles or goals which have to be recognized as valid and 
weighted in some way in order of their importance as judged by reason­
able, thinking persons. 
This is one direction of criticism against Sidgwick's utilitarian­
ism. Sidgwick himself recognized the inadequacy of the greatest happi­
ness principle and admitted, in the case of ties, an additional 
principle, that of equality. The principle of liberty he subsumed under 
utility both on grounds that a political order based on freedom was most 
conducive to happiness and that, with exceptions, economic liberty was 
essential to maximizing the national product. Dissatisfaction with the 
limited recognition Sidgwick gave to the principle of equality led on 
the one hand to the revival of the principle of average utility and on 
the other, to a search for a system that admitted pursuit of multiple 
goals. 
Utilitarianism is rejected also because whenever it leads to the 
justification of morally repugnant acts or institutions, it has to some­
how rule these out on the basis of judgements that give importance to 
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values other than either maximum or average utility. Rawls, for example, 
admits a plurality of ultimate values by which he would rank actions and 
Institutions. In the context of justice, he recognizes the principles 
of liberty and equality, with priority given to liberty. 
It is Important to recognize the limitations of both Sidgwlck's 
utilitarianism and Rawls contractarian view which admits the claims of 
both liberty and equality. Sidgwlck's utilitarianism uses "common 
sense morality" as a reference point. It is justified as providing a 
better guidance in cases where common sense morality leads to ambiguous 
or conflicting conclusions. Moreover, it is applicable only to incremen­
tal changes from the status quo. There is no room in Sidgwlck's system 
for major changes either in morality or politics or economic institu­
tions. This is a reasonable postulate within the framework of Sidgwlck's 
system as measurability and comparability may not be feasible between two 
totally different social states, but only between two states, one of 
which is but a marginal modification of the other. Where, therefore, 
major transformations of systems are involved, utilitarianism is of no 
assistance. Sldgwick thus deliberately restricts the operation of 
utilitarian calculation to incremental change In so-called "civilized" 
societies, those countries which are institutionally patterned after 
British constitutional democracy and share the values of western 
European civilization. 
A general argument can be made against the preference for marginal 
change even in affluent societies and that is the presumption that puts 
less weight on misery and unhappiness in an existing social state and 
214 
emphasizes the costs of attempting to eliminate this misery and unhappi-
ness by more than marginal measures that attempt systematic transforma­
tion. An aspect of social progress is the fact that it renders intol­
erable unhappiness and pain that was hitherto regarded as normal. 
Because societies, like human beings, have learned to live with much 
unhappiness in their midst, does not mean that they are not paying a 
high cost for the status quo. Sometimes, societies therefore need major 
changes. Often they may not be able to achieve such changes without the 
trauma that accompanies loss of faith in accepted values and political 
action by alienated dissidents that involve some costs. The problem with 
revolutionary or large scale transformation is not therefore that it is 
always inadmissible. The question is whether or not the costs of social 
change are temporary or permanent and whether the measure and duration 
of the suffering that change causes, balances not only against the 
happiness the change brings about but also the unhappiness and misery 
that it replaces. I am not of course ignoring the tendency of revolu­
tionaries to exaggerate the cost of existing unhappiness aâ well as Lo 
underplay the physical and human costs of revolutionary coercion in the 
new system. All I am arguing against is the tendency to reject revolu­
tionary change because it is revolutionary change on the presumption 
that its costs are greater than that of the status quo. This unwilling­
ness to consider the prospect of more than incremental change turns 
Sidgwick into a conservative who is attracted by and fears socialism 
at the same time. 
215 
Rawls too limits his view of justice to the developed societies 
patterned after the affluent western European democracies. He condi­
tions the importance of liberty to the historical situation of a, society 
and recognizes a trade-off between liberties and long-run benefits great 
enough to transform the less developed society. He goes so far as to 
almost negate temporarily for some societies his lexical ordering of 
liberty and equality. "To accept the lexical ordering of the two prin­
ciples; we are not required to deny that the value of liberty depends 
upon circumstances," he writes.^  All that is important in such cases 
is that present denial of liberties could be shown to eventually create 
social conditions wherein a less than equal liberty would not be 
accepted. 
Rawls' concession gives rise to the following objection. Why is a 
trade-off permissible only in some societies in which the present condi­
tion is one of the tyranny of tradition, economic backwardness and 
institutionalization of a relatively low order? Why should it not be 
permissible in the affluent democratic society where the practical need 
to diminish existing inequalities might involve a degree of compulsion? 
Rawls' answer is that "as conditions of civilization improve, the mar­
ginal significance for our good of further economic and social advan­
tages diminishes relative to the interests of liberty, which become 
stronger as the conditions for the exercise of the equal freedoms are 
2 
more fully realized." It can, on the other hand, be argued that the 
exercise of freedom is impossible for those without an assurance of 
minimum income and without a minimum level of wealth. As long as there 
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are even significant minorities in affluent societies for whom the 
assurance of liberty in the above sense is meaningless, the possibilities 
of a trade-off between liberty and minimum income for all should not be 
dismissed as inconceivable. As a matter of fact, RawIs is somewhat less 
absolutist in his lexical ordering of liberty and equality than appears 
at first sight in that he does seem to suggest that the priority indi-
3 
cated by the lexical ordering is only an ideal. 
It is not necessary to elaborate on the limited applicability of 
both utilitarianism and RawIs' ideal justice to presently less-developed 
countries. What has to be striven for here is a social state in which 
the vast majority of the population living under the triple dictatorship 
of custom, landlord and poverty have the assurance of minimum susten­
ance and employment. It is more than likely that in moving towards such 
a state, the wealthier sections of the population suffer loss in living 
standards and in the case of individuals opposing the institutional 
changes involved, physical coercion. What is to be deplored is not the 
xrî rv1 fnr* arhiAvin» rhanOA Kil l" fh A QUQfafnAH. 
long-term violence imposed by the new elite in the interests of con­
formity or what is called re-education for the new society. Even the 
choice between temporary revolutionary violence and political ineffec­
tiveness in its absence is unpleasant. Utilitarianism is not capable 
of delivering the right decision in such cases. But the measurable 
benefits in reducing inequality or reducing poverty levels may offer 
an ex-post criterion, if not tied to the priority of liberty. 
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Sldgwlck's Economics 
One aim that Sidgwick set himself in writing Principles of Political 
Economy was to establish the continuity of economic thought and to 
restore perspective on the debt English political economy owed to 
Ricardo and J. S. Mill, after the intellectual and methodological on­
slaught made on them by the historical school and Jevons. In this task, 
Sidgwick succeeded eminently. Marshall, who later attempted to do the 
same, found his endeavor to generate a neoclassical synthesis so much 
easier because of Sidgwick's work. 
Sidgwick also prepared the way for the neoclassical consensus on 
method, without abandoning his emphasis on the relevance of economic 
theory for economic policy and the economics of welfare which he called 
the "art" of economics. Moreover, Sidgwick was the first to clearly 
distinguish production welfare economics and distribution welfare eco­
nomics. The commitment to economic growth of Adam Smith was, according 
to Sidgwick, a normative predilection of economics which belonged to the 
realm of art. Sidgwick was also unique in pointing out the inter­
relationship between production and distribution. While others had 
merely emphasized the incentive or disincentive effects of a particular 
system of income distribution on production, Sidgwick also pointed out 
that the kinds of wealth produced depended crucially on the distribution 
of incomes in the economy. 
Sidgwick's discussion of economic growth, which he correctly inter­
prets as growth of per capita income, generally follows that of Adam 
Smith and J. S. Mill but is unusual in its emphasis on technological 
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progress. In particular, Sidgwick has a definition of 'invention' which 
is very close to the Schumpeterian concept of innovation. 
"We must extend the meaning of the term (invention-R.V.) 
he writes, "to include all expedients for saving labor or aug­
menting its utility; whether introduced in particular depart­
ments of industries, or in the great social organization of 
industries through exchange; and whether introduced with full 
deliberation by single individuals, or through the half 
spontaneous and unconscious concurrence of many."^  
Examples of inventions cited are the transition from barter to money, 
substitution of good paper currency for gold and even the adoption of 
the decimal system of measurement. 
It is Important to note that even though Sidgwick as moral philos­
opher started from the Benthamite view of happiness, as economist he 
regarded happiness as utility to signify "the intensity of the desire or 
the demand for the articles in question, as measured by the amount of 
other things, or of labor, that their consumers are prepared to give 
for them."^  This interpretation, akin to revealed preference, is in 
contrast to that of Jevons who interpreted 'useful* as that which gives 
pleasure and who measured utility in the Benthaaite way by the balance 
of pleasurable over painful consequences. 
In his discussion of value, Sidgwick is clearly a stepping stone 
from J. S. Mill, Cairnes and Jevons to Alfred Marshall. He stated the 
law of demand, explaining it by the law of diminishing marginal utility 
and distinguished between changes in quantity demanded ('extension of 
demand') and changes in demand ('rise or fall in demand'). He extended 
the concept of the margin ('final utility') to supply and revenue 
emphasizing that both supply and demand determine price. In discussing 
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price of commodities produced under increasing cost conditions, he 
formulated the equality of price and marginal cost as the equilibrium 
condition under competition. 
Anticipating Marshall and Rosentein-Rodan, he developed the concept 
of pecuniary external economies. In his discussion of interest, he 
suggests that one investment might, far from dinimishing the aggregate 
demand for investment, improve the opportunities for other investments.^  
Also anticipating Marshall, he develops the idea of quasi-rent. He does 
not use the term but regards the extra remuneration for labor of 
superior quality as "analogous to the high rent of fertile land used for 
ordinary agricultural purposes."^  
Sidgwick's examination of whether and to what extent the economic 
system conforms to the ethical norms of equity raises great expectations 
without producing any important new major formulations. He takes a 
utilitarian view of property. The justification or otherwise of 
property is made to rest on its effects. The right to property is then 
uéfêiiucu on grounds of eccr.cir.ic sfficicncy. While recognizing the 
elements of inequality involved in differences in skill, training and 
education due to inherited natural gifts or prior ownership of wealth 
which give rise to differences in remuneration, market wages as deter­
mined by supply of labor and marginal productivity are recognized in a 
qualified way as fair wages. The difference between fair wages and 
market wages is that fair wages are "market wages as they would be under 
g 
the conditions of the least possible inequality of opportunity." 
Sidgwick does indeed make a case for public financing of the education 
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of the children of the poor. But, subject as he was to the Victorian 
prejudice that assistance to the poor made them lazy and improvident, he 
was reluctant to propose any other measures that would improve their 
competitive chances. He did, however, support trade unions as an 
appropriate instrument of workers to raise wages though he was conscious 
of the limitations of the power of unions under conditions of free entry 
into unions and of the consequences of effective union power in increas­
ing unemployment. 
Even though Adam Smith had talked of human capital, and Sldgwick 
may not be regarded as being original in emphasizing human capital, his 
discussion of investment In human capital was contemporary in tone. He 
regarded education, technical knowledge and trained skills as forms of 
Investment in human capital. He distinguishes between human capital 
which is unique because of its "peculiar characteristic of nontrans­
ferability" and capital embodied In material Instruments. The former is 
called "personal capital." In the discussion on wages, he attributes 
amounts of time and money entailed by training. He speaks of the rates 
of return to education as well. Also, Sidgwick's discussion differs 
fundamentally from that of British economists, and anticipates that of 
J. B, Clark by including 'land' in 'capital.' However, he differs from 
the latter in making a case for the distinction between land and capital 
in the theory of distribution. 
Sidgwick's discussion of saving definitely anticipated Keynes in 
postulating a savings function that depends on income, "...we may 
221 
clearly lay down that the possible maximum of saving increases as the 
9 gross produce of labor (per head) increases, but in a greater ratio." 
Sidgwick is also clear that the annual produce (GNP) is equal to con­
sumption plus investment, which in turn is equal to consumption plus 
saving.It is, however, a definite weakness of Sidgwick that a 
reluctance to break decisively with John Stuart Mill and the classical 
economists made him very tentative about his own fresh ideas. He did 
not emphasize his break with older doctrine. 
Sidgwick was close to J. M. Keynes also in emphasizing expected 
profits (not realized profits) as part of the cost of production. 
"It may seem paradoxical to include in cost of 
production profits that are not yet realized," he writes, 
"but the paradox disappears when we consider that it is not 
the actual profit, but the expectation of profit, which, 
ceteris paribus, determines the flow of capital to one 
industry rather than another; which is thus the efficient 
cause of the variations in supply which raise or lower the 
market price. 
The role of profit expectations is also important to Sidgwick's explana­
tion of the existence of general overproduction. (But again, he is 
Keynesian in his contention that the existence of considerable unemploy­
ment is a normal feature of a developed free enterprise economy. He 
attributes it however to limited knowledge and imperfect communication.) 
He suggests that the estimate of profits to be made is typically liable 
to ebbs and flows and overproduction may be the result of a tendency to 
"overrate" the prospect of profits. 
Sidgwick's definition of the art of political economy as "economy 
applied to the attainment of some desirable result not for an individual 
12 but for a political community (or aggregate of such communities) 
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clearly marks the beginning of welfare economics as a separate discip-
13 line. Sidgwick has a brilliant description of competitive efficiency 
but argues rightly that the system of natural liberty tends to the most 
economic production of wealth, does not imply the further proposition 
that it also tends to the most economic or equitable distribution of the 
aggregate produce. 
As earlier noted, Sidgwick develops a comprehensive list of cases 
which are exceptions to laissez faire efficiency. He points out that 
laissez faire efficiency assumes appropriability, that the individual 
can always obtain through free exchange adequate remuneration for the 
services rendered. The lighthouse, where appropriability is not possible 
is cited as one example. Research, where uncertainty may negate the 
benefits of inventions, is another example. Roads and bridges are also 
examples of goods which should be provided by the state. No tolls are 
to be levied. 
Education is recognized as providing social gains in addition to 
private benefits and a case is made for public financing cf éducation as 
many poorer parents are unable to provide their children's education, 
thus depriving themselves of private benefits and society of additional 
social benefits. 
Public intervention would also be justified where production 
involves both gain and loss, but the major part of the gain is appropri­
ated by private enterprise and the loss has to be borne by third parties 
or society. The divergence between private and public interest is also 
marked in the case of natural monopoly and justifies some form of 
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intervention in the public interest. Sometimes, combination or public 
coercion, to regulate an industry, is essential to ensure regular supply, 
as in the case of fishing where it is to the interest of a minority to 
break the rules. 
Sidgwick's case of the inadequacies of laissez-faire at its competi­
tive best is both comprehensive and modern and constitutes his single 
most important contribution to economic theory. He may well be regarded 
as the father of welfare economics. However, he is cautious in his 
approach to government not only because of the threat to liberty pre­
sented by the increasing power of bureaucracy but by the amenability of 
government to be exploited by organized vested interests. As a utili­
tarian, he felt that the issue was to be resolved by weighting the costs 
of noninterference against the costs of coercion. 
This brief summary brings us to the end of our examination of Sidg­
wick's ideas. As the last in the tradition of moral philosophers who 
never lost sight of the integrative vision of the striving towards human 
bettsrsisnt which the specialized knowledge of particular disciplines 
would enrich, Sidgwick was overtaken by the intellectual revolution that 
had already made his kind of synthetic scholarship unfashionable. While 
his contribution to ethics, therefore, gained in importance over time, his 
not inconsiderable contribution to economics and particularly the ques­
tions he raised about justice, welfare, freedom and equality have been 
relegated to the background until recently. But issues ignored over time 
have a way of becoming important once again. Henry Sidgwick has gained in 
relevance as the issues he grappled with, justice and equity in the global 
and national system, have become the central concern concern of our time. 
224 
Footnotes 
J^ohn Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), p. 247. 
J^ohn Rawls, ibid., p. 542. 
J^ohn Rawls, ibid., p. 246. 
H^enry Sidgwick, Principles of Political Economy (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1901), pp. 123-24. 
H^enry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 63. 
H^enry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 277. Advantages of localization of 
industry are discussed in Henry Sidgwick, ibid., pp. 373-374. Reference 
to external economies that cannot be captured by entrepreneurs starting 
an infant industry are made in Heniry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 490. 
H^enry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 329. 
®Henry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 505. 
H^enry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 161. 
'^^ Henry Sidgwick, ibid., pp. 172-173. 
^^ Henry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 198. 
^^ Henry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 396. 
^^ Henry Sidgwick, ibid., p. 401. 
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